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Abstract: This thesis uses case studies of one unsuccessful, and three successful brownfield-to-
renewable energy projects to identify common barriers such projects face and how those barriers
can be overcome. The most significant barriers identified are those typical of brownfield
development: cleanup costs, liability risks, uncertainty, technical and legal complexity, and the
need to coordinate multiple stakeholders. These barriers can be overcome through strong
partnerships characterized by full cooperation among developers, property owners, regulators,
and local officials. Political and public support enables cooperation between public and private
stakeholders. This support is driven by an expectation that brownfield-to-renewable energy
projects will improve the city's image and stimulate development of the clean energy industry
locally.
The three successful projects received substantial public support. This suggests that locating
renewable energy facilities on contaminated lands is a possible solution to the siting
controversies faced by new renewable energy facilities, and by wind farms especially.
Renewable energy facilities offer a reuse option for brownfields that can coexist with ongoing
remediation. Carving-out less polluted parcels from large properties for phased development is a
strategy that has great potential to expand renewable energy development on brownfields and
provide property owners revenue that can facilitate complete remediation.
The thesis concludes with recommendations for local, state, and federal actions to encourage and
facilitate brownfields-to-renewable energy projects. Recommended local level actions include
incorporating renewable energy into municipal comprehensive plans and brownfield
redevelopment programs. Overall, recommendations emphasize facilitating the "carve-out"
strategy (i.e. use the cleanest parts of brownfields for new energy projects) and modifying
financial incentives to favor brownfield sites.
Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence Susskind
Title: Ford Professor of Urban and Environmental Planning
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to everyone who took time out of their busy schedules to speak with me about their
involvement in the projects studied and about the potential for renewable energy development on
brownfields:
Martin Doster, Robert Knoer, Andrew Riley, Chris Pawenski, Steve Walters, Paul
Curran, Elizabeth Weir, David Flynn, Norman Polanksi, Jennifer Harvey, Ralph
Miranda, Steve Hogen, Robert Cleary, Nils Bolgen, Paul Ellsberg, Chester
Wilson, Christine Slattery, Robert Colangelo, Dave Reynolds, and Gregory
Vanderlann
I give special thanks to Paul Werthman for granting me access to the former Bethlehem Steel site
in Lackawanna, New York, and to John Deth for taking me on a tour of the site. I am very
grateful to Dave Graham for arranging for me to meet the Solar City project team on short
notice, for picking me up at the airport in Chicago, and generally ensuring that my visit was a
success. Thanks to Tom Shepherd for finding time to give me his famous Toxics to Treasures
Tour. Special thanks are also due to Lori Ribeiro for digging through her personal archives to
share project documents with me that I probably would never have seen otherwise. I am also
very grateful to Molly Ekerdt for her advice and for sharing her contacts in Chicago.
I am grateful to my thesis advisor Larry Susskind for encouraging me to pursue the topic, for
always pushing me to do better, and for his dedication and responsiveness as an advisor. I thank
Carl Seidman and Terry Szold for serving on my thesis committee and for their thoughtful and
constructive comments.
I am deeply grateful to Blake Lipsett for her moral support, care, encouragement, and for
believing in me whenever I doubted myself. Thanks to Marian Jensen, Ian Axilrod, Brad Fraley,
Jacqueline Preston, and Joe Bolinger for their last minute copy-editing efforts. Any errors or
omissions are my own. Finally, I thank my friends and family for all they have done for me.
Table of Contents
List of Acronym s .................................................................................................................... 7
Chapter 1: Introduction................................................................................................................ 11
Presenting Case - Lake Calumet Cluster Site Energy Farm Proposal ................. 14
Case Introduction.................................................................................................................. 14
The Proposal: Drivers and Goals ...................................................................................... 17
Proposal Feasibility Analysis - Assessing the Environmental Contamination ................. 19
Cluster Site Case Analysis and Overarching Them es....................................................... 20
Hypothesis................................................................................................................................. 22
M ethodology and Research Design ...................................................................................... 23
Summ ary of Findings................................................................................................................ 24
Relevance.................................................................................................................................. 25
The Legal Landscape and Origins of "Brownfields"............................................................. 28
Challenges and Obstacles to Brownfield Developm ent......................................................... 33
Local Brownfields Program s ................................................................................................. 36
Chapter 2: The Brockton Brightfield ........................................................................................ 45
Introduction............................................................................................................................... 45
Site History and Environm ental Rem ediation ...................................................................... 46
Origins of the Brightfield Project and Early Concept Development .................................... 48
Feasibility Analysis and Securing Grants............................................................................. 52
Legal and Institutional Complications ................................................................................. 56
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 59
Chapter 3: Steel W inds, Lackawanna, N ew York ....................................................................... 63
Introduction............................................................................................................................... 63
Site History and Summary of Environmental Enforcement Actions.................................... 64
Rem ediation and W ind Farm construction ............................................................................... 66
Paving the W ay for W ind Developm ent in the Buffalo Area................................................ 68
N avigating the Regulatory Process and Project Financing.................................................... 74
Battling over PILOTs................................................................................................................ 82
"Looking Good", Im age M atters .......................................................................................... 85
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 87
5
Chapter 4: Exelon City Solar, Chicago, Illinois ...................................................................... 89
Introduction............................................................................................................................... 89
Site and N eighborhood H istory ................................................................................................ 90
Site Rem ediation and Solar Plant Construction.................................................................... 95
Putting the Project Together ................................................................................................. 99
Strong Political Support Enabled Full Cooperation................................................................ 103
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 107
Chapter 5: Cross-Case Com parative Analysis........................................................................... 109
Introduction............................................................................................................................. 109
Ow nership M odels .................................................................................................................. 109
Overcoming Common Challenges to Brownfield Redevelopment ........................................ 112
Cleanup Costs ..................................................................................................................... 112
Liability and Risk M anagem ent.......................................................................................... 113
Stakeholder Cooperation is Essential for Success. ................................................................. 114
The Im portance of Political Support....................................................................................... 115
Lessons for Local G overnm ents ............................................................................................. 117
Findings................................................................................................................................... 118
Recom m endations................................................................................................................... 120
Local A ctions ...................................................................................................................... 120
State A ctions ....................................................................................................................... 121
Federal A ctions ................................................................................................................... 123
Conclusion .......................................................... 125
References................................................................................................................................... 127
List of Interview s ................................................................................................................ 131
6
List of Acronyms
ACM Asbestos containing material
ARAR Applicable, Relevant, and Appropriate Requirements
ARRA American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
BAA Brownfield Action Age
BCP New York State Brownfield Cleanup Program
BF Brownfield
BSC Bethlehem Steel Company
BTEX Benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylenes
CBN Canadian Brownfields Network
CCA Carnow, Conibear and Associates
CEC New England Clean Energy Council
CDOE Chicago Department of Environment
CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
CERCLIS Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Information System
CGRM Coal gasification related materials
CREB Clean Renewable Energy Bonds
CSA Comprehensive Site Assessment
DOE U.S. Department of Energy
DOER Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources
DSIRE Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency
EAF Environmental Assessment Form
EAV Equalized assessed valuation
EERE U.S. DOE Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy
EIS Environmental Impact Statement
EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
ETA Economic Target Area
FIT Feed-in tariff
FWPW Former West Pullman Works
GEIS Generic Environmental Impact Statement
GHG Greenhouse gas
GTC Gateway Trade Center, Inc.
GWh Gigawatt hour
HDPE high-density polyethylene
HHRA Human Health Risk Assessment
HSWA Federal Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments
HUD U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
ICC Illinois Commerce Commission
IEPA Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
IJRL Illinois Jobs Recovery Law
IPCA Industrial Park Conservation Area
IRM Interim Remedial Measure
ITC Investment Tax Credit
kW
kWh
LLC
LNAPL
MACRS
MassDEP
MCP
MEPA
MOA
MRET
MOU
MTBE
MTC
MW
MWh
NEPA
NFA
NFR
NPL
NPV
NREL
NYSDEC
NYSERDA
NYSO
ORC
OSLMP
PAH
PBI
PCB
PILOT
PIP
PPA
PPM
PRP
PSEG
PSE&G
PTC
PV
RAP
RO
RAO
RAR
RCRA
RE
REC
RFP
Kilowatt
Kilowatt hour
Limited Liability Corporation
Light non-aqueous phase liquid
Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection
Massachusetts Contingency Plan
Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act
Memorandum of Agreement
Massachusetts Renewable Energy Trust
Memorandum of Understanding
methyl tertiary butyl ether
Massachusetts Technology Collaborative
Megawatt
Megawatt hour
National Environmental Policy Act
No Further Action
No Further Remediation
National Priority List
Net-present value
National Renewable Energy Laboratory
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
New York State Energy Research and Development Authority
New York Independent System Operator
Oxygen release compound
Onsite land use management plan
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons
Production-based incentive
Polychlorinated biphenyls
Payment in lieu of taxes
Public Involvement Plan
Power purchase agreement
Part per million
Potentially Responsible Party
Public Service Enterprise Group
Public Service Electric and Gas
Production Tax Credit
Photovoltaic
Remedial Action Plan
Remedial Objective
Remedial Action Objective
Remedial Alternatives Report
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Renewable energy
Renewable energy certificate
Request for proposals
RPS Renewable portfolio standard
SARA Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
SEC U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
SEPA Solar Electric Power Association
SEQR State Environmental Quality Review
SEQRA New York State Environmental Quality Review Act
SFA Slag Fill Area
SI Site Investigation
SRP Illinois Site Remediation Program
SWMU Solid waste management unit
TACO Tiered Approach to Corrective Action
TIF Tax increment financing
TPH Total petroleum hydrocarbons
TRP City of Chicago Tax Reactivation Program
TSCA Toxic Substances Control Act
USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
UST Underground storage tank
VCP Voluntary Cleanup Program
WECS Wind energy conversion system
WIRA West Pullman Industrial Redevelopment Area
This page intentionally left blank
Chapter 1: Introduction
The Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002
(Brownfields Act) defines a brownfield as "real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse
of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance,
pollutant, or contaminant."' These sites tend to be former industrial and commercial properties in
urban areas.2 Within the last year there have been several events indicating increased interest
and political pressure for combining brownfields redevelopment with renewable energy
generation. In January 2009 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) launched its RE-
Powering America's Lands Initiative to encourage the use of brownfields, mine-scarred lands
and other contaminated properties for siting renewable energy production. The EPA makes the
following argument for this strategy:
The advantages to siting renewable energy on contaminated land and mine sites may
include: critical infrastructure including transmission lines, roads and water onsite;
appropriate zoning already in place; the availability of large sites with few site owners;
reduced local opposition to renewable energy development; and the availability of many
government programs that support cleanup and reuse. In addition, reusing these sites
prevents the development of greenfield sites which serve as a critical carbon sink, protect
watersheds and wetlands, provide habitat, and provide raw resources. Renewable energy
is also an economically viable reuse for sites with significant cleanup costs or low real
estate development demand, and can provide job opportunities in urban and rural
communities, particularly where factories, mining and other manufacturing activities
have ceased operations. 3
The EPA and National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) collaborated to map the
renewable energy potential of the nation's brownfields, Superfund sites, Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) sites, and abandoned mine sites.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 provided $100 million
for the EPA's Brownfields Program, $6 billion for the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Loan
United States Environmental Protection Agency, ""Brownfields and Land Revitalization,"
http://epa.gov/brownfields/index.html.
2 Brownfields are not uncommon in rural areas. Common types of rural brownfields include closed mines, landfills,
and closed military bases. These can also be well suited to renewable energy facilities. There are examples of wind
farms and solar farms on these types of sites. , "Re-Powering America's Land: Renewable Energy on
Contaminated Land and Mining Sites "
http://www.epa.gov/renewableenergyland/docs/repowercontaminatedland factsheet.pdf.
3 "Data Guidelines for "Renewable Energy Generation Potential on Epa and State Tracked Sites" Maps ", ed.
OSWER Center for Program Analysis (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency).
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Guarantee Program, $16.8 billion for U.S. DOE Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable
Energy (EERE) and $1.6 billion for Clean Renewable Energy Bonds (CREBs). It also
authorized the U.S. Department of Treasury to provide Renewable Energy Grants equal to 30%
of the basis of the property for solar, fuel cells, and small wind turbines among other qualified
facilities.4
In January, 2009, The Urban Land Institute released a report on the potential of
Michigan's brownfields for renewable energy production. The report estimated that the state's
brownfields had a wind capacity of 4,320 MW and that photovoltaic arrays placed on the
remaining land under the turbines could produce 1,535 MW of electricity and would result in
substantial job creation. The Wilderness Society and the United States Conference of Mayors
sent a letter to congress on April 8, 2009.6 Referring to the joint mapping effort between EPA
NREL, they called on congress to include an incentive in the Renewable Clectricity Standard
legislation that prioritized brownfield sites for renewable electricity generation.
Interest is growing in other countries as well. In a letter to the Premier of Ontario dated
June 18, 2009, The Canadian Brownfields Network (CBN) advocates the use of feed-in-tariffs
(FIT) as a financial incentive for installing photovoltaics on brownfields. 7 CBN proposes that
municipalities could then lease brownfields to solar power developers while the site undergoes
bio or phyto-remediation thus creating a revenue stream for the municipality from what would
otherwise be a drain on the budget.
Brownfields have historically been difficult real estate transactions involving issues of
liability and multiple layers of regulations. This bureaucratic aspect of brownfields
developments has made their redevelopment a lengthy and risky process. Bureaucratic obstacles
include agreeing on and meeting environmental standards, legal issues of ownership and liability,
negotiating property transactions and establishing responsibility for maintaining site remediation
systems and site controls. Meeting the requirements to fully assess environmental contamination
and developing a remediation plan is often expensive and time consuming. Environmental laws
4 "Federal Incentives for Achieving Clean Energy Development on Contaminated Lands," U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/oswercpa/incentives/federalincentives.pdf.
5 Soji Adelaha et al. Potential Application of Renewable Energy on Brownfield Sites: a Case Study ofMichigan.
East Lansing: The Land Policy Institute. (2007)
6 http://wildemess.org/files/letter-to-Congress.pdf
7www.canadianbrownfieldsnetwork.ca/PDF/CBN%20Letter%20to%20Premier%2OMcGuinty%2OJune%202009_R
enewable%20Energy%20and%20Brownfields.pdf
governing the cleanup of polluted property create liability risks for owners, potential purchasers
and lenders that must be addressed before a site is redeveloped. Determining property owners'
liability for past contamination and possible public health consequences is quite complicated
particularly when there have been multiple owners over the life of the property.
Siting utility-scale renewable energy facilities has proven difficult as well. Utility-scale
renewable energy projects may be desirable because they can create economies of scale lowering
the cost per installed watt of capacity. Historically, public opposition has been a major obstacle
to the development of new energy facilities, often delaying them for years if not causing the
projects to be abandoned all together. Public opposition often stems from concern over safety,
environmental impact, the effect on property values, and concerns over cost and cost sharing.
Another source of friction is often a lack of agreement among stakeholders on the scope of
technical review needed to make decisions. The absence of a forum for considering costs and
benefits that includes genuine public participation and the failure to ensure timely and adequate
public participation are common downfalls as well. Still another source of conflict is the uneven
distribution of costs and benefits that means that some in a community may not receive benefits
commensurate with the extra burdens or risks that they bear.
This thesis seeks to answer the following questions and pinpoint sources of resistance and
political support. Does using brownfields increase or reduce the complexity of renewable energy
development? Will community support for utility-scale wind farms and solar fields be easier to
obtain when the site is a brownfield? Will the financing usually leveraged by utilities and others
in developing energy facilities be available when the site is a brownfield? It examines one
unsuccessful, and three successful brownfields-to-renewable energy projects in an effort to
highlight common barriers to developing large-scale renewable energy plants on brownfields,
illustrate how such barriers can be overcome, and develop policy recommendations to encourage
such projects. The projects studied are located in New York, Massachusetts, and Illinois.
Massachusetts is a leader in renewable energy policy and home to the Brockton Brightfield,
which is one of the largest such projects on the East Coast. New York is a leader in renewable
energy policy and home to the first urban wind farm on a brownfield. Illinois, and Chicago
especially, is a leader in brownfields development. Chicago is also known for being at the
forefront of urban sustainability programs. Chicago's first attempt to create a large-scale
photovoltaic array on a brownfield site as part of the Chicago Brightfield project failed and
serves as the presenting case of how barriers and challenges can derail a project.
The Lake Calumet Cluster Site Energy Farm Proposal discussed below serves as the
presenting case and clearly illustrates the challenges of developing large-scale energy facilities
on contaminated lands. It highlights overarching themes explored throughout the other case
studies. Just as in the presenting case, stakeholders in each of these projects had to deal with the
challenges of paying the cleanup and redevelopment costs, managing liability, accounting for
uncertainty, and coordinating multiple parties to work constructively and cooperatively together.
In addition to these challenges these projects had to successfully navigate the regulatory and
permitting process necessary to build a utility-scale wind farm or solar farm. How project
stakeholders in these three cases dealt with these challenges offers lessons for how others may
complete similar projects. Following the description and analysis of the presenting case I
describe the hypotheses tested by this thesis, and the methodology used to this. From there the
introductory chapter discusses the evolving legal context that has produced the brownfields
issue, the common barriers identified by the literature, and examples of local responses in the
form of comprehensive brownfields redevelopment programs.
Presenting Case - Lake Calumet Cluster Site Energy Farm Proposal
Case Introduction
Electricity issues were front and center in Chicago in 1999. In March the City had
reached a settlement over reliability issues with Commonwealth Edison (ComEd), the utility that
serves the Chicago area. However, the utility's record of poor reliability continued over the
summer with several neighborhood blackouts and several close calls. In August the Illinois
Commerce Commission (ICC) announced a thorough investigation of the utility's operations and
management. With pressure on the utility growing the City announced in early August that it
would partner with ComEd and Chicago Solar, a subsidiary of Spire Corp, in the first project
under a DOE's Brownfield to Brightfield Initiative. At the same time, the City of Chicago,
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA), and EPA were intensifying plans for
remediation and reuse of the Lake Calumet Cluster Site (Cluster Site), which is a "cluster" of
hazardous landfills and waste handling facilities in the heavily deindustrialized and polluted
Lake Calumet area on Chicago's South Side. William Abolt was commissioner of Chicago's
Department of Environment (CDOE) at the time. Dave Reynolds who worked under Abolt
describes him as a man with "big ideas." Abolt proposed the Cluster Site as a potential location
for an energy farm with a 500 megawatt (MW) natural gas peaker plant, landfill gas operations,
and 2.5 MW of photovoltaics. The proposal offered a sustainable reuse plan for the Cluster Site,
a good use for a portion of settlement funds the City would obtain through its March 1999
negotiated agreement with ComEd, and a site for the new peaker plant that was needed.
Southeast Chicago used to be one of the greatest centers of industry in the nation, and
still is a center of steel production. As of 2002, "Even with a 30 to 40 percent reduction in the
amount of steel produced [since its heyday], the area of southeast Chicago and northwest Indiana
remains the nation's largest steel producing and processing region by a wide margin."8 The Lake
Calumet area was transformed from a wetland oasis for wildlife, birds especially, to an industrial
powerhouse through the 1970s. It has largely been deindustrialized since then and in its current
state is an unusual juxtaposition between vast brownfields, a few remaining industries, and the
city's most important wetlands. It is critical habitat for birds. Over 200 species, including
herons and egrets, are known to visit the area annually. The Calumet area is also unique in the
City for offering vast acres of open land for industrial development. In 2001 it had at least 13
sites totaling 1,000 acres available for industrial development.
Up until the mid 1800s the Lake Calumet area was dominated by marshy prairielands and
was a prime spot for hunting and fishing. Beginning in 1876 the hydrology was altered
significantly as the areas waterways were engineered for shipping. Portions of Lake Calumet
and the surrounding rivers were dredged to make the waterways navigable for cargo ships and to
meet international trade standards. The first rail lines were built over the lake in the 1850s, and
"Today, so much rail has been laid that the Calumet area is North America's largest center for
intermodal freight shipping."9 In fact, "Over 9 million containers a year are shipped in and out of
the Calumet area-over twice that of any other U.S. metropolitan area."10
8 Department of Planning and Development, "Calumet Area Land Use Plan," (Chicago: City of Chicago 2001).
Page 10
9 Ibid. Page 4
10 Ibid. Page 10
Beginning in the 1860s the area became a center for pig iron and steel production. The
first steel plant was John Brown's Iron and Steel Mill at 119th Street. It was followed by U.S.
Steel in South Chicago in 1881 and Wisconsin Steel in South Deering. These towns were
annexed into the city in 1986. These were company towns:
At the time when the towns were new, it was a given that a man working at U.S. Steel
lived in South Chicago, and a man working at Wisconsin Steel lived in South Deering.
The fortunes of mills and towns were inextricably linked. Throughout most of the 1900s,
the steel industry was the dominant force that shaped both land use and culture in the
Calumet area."
Over the years other industries developed in the area included soap, paints, chemicals, and
cement, but the dominant industry was steel until the 1970s. By 1982, the steel industry was
collapsing. Southeast Side communities were devastated as mills closed taking supplier
businesses down with them. With much less money in the community, and many people out of
work, restaurants and shops closed too. The area has yet to recover.
Slag dumping began in Lake Calumet around 1900 and continued up until 1970.
Beginning as far back as the 1940s, 87 acres of marshlands near Lake Calumet that had been
strip-mined for sand needed for the nearby steel mills became a massive dumping ground for
large amounts of industrial and municipal waste from the greater Chicago region. Thousands of
chemical-filled drums, steel slag, and solvents were either illegally dumped in the strip mines, or
improperly managed at the former Album incinerator there.' 2
The Cluster Site is in the city's "dumping ground," which for better or worse is also an
area of tremendous ecological value. They are surrounded by several of the city's major
landfills, including Land and Lakes landfill to the west, Paxton II to the northwest, and Paxton I
to the North, which have checkered environmental histories themselves. The name Cluster Site
comes from a mid 1990s petition started by the Southeast Environmental Task Force asking U.S.
EPA to provide Superfund monies to address this group of individual but adjacent sites. The
petitioners' idea was to "cluster" or bundle the sites in order to qualify for the National Priority
List (NPL). Lake Calumet Cluster Site Workgroup formed around this petition and has been
meeting ever since.1 3 The Cluster Site consists of the Unnamed Parcel, U.S. Drum II, and the
"Ibid. Page 6
12 "Work Moves Forward on Lake Calumet Cluster Sites/Paxton I.I. Landfill Repair Maintenance," Environmental
Progress XXXIII, no. 1 (2007).
" Ibid.
Album Incinerator. The Unnamed Parcel actually includes hundreds of parcels for which there
are multiple owners. Nearby industries dumped industrial, chemical and municipal waste there
from the 1940s to the 1960s. Dumping of industrial and municipal waste also dates back to the
1940s at U.S. Drum II, where a solvent recovery and waste transfer facility was operated during
the 1970s. EPA removed and disposed of 6,000 drums and roughly 341,000 gallons of semi-
solid waste/liquids. The Album Incinerator was likely used as landfill before it became a
chemical incinerator from 1977 to 1983 when an explosion at the site led to investigations and
the closing of the incinerator.
The Proposal: Drivers and Goals
The energy farm proposal for the Cluster Site sought to address several issues the city
was confronting at the time. The City had recently reached a negotiated settlement with
ComEd. In 1997 Mayor Daly brought a law suit against Commonwealth Edison. He charged the
utility with violating its 1992 franchise agreement by lagging behind in system improvement
investments committed to in that agreement. In 1999 the City and the utility reached a
negotiated settlement which required ComEd to spend $1.25 billion to build substations and
transmission lines and pay the City $100 million over four years.14 The $100 would be paid in
allotments of $25 million per year to be used for investment in energy efficiency or renewable
energy projects.15 Additionally, ComEd's parent company, Exelon, had sold all coal-fired plants
to Edison Mission Energy. As a result of that sale, Mission Energy was required to build another
500 MW power plant. The City wanted the new peaker plant to be built at the Cluster Site as
part of the proposed energy farm. The Chicago Center for Green Technology had just been
established with Chicago Solar as the principal tenant. The City had been interested in the Lake
Calumet area for years because of its unique ecological value. The area contained the City's
largest wetlands and provided habitat to endangered species. The Cluster Site is located in the
middle of this special ecological area. The energy farm proposal was seen as a way to bring
revenue to calumet for ecological restoration as the electricity sales would be used to pay for site
remediation and ecological restoration.
1 Fran Spielman, "City Hall Lets Com. Ed. Cancel Plant in Return for $100 Mil.," Chicago Sun-Times, January 24,
2003.
15 David Reynolds. Telephone Interview by Author. April 1, 2010
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ComEd was under pressure to serve its customers better. It struggled over the summer of
1999 as several blackouts occurred in Chicago and the surrounding suburbs and by mid August
the Illinois Commerce Commission announced a thorough investigation into the company's
operations. A few weeks before on August 5th the City, ComEd, and Spire Solar Chicago
announced they would partner in the first "Brightfield" project under the U.S. DOE's new
Brownfield to Brightfield Initiative, which promoted redeveloping brownfields with solar
manufacturing, solar power installations, or both. Chicago Solar agreed to build a solar
manufacturing factory at 445 N. Sacramento, the former site of Sacramento Crushing, a
construction debris recycling facility that the City shut down in 1996 for violating environmental
laws. The City committed to a invest $2 million and ComEd would invest $6 million to place
solar panels on schools, museums, and other public facilities. 16 Spire would partner with the
City to develop a 2.5 MW photovoltaic array at the Cluster Site that would begin as a 500 kW
array and be expanded monthly until it covered 10 acres.17
In June, 2000 Mayor Daly and Governor Ryan announced the Energy Farm
Redevelopment Proposal for the Cluster Site. Based on a preliminary environmental assessment
conducted in 1999 by Ecology and Environment it was believed that the Cluster Site was a
contaminated brownfield with potential "hot spots." The energy farm proposal was based on that
assumption. Under this assumption the City's believed it could rely on revenue generated by
selling the electricity produced by the solar power plant and gas-fired power plant to fund
cleanup and acquisition of the Cluster Site. CDOE was involved because of the environmental
site assessment and remediation issues, the energy issues, and the responsibility for natural
resource management and ecological restoration. The Department of Planning and Development
manages the Tax Reactivation Program and the Calumet Open Space Plan. The Law Department
was involved both to deal with the legal aspects of environmental law and real estate
transactions. These three departments were to work together to implement the energy farm
proposal in cooperation with EPA and IEPA. For years the EPA had been convening the
Calumet Working Group, which was a citizen's group focused on cleaning up the illegal
landfills, increasing environmental scrutiny and improving the environment in the Calumet area.
16 Fran Spielman, "Solar-Energy Era Dawning for City, Corned at Ex-Dump," Chicago Sun-Times, August 5 1999.
17 Lori A. Ribeiro, "Does It Have to Be So Complicated? Municipal Renewable Energy Projects in Massachusetts"
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2006).
South East Environmental Task Force and Southeast Chicago Development Commission were
involved in Cluster Site Working Group.
Proposal Feasibility Analysis - Assessing the Environmental Contamination
In July 2000 EPA awarded a $100,000 Superfund grant to assess the Cluster Site and to
refine the ambitious plan to convert 6,000 acres at Lake Calumet to industrial and environmental
uses including the energy farm proposal. Commissioner Abolt told the Chicago Sun-Times that
the money would help answer questions such as, "Where are the hot spots to dig up? Do any
need to be capped? Which are the best wetlands to restore, and how?"' 8 The money was also to
be used to evaluate the best place to site the 2.5 MW of photovoltaics (PV) which would be built
in cooperation with Commonwealth Edison and was scheduled for completion in 2003.
Funded by the Superfund grant IEPA initiated an in-depth investigation of the Cluster
Site, installing 134 test pits ranging in depth from 4 to 30 feet below ground. All but one of the
test pits contained industrial, medical, and/or household waste. It and subsequent investigations
have indicated that the Album and U.S. Drum sites, for example, still contain wastes at depths of
more than 30 feet.19 The natural gas peaker plant was no longer feasible because the site was not
structurally sound. In August 2001 Harza Engineering Company completed a Comprehensive
Site Investigation that concluded that the site contained widespread soil and groundwater
contamination. A November 2001 Ecological Risk Assessment found that the site posed an
ecological risk to wildlife on the site. A Human Health Risk Assessment (HHRA) followed in
February 2002. It concluded that there would be carcinogenic and non-carcinogenic health risks
to unprotected site workers. A Remedial Options Report had been completed in September 2002
that proposed eleven remedial options ranging in cost from $18 million to $87 million. In
November 2002 CDOE concluded that the potential liability associated with the site and the cost
for remediation and abatement was much higher than originally anticipated. It was clear that the
energy farm would not produce sufficient revenue to fund the abatement work. The City was
also nervous about acquiring ownership and control of the site because of the liability and lack of
funding for abatement.2 1
18 Gary Wisby, "Superfund Grants Target Restoration of Wetlands," Chicago Sun-Times, July 14, 2000.
19 "Work Moves Forward on Lake Calumet Cluster Sites/Paxton I.I. Landfill Repair Maintenance." Page 7
20 "Lake Calumet Cluster Site Status Summary (Draft)," (Chicago: Chicago Department of Environment, 2002).
21 Ibid.
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With the energy farm proposal no longer feasible the City decided to work with EPA to
get the site added to the National Priorities List. Such a listing would provide access to Federal
Superfund monies for cleanup and create a pathway for the city to obtain liability protection if it
gained control of the site in the future. The Cluster Site was proposed for listing on the NPL in
2005 and added to the NPL on March 4, 2010.22
At the time of the Chicago World's Fair in 1893 the Lake Calumet area was subdivided
for residential development. Speculators successfully sold lots to visitors to the World's Fair,
who only after purchase discovered that they had been swindled and sold swamp land. As a
consequence most of the properties in the area had become tax delinquent and abandoned.
Consequently, sorting out ownership and associated responsibility in the area is extremely
complicated if not impossible. Because the Cluster Site were tax delinquent it was possible for
the City to acquire ownership through its Tax Reactivation Program. The City had a history of
acquiring tax delinquent properties and successfully redeveloping them through its Brownfields
Program when it had a viable end use established beforehand. In this case the City could not
justify acquiring a landfill that was not structurally sound for redevelopment. The Cluster Site
was much dirtier and more dangerous than originally thought and carried with it significant
liability the City was not prepared to accept. Ownership was extremely complicated. According
to David Reynolds, "Ownership is a big issue, without clear control of the Cluster Site no one is
going to build."
Cluster Site Case Analysis and Overarching Themes
The story of the Energy Farm Redevelopment Proposal for the lake Calumet Cluster Site
is illustrative of the major challenges facing brownfields redevelopment. These challenges are
the same whether the potential end use is renewable energy production or anything else. Clean-
up costs and fear of legal liability may be the two most critical issues in brownfields
redevelopment. Because of the technical and legal complexity of these sites their redevelopment
also involves lengthy and complicated administrative processes that are seen by many developers
as a disincentive to development.
22 "Superfund Site Progres Profile: Lake Calumet Cluster," U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
http://cfpub.epa.gov/supercpad/cursites/csitinfo.cfm?id=0500078.
23 David Reynolds. Phone Interview by Author. April 1, 2010
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Contaminated properties have to be cleaned up to standards deemed adequate to protect
public health, safety, and the environment. Depending on the type and extent of contamination
clean up can be extremely expensive. In most cases, particularly when a private developer is
driving remediation and redevelopment, a project's viability depends on whether the end use will
generate revenues greater than the cost of cleanup. In the case of the Cluster Site cleanup costs
turned out to be much higher than originally thought. Closing this economic gap is essential to
make development possible on challenging sites. One possibility for accomplishing this is
through increased government funding, tax credits, or other policy incentives. Developers can
also strategically take advantage of existing incentives. In the Steel Winds case a moderately
polluted brownfield is carved out of a larger more hazardous Resource Conservation and
Recovery (RCRA) property to take advantage of New York State's Brownfield Program
benefits. The modular nature of solar and wind power technologies are particularly well suited to
this strategy.
There are several issues related to legal liability. First there is the question of who is
responsible for the contamination and therefore liable for it. There is also a question of whether
the liability can be managed effectively. In the last twenty years a variety of programs and legal
tools have been developed to manage liability and facilitate redevelopment. State Volunteer
Cleanup Programs (VCPs), risk-based cleanup standards,2 4 innovations in environmental
insurance 25 , deed restrictions and other contractual real estate covenants have made it possible to
manage liability risks effectively in many cases.26 However, many potential developers are still
scared away from brownfields sites by potential liability issues. Liability issues were
complicated greatly in the case of the Cluster Site because the extent and hazardousness of
contamination on the site, and the complicated and murky chains of title associated with multiple
owners and long abandoned sites. This potential liability was greater than the City could accept.
In addition to the cleanup costs and liability brownfields present uncertainty that may be
greater than a developer is willing to assume. No one knows with absolutely certainty what is on
the site or beneath it until they dig there. Even when environmental assessments have been done
24 Nathan Graves, "Risk Management: Reducing Brownfield Cleanup Costs," Pollution Engineering 29, no. 8
(1997).
25 See William J. Warfel, "Brownfield Transactions: Identification of Environmental Liability Exposures," CPCU
eJournal (2007).
26 Robert Colangelo. Telephone Interview. March 31, 2010
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there is the potential that a hazard will be discovered during construction or redevelopment
preparation that could greatly increase the cost of cleanup. In order to succeed developers have
to have contingencies that enable them to deal with the unexpected. The Exelon City Solar
project offers a clear example of how such uncertainty manifests and how it can be managed
effectively.
The Cluster Site also exemplifies how site conditions can limit redevelopment options.
The area slated for the natural gas plant was discovered to be a structurally unsound landfill
making the site unsuitable for a peaker plant. More generally, the construction of engineered
barriers with clay, concrete, asphalt, high-density polyethylene (HDPE) or other materials is a
commonly used remedial measure that may limit what can be built on the site in the future.
Brownfield sites are also complicated because of the number of parties that need to be
involved to remediate them. This can be seen in the Cluster Site case. The City of Chicago was
one party, although it required significant involvement from at least three city departments:
Environment, Law, and Planning and Development. The IEPA and EPA were additional parties
directly involved in site assessment and potential cleanup. Support was needed from the
following parties as well: Exelon/ComEd, Spire Solar Chicago, Mission Energy, U.S. DOE, the
Southeast Chicago Development Commission, Southeast Environmental Task Force, and the
local alderman's office. Beyond these eleven (or thirteen if you count each city department
separately) the list could go on. It could include the potentially responsible parties (PRPs), of
which there were hundreds in this case, 27 as well as other community groups, government
officials, etc.
Hypothesis
I expected several factors to be necessary ingredients for overcoming the barriers
contaminated lands present for renewable energy development. Successfully completing
renewable energy development on brownfields depends on strong public support in the local
community and the active support of state, local, and even federal officials throughout the life of
a project. Success also requires close partnership between project stakeholders including
developers, property and environmental liability owners (these are not necessarily the same
27 USEPA identified about 400 potentially responsible parties that had sent waste to the area. "Work Moves Forward
on Lake Calumet Cluster Sites/Paxton I.I. Landfill Repair Maintenance."
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entities in the case of brownfields properties) and public officials. To overcome the complexity,
uncertainty, and risks of working on brownfield properties, project partners need to have good
working relationship that involves close cooperation, clear communication of expectations, and
free sharing of information. Also, the maturation of the renewable energy development market is
also important. This includes the maturation and expansion of state renewable portfolio standard
(RPS) policies and associated markets for renewable energy certificates 28 (RECs), increasing
willingness to invest in these projects among investors, and the establishment of a pool of solar
and wind power developers experienced in assembling corporate financing, marketing RECs and
developing power-purchase agreements in diverse settings.
Methodology and Research Design
This thesis uses a case study methodology to test the above hypotheses. Four in-depth
case studies, one of an unsuccessful project, and three of successful projects, highlight the
obstacles and risks that brownfields-to-renewable energy projects face and how they were
overcome. The presenting case highlights how risks, obstacles and barriers to siting utility-scale
renewable energy plants on brownfields can cause such projects to fail. The other three case
studies will illustrate how these barriers can be overcome. An extensive internet search revealed
relatively few (perhaps a dozen) examples of completed large-scale renewable energy production
projects on brownfields in the United States. My case studies are selected from among this
group. They involve relatively large scale projects, represent common types of contaminated
land sites, and illustrate different partnership models. Using cases that are quite different from
one another will yield a more comprehensive understanding of the common challenges these
projects must overcome. In addition to a literature review, I conducted archival research of
newspaper and journal articles, project related reports, presentations, websites and other
materials. Approximately 20 stakeholders from the various projects were interviewed.
Interviews were also conducted with environmental and brownfield regulatory staff, brownfields
28 A RPS requires utilities in the subject jurisdiction, usual a state, to supply a certain percentage of their energy
through renewable sources. RPS policies define what is qualifies as a renewable resource and establishes
compliance guidelines. A common characteristic of a RPS polices is that utilities demonstrate compliance through
the ownership of RECs, which they either produce themselves or purchase from another power producer. A REC
represents the attributes of one megawatt-hour of renewable electricity. For a comprehensive overview of the
treatment of RECs in RPS policies in the U.S. see Edward A. Holt and Ryan H. Wiser, "The Treatment of
Renewable Energy Certificates, Emissions Allowances, and Green Power Programs in State Renewables Portfolio
Standards," (Berkeley, CA: Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 2007).
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redevelopment and renewable energy professionals and advocates, and consultants and attorneys
who have worked with companies/developers to get a renewable energy project built on
brownfield sites. In many cases interview subjects fell into more than one of these categories. In
addition to the "nuts and bolts" of each individual project, interviews focused on which
regulations, processes, policies and other factors create challenges and facilitate development,
and what policy changes or additions may be beneficial.
Summary of Findings
I do not intend to suggest that these challenges can always be overcome. Indeed, in some
cases, like that of the Cluster Site, they may be insurmountable given the available resources.
However, the three case study projects presented in this thesis demonstrate that developing large-
scale renewable energy projects on complex contaminated brownfields can not only be viable
business projects but can also provide multiple community benefits. One important benefit is an
improvement in community image through improved aesthetics and the introduction of non-
polluting industry in communities that have historically had a concentration of dirty industries.
The projects produce revenue for local governments through property taxes, payments in lieu of
taxes (PILOTs), or lease payments. Other public benefits include educational opportunities,
tourism opportunities, and increased development interest in the surrounding area.
The cases also demonstrate that the arguments for siting renewable energy facilities on
brownfields have practical validity. The existing infrastructure on these sites, particularly
electricity transmission infrastructure, is valuable and facilitates renewable energy development.
Renewable energy technologies are aesthetically compatible with industrial sites and more easily
accommodated by industrial zoning. In all three cases studies the project received overwhelming
support from the community suggesting that brownfields may offer one solution to the siting
difficulties faced by new energy production facilities, particularly the difficulty of siting large-
scale wind turbines.
Renewable energy projects are similar other to development projects in many ways.
However, passive renewable energy projects like wind farms and solar farms differ from other
commercial development in at least one important aspect. They provide an option for a revenue
producing operation that can coexist with continuing remediation activities. They are a viable
use for sites with significant development constraints resulting from engineered or institutional
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controls. The modular nature of solar photovoltaics and wind turbines is well suited to
brownfield development in several ways. It may allow for flexible configurations and project
phasing such that these technologies can first be deployed on less polluted areas of the site while
remediation continues on other portions, or on areas with less potential for other commercial or
industrial development. As illustrated by the Steel Winds project, this allows for a novel
approach to reducing cleanup costs by dividing smaller less polluted properties out of larger
more severely polluted ones. Depending on state and local policies, this can allow a developer to
access brownfields tax credits and liability protection. Lease payments in this scenario provide
the owner of the larger more severely contaminated site revenue that can support remediation of
the entire site.
Relevance
For at least a decade there has been a federal agency promoting the use of brownfields
and other contaminated lands for renewable energy production, yet relatively few projects have
been completed in urban areas. DOE launched its Brownfield into Brightfield Initiative in 1999,
and the EPA officially began the RE-Powering America's Lands Initiative at the beginning of
2009. The DOE program met with limited success. Of the six pilot projects funded, the only
large scale facility completed was the 425 kW Brockton Brightfield.
There are still relatively few completed urban brownfields-to-energy facility projects, but
many are in the works. These include the ambitious Destiny mixed use development in Syracuse
New York which plans to meet all of its energy needs on site through a 16 MW municipal solid
waste plant and a 3.2 MW photovoltaic system on an adjacent structure; the Georgetown
development in Redding Connecticut which is reusing a small scale hydro-electric dam to power
one of its commercial buildings; the Kin-Buc Superfund landfill in New Jersey, which plans to
install a 2.6 MW solar array to generate revenue for the onsite land use management plan
(OSLMP), Staffard Park mixed use development in New Jersey that plans to meet its energy
needs by onsite renewable energy technologies including wind turbines, and a ground mounted
photovoltaic array, as well as building mounted solar panels. A 1.5 MW solar power plant is
being built on a former seven acre landfill in The Navy Yard in Philadelphia. Clear Skies Solar is
building a 2.1 MW solar farm on a former landing strip in Badger California. The solar park will
be built on an existing 30-acre Brownfield that once served as an airplane landing strip. The
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property has a substation that is capable of handling the 2.1 MW of new electrical capacity. The
landing strip is well suited for a solar power plant because of it receives high radiation levels and
faces limited air pollution.29
Additionally, two utilities have announced plans to deploy significant amounts of
photovoltaics on brownfields and other sites. National Grid plans to deploy 5 MW of solar
power in Massachusetts:
National Grid said it plans to construct facilities in Dorchester (1.3 MW), Revere (0.7
MW), Everett (0.6 MW) and Haverhill, Mass. (1 MW), on company-owned property.
With its filing, National Grid announced plans to add a fifth site at its New England
Distribution Center, located on the Sutton-Northbridge, Mass., border (1.2 MW). Four of
the five sites are former brownfield locations and were selected because they have
enough space to provide a nearby source of electricity to help reduce demand on the
distribution networks in those areas, the company said.30
In the Spring of 2009, Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) announced "Solar 4 All", a
$773 million solar installation program:
According to the Solar Electric Power Association (SEPA), PSE&G's Solar 4 All
program includes a four-pronged approach: adding PV panels on up to 200,000 utility
poles; installing small rooftop PV systems on government facilities; installing large-scale
solar power plants on utility property, brownfields and underutilized real estate; and
installing systems on affordable housing developments.3'
On February 26, 2009, Ralph Izzo, CEO of PSE&G's parent company, Public Service Enterprise
Group (PSEG), mentioned this plan when he testified before congress in support of national
renewable portfolio standard (RPS).32 A RPS requires utilities in the subject jurisdiction to
supply a certain percentage of their energy through renewable sources. The percentage typically
increases over time. Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have RPS policies. 33
These projects suggest increasing interest among developers in incorporating large-scale
renewable energy production into brownfields redevelopment. The limited number of successful
projects to date combined with the growing interest in such projects highlights the need for
29 "Clear Skies Solar Announces $8 Million Solar Farm Project in Badger, Ca," Business Wire, February 10, 2009.
30 Corina Rivera, "National Grid Seeks Approval for 5 Mw of Solar Facilities in Massachusetts," SNL Electric
Utility Report, May 4, 2009.
31 "New Jersey's Utility to Install 200,000 Solar Panels," Electric Wholesaling, March 1, 2009.
32 Ralph Izzo, "Complementary Policies for Climate Legislation; Committee: House Energy and Commerce;
Subcommittee: Energy and Environment," CQ Congressonal Testimony, February 26, 2009.
3 Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, "Summary Maps,"
http://www.dsireusa.org/summarymaps/index.cfm?ee=1&RE=1.
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research focused on determining the barriers to renewable energy developments on brownfields
and outlining policy changes to address these barriers.
The issue of contaminated idle sites is not going to go away. EPA estimates that there are
450,000 brownfields nationwide, but the true number could be much greater. Today's industrial
and commercial sites may be tomorrow's brownfields. The dynamic global economy continues
to shift the focus of capital, causing massive economic decline in some communities and leaving
swaths of brownfields in its wake. The current economic crisis has already caused many
industrial sites to shut down, creating new potential brownfields. Brownfields typically exist in
urban areas where energy demand is the greatest. Brownfields are also well connected to
transportation routes, and have existing transmission lines and other infrastructure. They are also
often zoned appropriately for energy plants. They exist all over the country including the areas
with the best solar and wind resources and areas well suited to biomass plants. Furthermore in
the land-scarce cities of the northeast, the only available sites for locating renewable energy
facilities often are brownfields.
This research is timely given the recent launching of the EPA RE-Powering America's
Lands initiative and the increasing number of projects underway. Furthermore, the need for
increasing low- and zero-carbon renewable energy production is critical and ongoing. The EPA
reports:
Climate change is a serious global challenge... Furthermore, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has proposed that climate change is primarily the result of
GHG emissions, its effects will worsen over time in the absence of regulatory action and
the overall rate and magnitude of human induced climate change will likely increase,
such that risks to public health and welfare will likewise grow over time so that future
generations will be especially vulnerable; their vulnerability will include potentially
catastrophic harms.34
Increasing renewable energy production is now an important item on the national agenda. In
order to address the climate crisis, reduce the nation's reliance on fossil fuel imports, and create a
green economy, President Obama's has set a goal of doubling the nation's renewable energy
34 United States Environmental Protection Agency. "Opportunities to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions through
Materials and Land Management Practices," ed. Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response (Washington D.C.:
2009).
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capacity in three years, which would create enough power from renewable energy to meet the
needs of six million homes. 35
The Legal Landscape and Origins of "Brownfields"
The following section describes the origins of the brownfields issue in U.S.
environmental policy. The relevant federal legislation is summarized and the evolution of
brownfield policies in response to the experience of states and cities in implementing those
policies is discussed. The next section enumerates the challenges and obstacles facing
brownfields redevelopment. The introduction ends with a discussion of the role city
governments play in brownfield redevelopment and how promoting large-scale renewable energy
projects might be incorporated into local brownfield programs.
The brownfields issue stems from the way in which major environmental issues of the
1960s and 1970s were addressed through regulation. The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) was enacted in December 1980. It has
been nicknamed Superfund because one of its functions was creation of the Superfund Trust
Fund capitalized by a new tax on chemical production. The tax expired in 1995 but the Obama
Administration has proposed reinstating it.36 The legislation was in part a response to growing
anger over the presence of hazardous pollution in communities, which was heightened by
notorious environmental disasters such as Love Canal in New York and Times Beach in
Missouri in the late 1970s. 37 Liability under CERCLA is strict, joint, several, and retroactive.
Strict liability means that a potential responsible party (PRP) can be held liable even if they are
not at fault or did not act negligently. Ignorance is not an excuse, nor is following standard
industry practices of the time. Joint and several liability means that every PRP for the site can be
held responsible for the entire cleanup, and retroactive liability means that parties can be held
liable for actions taken before the enactment of CERCLA in 1980.
In addition to the Superfund Trust Fund, CERCLA also created the National Contingency
Plan (EPA protocol for response to hazardous substance releases) and the National Priorities List
35 Remarks of President Barack Obama to Joint Session of Congress Tuesday, February 24th, 2009
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press-office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Address-to-Joint-Session-of-
Congress
36 Molly H. Ekerdt, "Where Have All the Brownfields Gone? Lessons for Chicago 15 Years In" (Master in City
Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009).3 Ibid.
(NPL), which is a list of severely contaminated sites demanding federal attention, legal action,
and resources for clean-up. The EPA's computerized inventory system for brownfields is called
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Information System
(CERCLIS). Sites on this list are under Superfund jurisdiction. Those that exceed a designated
hazardous ranking are assigned to the National Priorities List, the rest are assigned to state
inventories.38
In 1986 the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) added research
and remediation activities to the EPA's mandate. It also charged the EPA with increasing state
involvement in negotiating with responsible parties. Within the CERCLA framework states
must enact and implement their own contaminated site legislation. State regulations must be
consistent with CERCLA and other Applicable, Relevant, and Appropriate Requirements
(ARARs) under federal laws, such as soil, air and water quality standards.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 governs the management
of nonhazardous (solid) waste, hazardous waste, and underground storage tanks. The act gives
EPA authority to control hazardous waste from "cradle-to-grave." This cradle-to-grave authority
covers generation, transportation, treatment, storage and disposal. RCRA regulates solid waste
management units (SWMU), which are defined as:
any discernible waste management unit at a RCRA facility from which hazardous
constituents might migrate, irrespective of whether the unit was intended for the
management of solid and/or hazardous waste. The SWMU definition includes containers,
tanks, surface impoundments, waste piles, land treatment units, landfills, incinerators and
underground injection wells, including those units defined as "regulated units" under
RCRA. It includes recycling units, wastewater treatment units and other units, which
EPA has generally exempted from standards applicable to hazardous waste management
units. Finally, it includes areas contaminated by routine, systematic and deliberate
39discharges from process areas.
The Federal Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) are 1984 amendments to RCRA.
HSWA focused on waste minimization, phasing out land disposal of hazardous waste, and on
corrective action for releases. This law increased enforcement authority for EPA, created stricter
hazardous waste management standards, and established a comprehensive UST program. RCRA
38 Christopher DeSousa, Brownfields Redevelopment and the Questfor Sustainability, ed. Steve Tiesdell, 1st ed.,
vol. 3, Current Reseach in Urban and Regional Studies (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2008).
39 Steven W. Sisk and Steve E. Way, "R.C.R.A. Facility Assessment: Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Lackawanna
Plant," (Denver, CO: National Enforcement Investigation Center of the Environmental Protection Agency, 1988).
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was amended in 1986 to give EPA authority to address problems resulting from underground
storage tanks (USTs) containing petroleum or other hazardous materials.40
An unintended consequence of CERCLA was that the aggressive liability rules
discouraged clean-up, remediation, and redevelopment of moderately contaminated sites with
economic potential. In implementing CERCLA EPA targeted not just past and present property
owners, but transporters, parties that shipped waste to the landfill, lenders with ties to the
polluting companies, and government entities that had acquired contaminated property. Molly
Ekerdt describes the problems as follows:
CERCLA alarmed a lot of people over the next ten years [after enactment] as a storm of
litigation ensued, even the most lucrative projects were stalled, banks wouldn't lend to
projects where land might be contaminated, and companies had even more incentive to
mothball properties. These conditions held no matter the level of contamination at the
site, which in many cases was minimal or undetermined.41
Fear around potential contaminated sites and increasing difficulty redeveloping industrial
property lead to the realization among some regulators and policymakers that there was a need
for a regulatory process to separate the moderately contaminated sites from the severely
hazardous ones and to facilitate their redevelopment. Over the years CERCLA has been
amended to reduce liability for recyclers and lenders that had made loans to PRPs. Financial
incentives for brownfields projects have been added as well.
The EPA launched the Brownfield Action Agenda (BAA) in 1995. The BAA consisted
of four main parts "(i) it provided funds for pilot programs to test redevelopment models and
facilitate stakeholder cooperation; (ii) it clarified the liability of prospective purchasers, lenders,
property owners, and others regarding their association to the site; (iii) it fostered partnerships
among the different levels of government and community representatives aimed at developing
strategies for promoting public participation and community involvement in brownfields
decision making; and (iv) it incorporated job development and training opportunities into
brownfields efforts." 42 By the end of 2000 all 50 states had participated in the EPA's
brownfields program and 45 states had established voluntary cleanup programs. Voluntary
cleanup programs (VCPs) offer more flexible cleanup options than the prescriptive structure of
40 "Summary of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act," U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/rcra.html.
41 Ekerdt, "Where Have All the Brownfields Gone? Lessons for Chicago 15 Years In". Page 15
42 DeSousa, Brownfields Redevelopment and the Quest for Sustainability. Page 11
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federal and state Superfund program and provide technical assistance, financial support and
liability protection. The EPA negotiates the content of VCPs with state governments and signs
Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) or Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with states
endorsing these programs.
Illinois Site Remediation Program (SRP) was created in 1995 and offers an example of
the flexible cleanup approach of VCPs. Through this program developers receive technical
assistance and guidance from the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) for site
assessment and no further remediation (NFR) rulings to facilitate cleanup. SRP uses a Tiered
Approach to Corrective Action (TACO), which is a risk based approach in which property is
remediated according to intended reuse. Participants in the SRP must comply with state
regulations, allow their site to be evaluated by IEPA, and develop a remedial action program that
meets the Program's approval. Once a satisfactory Remedial Action Plan (RAP) is submitted
and accepted IEPA issues a NFR letter certifying that the property does not pose a threat to
human health or the environment. The NFR Letter is used to assist in a property transfer by
informing an individual buying or selling property of the environmental site conditions."43 The
value of the NRF letter is that it "signifies a release from further responsibilities under the
Illinois Environmental Protection Act,"4 but "The SRP is not an enforcement shield or an
alternative to regulatory compliance." 45 The SRP also offers the following financial programs:
Illinois Muncipal Brownfields Redevelopment Grant Program, the Illinois Brownfield
Redevelopment Loan Program, the Brownfields Cleanup and Revolving Loan Fund, the
Underground Storage Tank Fund, and the Environmental Remediation Tax Credit.
The Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act (Brownfields
Act) became law in January 2002. It authorized $250 million annually in brownfields grants.46
However, between FY2003 and FY2007, Congress appropriated two thirds or less of this
amount.4 7 According to DeSousa, "The review process for non-Superfund brownfields is under
the jurisdiction of state governments and an important element of the Brownfields Act was the
43 "Site Remediation Program Frequently Asked Questions," Illinois Environmental Protection Agency,
http://www.epa.state.il.us/land/site-remediation/site-remediation-faq.html.
44 "More Information About the Bureau of Land," Illinois Environmental Protection Agency,
http://www.epa.state.il.us/land/more-info-about-bol.html#Voluntary-Site-Remediation-Program.
45 "Site Remediation Program Frequently Asked Questions."
46 The Wilderness Society. Revitalizing Contaminated Lands with Renewable Energy. ( 2009)
http://wilderness.org/content/revitalizing-contaminated-lands-renewable-energy
47 Ekerdt, "Where Have All the Brownfields Gone? Lessons for Chicago 15 Years In".
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creation of the federal enforcement bar, which ensures that when a site goes through a state
review program, the state becomes the primary regulator and the federal government cannot use
Superfund enforcement authority over that site." 48 As a result, most state agencies take a more
active role in technical assistance and review activities than EPA. It is typical for the state
agency to review and approve work plans and remedial objectives proposed by the responsible
party at the beginning of the remediation process and then reviewing the remedial work to certify
that remedial objectives have been met.49
In 1995, when the EPA launched its Brownfields Action Agenda (BAA) it defined
brownfields as "abandoned, idled, or underused industrial and commercial facilities where
expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived contamination."50 The Small
Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002 changed the definition to
"real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the
presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant."5 1 The
brownfield term is intended to avoid the negative connotation of contaminated land. It also
invokes brownfields counterpart, greenfields, which refers to open space or agricultural land on
the urban periphery. Greenfields may also be called "unimproved" or "undeveloped" land.
The Brownfields Federal Partnership Action Agenda is a "compilation of commitments,
new initiatives, events and activities that the participating federal agencies committed to
undertake in partnership to help communities deal with brownfields and associated problems."52
It was announced in November 2002 and contained over 100 commitments from 23 federal
agencies. EPA's Brownfields Program provides direct funding for brownfields assessment,
cleanup, revolving loans, and environmental job training. "The EPA estimates that since its
inception in 1995, investment in the Brownfields Program has leveraged more than US6.5 billion
in brownfields cleanup and redevelopment funding from the private and public sectors and
created approximately 25,000 new jobs."53
48 DeSousa, Brownfields Redevelopment and the Quest for Sustainability. Page 13
41 Ibid.
50 Ibid., 2
s1 Agency, ""Brownfields and Land Revitalization."
5 DeSousa, Brownfields Redevelopment and the Quest for Sustainability., 12
5 Ibid., 14
Challenges and Obstacles to Brownfield Development
The two most critical challenges to redeveloping brownfields are high redevelopment
costs and potential liability. According to DeSousa the primary obstacles discussed in North
American and European literature are "the character and application of regulations, a lack of
standardized and practical cleanup criteria, uncertainties regarding liability ensuing from
environmental remediation, and funding resources available for remediation and
redevelopment."54 Brownfields face a basic economic challenge because they present high
assessment and cleanup costs and tend to produce lower returns in terms of market or rental
value. Idle or abandoned sites are a burden to local governments because they generate little to
no property tax revenue for the municipality. The onsite infrastructure is often in poor condition
further discouraging redevelopment. These sites are often viewed as "environmentally impaired
areas where ecological renewal is futile."55 A study conducted by DeSousa in the late 1990s in
Canada found that private developers saw liability, which added to costs and risks through
increased legal costs and decreased land values, as the most severe obstacle. Time delays are
another source of uncertainty. Because they lengthen the development process, regulatory
mechanisms continue to be serious barriers to redevelopment. Table 1 shows the results of
DeSousa's study in which developers in Ontario, Canada, were asked to rank potential obstacles
on a scale from 1 (not an obstacle) to 5 (severe obstacle).
Table 1.1 - Private Sector Challenges Associated with Brownfields Development 5 6
Avg. Scaling Potential Obstacle
Moderate-severe
4.3 Liability concerns
3.7 High Remediation Costs
3.7 Slow Regulatory Process
3.6 Complex Municipal Land Use Policies
Moderate Obstacles
3.4 Stringent Remediation Requirements
3.4 Uncertainty related to site-specific risk assessment
3.2 Lack of government incentives
3.1 Obtaining project financing
3.0 Lack of knowledge/negative attitude on the part of the public
3.0 Lack of knowledge/negative attitude on the part of stakeholders
1 Ibid., 8
" Ibid.,31
56 Ibid. Page 31
Low-moderate obstacles
2.4 More Contamination than expected
2.3 Potential impacts to adjacent properties
2.2 High cost of insurance
2.1 Lack of information on history of sites
1.3 Lack of remediation or disposal options
A 2006 study by the U.S. conference of Mayors found the most often identified obstacles
to brownfields development from the public sector perspective was a lack of cleanup funds (156
cities/87%). The need for environmental assessments was second (101 cities/61%) followed by
liability issues (97 cities/54%)." Landowners may be concerned that if contamination is found,
the owner will be responsible for cleanup costs, land value will decline because of contamination
or perceived contamination (stigma hurts value), and adjacent landowners might blame their
contamination problem on their neighbor. One result is that landowners landbank waiting for
values to increase. Similar to landbanking, property owners may "mothball" their properties:
Corporate owners find it cheaper to pay taxes, keep up fences, and pay a guard [than to
clean up the sitel. Many policymakers find these to be the most high-impact and
frustrating properties to deal with. 58
Whether the intent is mothballing or landbanking, these practices can stall neighborhood-wide
renewal efforts.
Outdated infrastructure is another reason developers may avoid brownfield sites.
Howland (2004) found that "In spite of the widespread view that one advantage of an inner-city
site is its ready access to infrastructure, a common grievance among property owners is that
water, sewer, and telecommunications facilities are outdated and inadequate." 59 This last point
refers to the fact that high-speed internet was not available in most of the sites in Howland's
study area, the Carroll Camden neighborhood in Baltimore. Urban form can also be outdated
such that it is no longer suitable to industry. Howland also found that sites that are "small and
oddly shaped; with inadequate road access for modern trucks; ... and with incompatible
surrounding land uses are the most likely to remain unsold after 2 years." 60
DeSousa found that developers in Milwaukee and Chicago identified the high cost (or
amount) of cleanup as the biggest barrier to brownfield development. Other barriers mentioned
" Ibid.,32
58 Ekerdt, "Where Have All the Brownfields Gone? Lessons for Chicago 15 Years In". Page 26
59 Marie Howland, "The Role of Contamination in Central City Industrial Decline," Economic Development
Quarterly 18, no. 3 (2004)., 217
60 Ibid.
by Milwaukee developers included liability risks, longer project duration, and unknown or
surprise costs. Some Chicago developers emphasized city and state regulations that delayed
development, unknown costs, trouble obtaining financing. Liability risk was not mentioned by
developers in the Chicago sample.61
Lending costs are typically higher for brownfield sites than for greenfield sites. Banks
may require lower loan-to-value ratios because they do not want to own a stigmatized and costly
property. This raises the needed equity beyond what many developers can handle. 62 One way to
encourage investment is to rezone to a higher value use. However, if risk based standards are
used to govern cleanup the value added by more intensive use (residential) may be cancelled by
increased cleanup costs. The findings of DeSousa 2002 study of brownfields development in
Toronto support the argument that industrial reuse of brownfields provides greater public
benefits for cities than residential reuse.
Experience with brownfields development tends to lessen the level of fear developers
have of developing other contaminated properties. DeSousa reports:
While developing on brownfields is indeed perceived as slightly more costly and risky
than greenfields, such views are strongly tied to the experience of developers in
managing them. The more experienced developers consider brownfields management as
just another aspect of development, while those with less tend to react more cautiously,
but are willing to 'do it again.' Projects, therefore, are occurring at an increasing rate
driven by a small group of 'veteran' urban developers, many of whom now concentrate
on larger-scale mega-projects, and a cadre of new developers trying out the brownfields
market typically on smaller properties... the vast majority of developers [in Chicago and
Milwaukee] feel that greater financial assistance is the key to increasing residential
redevelopment. However, many are still willing to go about profitable projects on their
own, particularly if it helps avoid bureaucratic entanglement and delays.6 3
The author also found experience to be an important factor in how obstacles are perceived by
those involved in brownfield development projects. Interview subjects who had made a career of
brownfield redevelopment frequently viewed the risk and liability as manageable. One remarked
that VCPs have largely addressed the liability issue.64 Conversely, a lawyer who is involved
with her first brownfield project was extremely concerned about the liability issues. The
61 DeSousa, Brownfields Redevelopment and the Quest for Sustainability.,112
62 Ibid.,59
63 Ibid., 114
64 Robert Colangelo. Telephone Interview. March 31, 2010
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experienced brownfields professional interviewed for this thesis agreed that greater financial
assistance is essential for increasing the amount of brownfield redevelopment.
Because surrounding residents are directly impacted by brownfields, either by past
pollution or the ongoing affects of blight, they tend to have greater involvement in brownfields
redevelopment then conventional development. Developers and community members may
disagree on the highest and best use of the property. From the developers' perspective the
highest and best use means the most profitable, whereas the community is likely to want the
future use to meet community needs. These interests can overlap, but often do not, as blighted
communities have needs for open space, public services, community centers, senior centers, etc.
Understanding brownfields redevelopment from a profit-based perspective is useful for
policy makers. Understanding brownfields from a real estate market perspective allows
planners to identify sites that will be attractive to developers and to develop realistic visions for
future use. DeSousa argues that knowledge of the real estate market can be used to target
brownfield policies and maximize public benefits:
Knowledge of an area's market will help government determine what level of support is
required to get a project moving and, on the flip-side, help government figure out how
much public benefit it can squeeze from a project that has stronger market viability. The
planning department of Vancouver, for instance, has an extremely detailed knowledge of
the viability and profit potential of its real estate market, which they have used
strategically to secure extensive public services and amenities from developers who wish
to build on them. 65
A pro-forma analysis assists in understanding the sources and extent of costs and risk factors for
developers. This is essential for developing policies that effectively address those barriers to
private-led brownfields development.
Local Brownfields Programs
The first level of action for local government is often creating and maintaining an
inventory of brownfields. Some municipalities maintain inventories as property development
portfolios to supply potential developers with relevant real estate information. 66 Cities can use
their land use planning powers to facilitate development. Such powers include zoning, powers of
land acquisition through tax foreclosure or eminent domain, and the power to establish land
65 DeSousa, Brownfields Redevelopment and the Quest for Sustainability. Page 270
66 Ibid.
trusts. Municipalities can use their ability to acquire and assemble land to make properties more
attractive to developers. This may be particularly useful in older cities where parcels are smaller
and more oddly shaped. Cities may also incorporate demolition and remediation as part of these
assembly efforts.
Local government contributes more funding to brownfield remediation and
redevelopment than either states or federal government. Local governments provide subsidies
though tax increment financing (TIF), bonds or tax abatements.67 TIF uses incremental real
property tax revenue to fund designated development activities. Tax increment revenue is the
portion of property tax that results from the increase in the current equalized assessed valuation
(EAV) of each property over its certified initial EAV. 68
The EPA only makes assessment grants to cities giving city planning a central role in
brownfield policy. The planning role can include engaging stakeholders to garner support,
establishing and maintaining data on the city's brownfield properties, creating marketing
strategies to attract private developers or industries, ensuring equity and creating environmental
justice. Classifying and prioritizing sites can be an important part of a marketing and
redevelopment strategy. Cities also use EPA brownfield grants to create job training programs
that prepare people for work in environmental cleanup.
Local ordinances can be powerful tools for facilitating cleanup and development.
Chicago's 1997 groundwater ordinance, which prohibits drilling wells and the consumption of
groundwater within city limits, has been credited by some as being more effective at inducing
cleanup than any other financial or regulatory incentive.69 By eliminating groundwater
consumption the ordinance eliminated a major pathway for ingestion of contaminants. By
eliminating the need to remediate groundwater, this ordinance has made cleanup generally much
less expensive. According to Dave Reynolds, this ordinance is the reason only one site in
Chicago has made the Superfund NPL. That site is the Lake Calumet Cluster Site, which was
added to the NPL because it posed ecological risk to a special natural habitat, not because it was
a threat to public health and safety, which is the reason sites usually make the NPL.70
67 Ekerdt, "Where Have All the Brownfields Gone? Lessons for Chicago 15 Years In". Page 28
68 S.B. Friedman & Company, "West Pullman Industrial Park Conservation Area Industrial Jobs Recovery Law Tax
Incremental Financing Eligibility Study and Redevelopment Planning and Project Plan," (Chicago: Department of
Planning and Development, 1997).
69 Ekerdt, "Where Have All the Brownfields Gone? Lessons for Chicago 15 Years In".
70 Dave Reynolds. Telephone Interview. April 1, 2010.
Brownfield policy has focused on city ownership and clean-up of properties under the
assumption that local governments were less exposed to legal action and would be able to access
lower cost capital, and do not need to achieve as high a rates of return as private developers. On
the other hand public ownership brings with it project requirements including bidding and labor
use rules, time delays and a loss of control that may deter private developers.71 Furthermore,
cities are not protected from liability. Chicago has avoided acquisition of properties because the
Department of Justice does pursue cities as PRPs in Superfund cases.
The EPA divides the brownfield development process into four phases: Pre-development,
Securing the Deal, Clean-up and Development, and Property Management. Pre-development
typically involves refinement of the development concept (property use and type), conducting
due diligence to assess the contamination on the property, securing access to the property, and
indentifying sources of funding. The EPA notes that "Identifying the presence and extent of
contamination is essential to evaluating risk, limiting liability, and determining an appropriate
reuse.72 A phase 1 environmental site assessment involves researching the background and
history of the site to determine possible sources of contamination and to get an idea of what
types of contaminants are likely to be found on the site. Phase I also involves a preliminary
visual inspection of the site. Phase II involves conducting soil and groundwater tests in the areas
that appeared to be contaminated during the Phase I. Determining clean-up and redevelopment
options and estimating cleanup costs are also part of a Phase II. Additional phases may be
required depending on the extent of contamination. The EPA also breaks development down
into three common scenarios: private led, private-public partnership, or public led.7 3
It is informative to examine real examples of comprehensive city-run brownfield
programs. Milwaukee's brownfield program carried out through a partnership of four agencies:
Department of City Development, the Health Department, City Redevelopment Authority,
Milwaukee Redevelopment Corporation. The program is part of the city's Land Reuse Strategy.
It focuses on attracting private investment, creating jobs, and restoring the environment. The
City created various staff positions and established multiple TIF Districts for cleanup. It has also
created an environmental testing fund for tax delinquent properties. City staff took part in a task
71 Ekerdt, "Where Have All the Brownfields Gone? Lessons for Chicago 15 Years In".
7 United States Environmental Protection Agency, "Anatomy of a Brownfields Redevelopment," in Brownfields
Series (Washington D.C.: 2006).
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force encouraging flexible closure, clarifying liability, streamlining regulatory processes, and
facilitating groundwater negotiated agreements. Milwaukee has also taken steps to centralize
administrative functions related to brownfields in order to make the development permitting
process simpler and faster.74
Chicago's Brownfields Initiative is managed by an interdepartmental team of project
managers from the Department of Environment, the Mayor's Office, the Department of
Community Development, the Department of Buildings and the Department of Law. It aims at
making brownfields development as attractive as conventional development. Chicago's first
effort used $2 million in General Obligation Bonds to redevelop five brownfield properties. The
pilot was so successful the city subsequently secured $74 million of Section 108 Loan
Guarantees from the U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and was designated
a Showcase Community by the EPA. Under the program the City evaluates brownfields for their
industrial, commercial, or residential development potential. If a property is attractive and has
been tax delinquent for two years or more, the city can acquire it through negotiated purchase,
lien foreclosure, or tax reactivation. The City performs a risk assessment to develop cleanup
strategies and cost estimates. The City enrolls the majority of its brownfields properties in the
SRP. 75 If a developer of a brownfield site is receiving City funds, the redevelopment must meet
"Chicago Standards," which are additional environmental criteria such as green roofs or onsite
storm water management. One reason Chicago's Brownfield Program may be so well regarded
is its emphasis on creating open space and housing. 76
The West Pullman Industrial Park Conservation Area (IPCA) Tax Increment Financing
(TIF) district is an example of a comprehensive municipal brownfields redevelopment project.
The Illinois Industrial Jobs Recovery Law (IJRL) was ratified in 1992 with the intent to address
the unique redevelopment challenges of underutilized and/or abandoned industrial areas,
particularly environmentally contaminated areas. 77 The law allows communities to create three
types of industrial redevelopment planning areas: Environmentally Contaminated Areas,
Industrial Park Conservation Areas (IPCA), and Vacant Industrial Buildings Areas. The West
7 DeSousa, Brownfields Redevelopment and the Quest for Sustainability.
7 Ibid.
76 Chciago Metropolitan Agency for Planning, "Brownfield Redevelopment Strategy," (Chicago: 2008).
77 S.B. Friedman & Company, "West Pullman Industrial Park Conservation Area Industrial Jobs Recovery Law Tax
Incremental Financing Eligibility Study and Redevelopment Planning and Project Plan."
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Pullman IPCA-TIF was created in 1998 with lifespan not to exceed 23 years. It consists of 210
acres zoned for industrial use. In order to qualify as a TIF under the IJRL the area had to meet
certain conditions including being a "labor surplus municipality," 78 being well serviced by multi-
modal transportation, accounting for less than 2% of the city's equalized asset value (EAV) in
the most recent valuation, and that redevelopment by private investment "in accordance with
public goals" could not be reasonably expected "without the adoption of the plan." 79
This last point highlights an important stipulation of TIF law in Illinois, and other states,
commonly referred to as a "but for" clause. The purpose of this clause is to ensure that TIF is
only used where necessary, that is where "but for" the TIF, development could not reasonably be
expected, that is in blighted areas with weak markets and poor infrastructure. One concern
raised about TIF is that municipalities use it to compete with one another to attract businesses
and consequently cannibalize their tax base. The "but for" clause is a safeguard that attempts to
prevent TIF being used in areas that would likely experience development anyway.
The West Pullman IPCA-TIF intends to foster the area's revitalization through site
assembly efforts, soil remediation projects, and numerous infrastructure improvements,
specifically the reconstruction of 119th, 120th and Morgan streets, and portions of Loomis and
Racine avenues. The West Pullman IPCA is part of a larger comprehensive planning effort to
revitalize the West Pullman/Maple Heights community and is an important component of the
City's economic and industrial development strategy.80
Under the plan the City catalogued, environmentally assessed, and appraised vacant and
underutilized properties to establish fair market values. The City then sought to acquire those
properties through direct purchase, the Tax Reactivation Program, donation, leasing, or eminent
domain. Environmental remediation performed by the City on properties it acquired included the
major components of Phase 2 Environmental Studies and Remediation Plans with particular
attention to separating aspects of remediation that must be completed before sites can be
marketed (Advance Remediation) and those that should be undertaken at the time of
78 Illinois TIF law defines a labor surplus municipality as "one in which the unemployment rate was more than 6
percent, and 100 percent or more of the national average unemployment rate at any time during the preceding six
months." "What Is T.I.F.," S.B. Friedman & Company,
http://www.friedmanco.com/What%20is%20TIF%20Updated%207-11-06%20TAB.pdf.
, West Pullman Industrial Park Conservation Area Industrial Jobs Recovery Law Tax Incremental
Financing Eligibility Study and Redevelopment Planning and Project Plan." Page 21
80 Ibid. Page 15
redevelopment (Concurrent Remediation). The intent was to create a regulatory streamlining
program to achieve agreement on required remediation actions in advance so that building
construction could occur concurrently with remediation. Under the plan the City evaluated and
remediated environmental contamination throughout the West Pullman IPCA. Redevelopment
agreements may provide resources and technical expertise for additional site specific
environmental remediation activities.
Several area-wide infrastructure improvements were made to improve circulation within
the West Pullman IPCA and improve accessibility to the area. These circulation improvements
included entryway lighting, signage, landscaping, and street widening to various streets.
Improvements were also made to water and sewer systems, and to the landscape perimeter and
buffer landscaping to distinguish and screen the industrial park from the surrounding residential
area, and creation of internal pedestrian circulation network. Additionally the neighborhood was
hardwired for modern telecommunication.
After properties have been assessed and acquired the City performs market analysis to
determine how best to market the properties. It then engages in targeted marketing to firms
whose needs match the site and developers experienced in developing business and industrial
parks, especially those with experience in brownfield redevelopment. Financial incentives are
offered to existing property owners and redevelopers on a project by project basis to support
redevelopment within the West Pullman IPCA. Costs eligible for such "development
assistance" included interest costs incurred by developers, rehabilitation costs of existing private
structures, land cost write-down, and specific site preparation costs.
Redevelopment Project Costs are expenditures that can be funded by tax increment
revenues under the IJRL. The IJRL defines these Redevelopment Project Costs "as the sum total
of all reasonable or necessary costs incurred or estimated to be incurred by the municipality, and
any of those costs incidental to a redevelopment plan and a redevelopment project."8 1 There is a
wide range of eligible costs including those incurred for environmental studies and remediation,
land assembly, site preparation and infrastructure improvements, and financing. In addition to
TIF revenues, other sources of funds which may be used to pay for Redevelopment Project Costs
and associated obligations include: "land disposition proceeds, state and federal grants and loans,
investment income, private investor and financial institution funds, reimbursement of
81 Ibid. Page 36
environmental clean-up costs by those legally responsible for such costs, and other sources of
funds and revenues as the municipality may from time to time deem appropriate such as
municipal sales tax revenues, municipal amusement taxes, and other sources."82 Other sources of
funds that could be applied to sites in the IPCA to finance redevelopment activities and offset
predevelopment costs included new market tax credits, property tax abatement EPA grants, and
EPA revolving loan funds. The city also pursued previous owners and operators who were
responsible for polluting the sites to finance cleanup. There also may be the possibility of
collecting on historic insurance policies including general and liability insurance policies and
Federal Recovery through the Department of Defense. 83
Vancouver, Canada offers another example of comprehensive brownfields development
program. John Punter has written extensively on Vancouver's cooperative planning process,
which he calls the Vancouver Model. According to Punter, this model:
is characterized by a clear demarcation between political decision making, which sets the
overall parameters of the projects, and the technical resolution of development forms and designs
that is delegated to city officials. The emphasis is on joint working by teams comprised of
developer and city staff to prepare masterplans and convert them into official development plans
and guidelines on their own. The developer pays for the creation of a dedicated team to work
full time on the project's preparation, while the city works corporately, linking the planning
function as necessary... The approach is complemented by sustained public participation at all
stages of development. 84
In the late 1970s the provincial government of British Columbia acquired 71 hectares of Falls
Creek North in Vancouver. In 1980 the Premier announced the construction of a new sports
stadium, BC Place, and planned to hold the World Transportation Fair (Expo 86) there to
celebrate the centennials of Vancouver and Canadian Pacific, which operated major railroad
yards on the site. Ten thousand residential units and 700,000 m2 of office space were to be built
after the Expo. The provincial government thus took on the role of performing much of the
brownfields cleanup in Falls Creek North. The area was the city's industrial center for much of
its history and included two coal gasification plants, a dozen saw mills and wood preserving
operations, metal shops, and the aforementioned rail yards. A range of metal and organic
contaminants were present. The province created a comprehensive approach to managing
82 Ibid. Page 39
83 Dave Graham and Jessica Brandt, "Stamp: Industry Revival in a Classic Chicago Neighborhood," Brownfield
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contamination that used cost-effective site-specific and risk based tactics. After the expo the
province sold the site to a property tycoon from Hong Kong, Li-Ka-Shing for CDN$320 million
generating much controversy as critics argued the land true value was actually closer to CDN$1
billion. 85
A defining characteristic of Vancouver's approach is extensive public-private
cooperation. For example, the developer of Falls Creek North paid for the city's planning and
regulatory work funding a dedicated team of city officials including planners, engineers, park
board members, housing officers, and social and cultural planners. Through public meetings and
workshops seven principles emerged to guide the development. The development would
integrate with the city, build on the setting, maintain the sense of a substantial water basin, use
streets as an organizing device, create lively places having strong "imageability", create
neighborhoods, and plan for all age groups.86
In 1991 Vancouver decided to develop South East Falls Creek as a sustainable residential
community. The areas consisted of 80 acres of brownfields including: former sawmills,
foundries, shipbuilding, metalworking, salt distribution, an incinerator, an asphalt paving plant,
PCB transformer storage, explosives storages, underground fuel storage, steel fabrication and
other industrial activities. The city owned approximately 50 acres with the remaining 30 in
private hands. Heavy metals, hydrocarbons, and PCB wastes required remediation. The Official
Development Plan for SEFC released in 2006 is a comprehensive design guide that includes 12
design principles and 14 sustainability principles. Among the environmental sustainability
considerations is energy efficiency. The goal is to create a greenhouse gas neutral neighborhood
based on renewable resources and energy efficient buildings. Energy source strategies include
horizontal ground-source geothermal heatpumps, district heating, sanitary sewer and hot water
waste heat recovery, solar water heating, and passive solar gain. After Vancouver was selected
as the site of the 2010 Winter Olympics, the SEFC project site was chosen for the Olympic
Village.
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Chapter 2: The Brockton Brightfield
Introduction
The Brockton Brightfield is a 425 kW solar energy farm built on a former manufactured
gas plant in the city's blighted economic corridor. It is by far the largest and arguably the most
successful brightfield project to result from the DOE's Brownfields to Brighfields Initiative.87
The project was quite complex. It took six years, twelve grants, 101 local, state and federal
approvals, and two pieces of special state legislation to complete. 88 It involved at least 25
stakeholders and stakeholder groups with different interests and varying levels of commitment. 89
Because of the diligence of highly committed project champions, detailed predevelopment work
and significant local investment, the project team was able to overcome multiple legal and
institutional barriers including the city's lack of legal authority to own and operate a power plant
and restrictions on its bonding authority. The difficulties created by the site's status as a
brownfield were less critical than the legal, institutional, and financial barriers enumerated in this
case study. The Brockton Brightfield was a pioneering project, and thus a learning experience
that highlighted state policies that would challenge any city interested in developing a
brightfield. The project manager, Lori Ribeiro, went on to join the Policy Committee of the New
England Clean Energy Council, an organization that helped shape the Green Communities Act
which removed many of the barriers encountered by the Brockton Brightfield.
Similarly to the other two successful projects highlighted in this thesis, the Brockton
Brightfield enjoyed significant community support and was successful because of a cooperative
partnership approach. The cooperation of the Bay State Gas Company (Bay State), the party that
owns the site liability, was particularly important. The project could not have been completed
without critical support from the Massachusetts Renewable Energy Trust and state legislature.
Construction costs for the Brockton Brightfield totaled $3.037 million. This was funded by a
87 The DOE's Brownfield to Brightfield Initiative's purpose was to encourage the incorporation of solar energy into
brownfields redevelopment by installing solar power technology on brownfields, establishing solar power related
manufacturing on redeveloped brownfields, or both. Of the six projects that received Brownfields to Brightfields
grants from the DOE, the Brockton is the largest in terms of installed capacity. Ribeiro, "Does It Have to Be So
Complicated? Municipal Renewable Energy Projects in Massachusetts". Pages 32-33
88Lori A. Ribeiro, "Waste to Watts: A 'Brightfield' Installation Has the Potential to Bring Renewed Life to a
Brownfield Site " Refocus 8, no. 2 (2007). Page 49
89 Ribeiro, "Does It Have to Be So Complicated? Municipal Renewable Energy Projects in Massachusetts". Page 77
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$1.6 million city bond, $789,000 grant from the U.S. Department of Energy, and more than $1
million in grants from the Massachusetts Technology Collaborative's Renewable Energy Trust.90
The difficulties created by the site's status as a brownfield were less critical than the
legal, institutional, and financial barriers that would have confronted any municipality attempting
to build a utility-scale renewable energy plant in Massachusetts. The brownfield specific
challenges included site constraints in the need to allow the Bay State to perform ongoing
maintenance and environmental monitoring, design specifications to protect the high density
polyethylene (HDPE) cap, and complications in the land transaction and lease between Bay State
Gas Company and the City of Brockton.
First a summary of the site's history and past environmental enforcement actions
provides a sense of the context in which the project took place. Next, I situate the Brockton
Brightfield project in the city's sustainable redevelopment strategy and describe the project's
early concept development. The third section details the feasibility analysis and project
fundraising activities. The fourth section describes the unexpected legal barriers the project
encountered and how they were overcome by the project team. The chapter concludes with an
argument that the legal and institutional barriers created by state law were more critical
challenges than any created by the site's status as a brownfield. I argue that this was a
pioneering project that generated valuable public policy lessons and contributed to the passage of
the Green Communities Act.
Site History and Environmental Remediation
Brockton was once the "Shoe Manufacturing Capital" of the U.S., with more shoe
companies collectively producing more shoes than any other U.S. City. The city also hosted a
large number of other industries including gas production and cabinet-making. 91 The Former
Brockton Gas Plant operated from 1898 to 1963 was sold to LeBaron Foundary Inc. in 1983.
The plant's operations included a retort house, purifier house, coke storage area, above and
below ground oil tanks, tar wells and gas holders. Byproducts of the operation included tars,
spent purifier wastes, coal ash, coal fines, clinkers and cinders, collectively referred to as coal
90 http://www.masstech.org/rebate/press/pr_10_26_06_brockton.html
91 City of Brockton, "Brownfields to Brightfields Project Final Report," (Brockton: U.S. Departmetn of Energy,
2004).
gasification related materials (CGRM). In general, the CGRM consist of volatile organic
compounds benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, styrene, and xylenes and semi-volatile organic
compounds that are classified as polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH).92 Water gas and oil
gas were also manufactured at the plant. The plant, buildings, and other structures were
demolished in 1964. During the operation of the manufactured gas plant Gas Works II (Lot 55)
was used for storage and disposal in manufacturing materials and wastes. The Salisbury Plain
River, a perennial stream, is located approximately one-quarter mile east of Lot 19 and east of
Lot 55. The Vinegard Swamp Storm Drain runs underneath both lots and empties into the
river.93
The EPA began investigating Gas Works I (Lot 19) in 1984. In 1989 Citizens Against
Waste Sites petitioned the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering, MassDEP's
predecessor, for a Public Involvement Plan (PIP) for Brockton Gas Works I and II. The
CERCLA Removal Action at Brockton Gas Works I occurred in 1992. Actions included
removal of 2,420 gallons of coal tar, the installation of a 15 foot wide by 75 foot long high-
density polyethylene (HDPE) soil-vapor barrier to prevent migration of organic vapors to
residences, the consolidation of 2,424 cubic yards of impacted soils under a 3.35 acre
impermeable HDPE geo-membrane, and a separate 1.63 acre cap of clean fill. Bay State Gas
also connected two residences to the municipal water supply and implemented an operation and
maintenance plan that included a groundwater monitoring program94 The CERCLA Removal
Action for Brockton Gas Works II took place in 1990. Much of the site was fenced off and two
residences were purchased and incorporated into the property. A permeable cap was installed
over 1.66 acres. A 1.85 acre HDPE cap was installed over 957.5 cubic yards of potentially
impacted soil that had been consolidated. Site grading was performed to improve drainage and
prevent erosion and possible contact with contaminated soil. In 1993 EPA issued "No Further
Remedial Action Planned" decisions for both sites indicating that they would not be added to the
National Priorities List.95
92 ENSR Corporation, "Phase Iii Remedial Action Plan: Former Brockton Gas Works Site Brockton, Ma, Dep Site
Number: 4-0045," (Westborough, MA: Bay State Gas Company, 2001).
93 . "Human Health Risk Characterization Scope of Work Former Broctkon Gas Works Site, Rtn No. 4-
0045," (West Bororough, MA: Bay State Gas Company, 2000).
94 Mark Wood, "Draft Memorandum: Former Brocton Gas Works, Brockton Ma, 4-00045," (Masschusetts
Department of Environmental Protection, 2007).
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In May 1994 Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MassDEP) took
control of oversight of the Gas Works remediation, notifying the responsible party that the site
now must meet the requirements of the 1993 Massachusetts Contingency Plan (MCP). Bay State
attempted to argue that compliance with previous EPA administrative orders was the "functional
equivalent of completion of applicable MCP processes and had resulted in a condition of No
Significant Risk as defined by the MCP."96 In January 1997, MassDEP sent Bay State Gas
Company letters indicating that Brockton Gas Works I and II would be classified as Tier I
disposal sites for Failure to Take Action. A draft memo from Mark Wood at the MassDEP
Southeast Regional Office illustrates that the site's transition from CERCLA to the MCP was
contentious. In 1997 MassDEP communicated numerous concerns regarding the extent of
contamination, the identification of contaminants of concern, dose-response assessment, soil and
groundwater categorization, identifying foreseeable uses, estimating exposure point
concentrations, risk of harm to welfare, upper concentration limits, and stage I environmental
screening. By 1999 remedial actions were continuing with removal of 21.5 cubic yards of soil
containing hardened tar-like material.
Origins of the Brightfield Project and Early Concept Development
During the course of the project's development and implementation Brockton was the
sixth largest city in the state, with a population of over 94,000. With 97% of its land developed,
Brockton is a dense city that must focus on brownfields redevelopment if it wants to achieve
further economic development. 97 Ranking fourteenth highest in poverty in the state, it was
designated an Economic Target Area (ETA) with several TIF-districts and several state
designated Environmental Justice Populations. An ETA as defined by the Massachusetts
Economic Develop Incentive Program, "is three, or more contiguous census tracts, in one or
more municipalities, meeting one of eleven statutory criteria for economic need."98 Companies in
these areas may qualify for certain state tax incentives. The state defines an Environmental
Justice Population as "neighborhoods (U.S. census Bureau census block groups) that meet one or
96 Ibid.
97 City of Brockton, "Brownfields to Brightfields Project Final Report."
98 "Economic Development Incentive Program," Massachusetts Executive Office of Housing and Economic
Development,
http://www.mass.gov/?pagelD=ehedterminal&L=3&LO=Home&L1=Start%2C+Grow+%26+Relocate+Your+Busin
ess&L2=Taxes+%26+Incentives&sid=Ehed&b=terminalcontent&f=mobdtaxincentives edipinfo&csid=Ehed.
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more of the following criteria: the median annual household income is at or below 65 percent of
the statewide median income for Massachusetts; or 25 percent of the residents are minority; or
25 percent of the residents are foreign born, or 25 percent of the residents are lacking English
language proficiency."99 Many of these neighborhoods are located in and around the state's
oldest industrial sites and either host, or are located near to, many of the state's brownfields. The
state prioritizes these neighborhoods for hazardous waste site clean-up funds, environmental
inspections and enforcement actions, and increased scrutiny of industrial facilities and sources of air
emissions. The state's Environmental Justice Policy also encourages the creation of open space
within the designated neighborhoods and creates greater opportunities for community participation in
environmental decision making.100
The city had one of the highest concentrations of trash related businesses in the state, and
the Brighfield project fit with the community's desire to change the city's image as the
"Commonwealth's dumping ground."10' Residents also wanted to ensure that brownfield
redevelopment did not create traffic problems or add pollution. Brockton's Brownfields to
Brightfields project was part of a larger sustainable development strategy.102 The development
of a photovoltaic array as a "Solar Energy Park" had the following goals: "redevelop brownfields
in an environmentally friendly manner; develop a new local clean energy source for City use;
expand the city's tax base; enhance Brockton's image as 'Cleaner and Greener'; attract a PV
manufacturer; and to develop the 'Brockton Solar Champions' concept which builds on the 'City
of Champions' logo by making Brockton first in the state in installed PV."103
In 1998 the City convened a meeting of stakeholders to develop a proposal for an EPA
Sustainable Development Challenge Grant. The grant application failed, but the idea that
emerged gained strong and lasting support among a group called the Mayor's Economic
Advisors, which included the city planner and the leaders of the local economic development
agency, chamber of commerce, transit authority, redevelopment authority, and housing authority.
The idea they rallied behind was to capitalize on the city's history as the home of Thomas
99 Bob Durand, "Environmental Justice Policy of the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs," ed. Executive
Office of Environmental Affairs (Boston: State of Massachusetts, 2002). Page 5
100 Public Law Research Institute, "Environmental Justice for All: A Fifty State Survey of Legislation, Policies, and
Cases," ed. Steven Bonorris (San Francisco: U.C. Hastings College of the Law, 2007).
101 Ribeiro, "Does It Have to Be So Complicated? Municipal Renewable Energy Projects in Massachusetts". Page 35
102 City of Brockton, "Brownfields to Brightfields Project Final Report."
103 Ribeiro, "Does It Have to Be So Complicated? Municipal Renewable Energy Projects in Massachusetts". Page 36
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Edison's first successful three wire electric plant by creating an eco-industrial park that included
a solar panel manufacturer.
The idea remerged in April, 2000, when Tire Recyclers Inc.'s effort to open a tire
recycling plant on a Brockton Superfund site called the Bargaineer Center ignited fierce
community opposition and served to catalyze the city's pursuit of environmentally sustainable
brownfield redevelopment. Soon after the backlash against Tire Recyclers, the city's
Brownfields Coordinator, Lori Colombo (now Lori Ribeiro) learned about the DOE's
Brownfield to Brightfield program through a press release.104 The idea of photovoltaic array was
appealing because it would not produce emissions or increase traffic, which were major concerns
residents had regarding the proposed tire recycling plant. The City began communication with
DOE in May, 2000. Rebeiro developed a concept paper that presented the Brightfield concept as
part of sustainable development strategy to attract renewable energy producers and clean
industries to Brockton. The City Planner and Rebeiro obtained approval for the project from
Mayor Yunits in September 2000 and were directed to explore five potential sites in the
Brockton area.
At the request of Ribeiro, Spire Solar Executive Rodger LaFavre met Mayor Yunits to
tour the Bargaineer Center site in November 2000. LaFarve described the ideal site for a utility-
scale Brightfield as a property where soil contamination prohibits excavation, makes excavation
overly expensive, or where soil disturbance is otherwise greatly restricted. For example, if a
HDPE membrane is used to cap contaminates on a brownfield, then future use of the site must
not break the seal of the cap, which significantly limits the site's development options. The
former Brockton Gas Works sites fit this description as the remedial method being implemented
was an HDPE membrane capping contaminants 18 inches below the surface, and the membrane
could not be penetrated by reuse. Other factors making the site desirable for the Brightfield
project included its large size of 27-acres and location in Brockton's industrially zoned Economic
Corridor. The area along the corridor was characterized by substandard housing, abandoned
buildings, high crime rates, high unemployment rates, and idle brownfields. Furthermore, the
gas site had historical significance related to Edison's legacy on which city officials were trying
to build.'45
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
In 2000, Bay State owned the liability for the former Brockton Gas Works and was
responsible for its remediation, although it no longer owned either parcel as it had donated Lot
55 to the city in the 1970s and sold Lot 19 to LaBaron Foundry. Remediation and closure of the
Brockton Gas Works was a long and arduous process for Bay State, which at that point had been
involved in state or federal site clean-up programs for 16 years. The company was in the process
of completing A Phase II Comprehensive Site Assessment (CSA) Report. Having dragged on
for many years, the remedial activities no doubt had a significant impact on the neighborhood.
Four houses had needed to be connected to municipal water and two houses had been purchased
with the residents being permanently relocated.
Bay State had taken steps to maintain positive community relations. From 1987 to 1993
the company assigned a full time Public Affairs Representative, Vincent Pizzano, to handle day
to day community relations during EPA removal actions. Mr. Pizzano spent many afternoons at
the site meeting with residents at their homes to discuss their concerns. According to the
company's Public Involvement Plan submitted in 1997 as a requirement of the MCP the
company had a record of being responsive to residents' concerns, halting early morning truck
traffic in response to complaints about noise, contracting a street sweeper for daily service in
response to concerns about construction debris in the street, and responding to health concerns
by testing nearby residential wells and connecting residents to public water supply when levels
of site-related contaminates exceeded federal drinking water standards.106 The company also
conducted a variety of outreach activities to keep the community informed.107 These outreach
activities were continued under the 1997 Public Involvement Plan filed for the MCP.108
Despite these efforts neither the community nor MassDEP were satisfied with Bay State's
actions or future plans. Bay State was under pressure to redevelop the land in a way that was
beneficial to the community. An internal MassDEP memo dated May 14, 1997 raised a number
of concerns about the risk assessment in support the Closure Report:
106 Ron Moreira, "Public Involvement Plan, Release Tracking Numbers 4-0045, 4-0241, and 4-11971, Brockton Gas
Works I, 1.1., and East Union Street Sites, Brockton Massachusetts," (Westborough, MA: Bay State Gas Company,
1997).
107 The company's outreach activities included maintaining a mailing list of interested parties , sending notification
letter to residents, communicating with the Brockton's newspaper The Enterprise and the regional newspaper the
Quincy Patriot Ledger, and meeting with public officials and residents to keep them informed about activities at the
site. Public reports related site investigation and remediation were distrusted to interested parties and public
repository was created at the Brockton Library.
108 Moreira, "Public Involvement Plan, Release Tracking Numbers 4-0045, 4-0241, and 4-11971, Brockton Gas
Works I, 1.1., and East Union Street Sites, Brockton Massachusetts."
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The risk assessment report's premise is that foreseeable use of both properties is vacant,
inaccessible, capped land, based on the assumption that Bay State will acquire control of
both properties, and that the PRP can determine the foreseeable use. Loss of beneficial
land use to the community and to the neighborhood does not appear to have been
addressed [my emphasis].. .The determination of reasonable foreseeable use is a BWSC
decision, not a risk assessment decision. If the landfills are to be left in place, however,
and the parcels remain essentially unused to protect against exposure, the risk of harm to
welfare should be evaluated more extensively. 109
In October 2000 both sites were still surrounded by an 8 foot chain-link fence topped with
barbed wire."10 Bay State's relations with the community and MassDEP would benefit from a
reuse plan that improved the site's appearance and created a beneficial use for the community.
Consequently when Bay State was contacted by the City of Brockton about the
Brightfield proposal they embraced the solar project concept and agreed to work with the City to
test its feasibility. Bay State's cooperation and contribution were considerable. The company
agreed to pay for landscaping. The company's commitment to buy back the parcel from the city
was essential for the city's ability to finance the construction of the photovoltaic array. They
contracted a landscape architecture firm to provide renderings for community meetings and
would eventually agree to install fencing and provide landscaping worth $575,000, which
assured community support.' The gas company dedicated its environmental consulting firm
ENSR to the project and the firm worked with Spire Corp. to perform the technical feasibility
analysis.
Feasibility Analysis and Securing Grants
In February 2001 a $30,000 grant application for a feasibility study was submitted to the
DOE through the Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources (DOER). The proposal was to
study the feasibility of the large photovoltaic array on Grove Street, five rooftop installations,
and a PV manufacturing facility. The Director of the Massachusetts Renewable Energy Trust
(MRET) encouraged the City to apply for the Massachusetts Technology Collaborative's (MTC)
first "Green Power Predevelopment Program" for a grant to perform a detailed technical and
financial feasibility study for the Grove Street parcel. In June 2001 Brockton received $128,415
109 Nancy Bettinger, May 14 1997.
0 ENSR Corporation, "Human Health Risk Characterization Scope of Work Former Broctkon Gas Works Site, Rtn
No. 4-0045."
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grant from MTC and the $30,000 grant from the DOE. These awards enabled Brockton to hire
consultants to perform the technical feasibility and financing studies.
The public nature of the project made phasing more complex. For example, Brockton
needed state legislation to grant it the authority to borrow in order to obtain the funds to execute
a contract with Global Solar Energy, the lead contractor for the construction of solar installation.
Also, state law required the Brockton City Council to accept grant funds before they were
expended. The time lapse between the award announcement and actual dispersal of funds to the
city could delay the project. To advance the project more quickly Brockton committed to a
$30,000 cash match for the DOE grant to cover certain consulting services allowing the project
to move forward. In the case of the MTC grant the match came in the form of pro-bono services
provided by project partners, so city appropriation was not required, "Thus, City Council
accepted $158,415 in grant funds with a commitment of only $30,000 in city funds to explore
this promising new approach for brownfields revitalization.' 1 2
Figure 2.113
Spire Corp worked with
Bay State Gas Company's
environmental consultant ENSR
to perform the technical
feasibility study of the former
Brockton Gas Works. The study
began in October 2001 and the
first community meeting about
the proposed brightfield was held
on November 29, 2001. About
- '50 people attended the meeting.
Brockton Brightfield Illustrative Site Plan The original proposal included
linking the brightfield to the Salisbury greenway with a pedestrian corridor. Residents objected
strongly to the greenway link because they thought it would bring unwanted foot traffic. Once
the proposal for the pedestrian path was dropped and residents' concerns about safety and noise
112 Ibid.
113 Lori Ribeiro, "Case Study: Brockton "Brownfields to Brightfields" Renewable Energy Certificate Innovative
Marketing Strategy," (Brockton, MA: City of Brockton, 2006).
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were addressed the community supported the solar power plant pending the aesthetics of the final
design.114
While Spire had originally thought that Grove Street site could support between 5 and 10
MW of photovoltaics, the final technical feasibility study concluded that based on technical,
financial and aesthetic constraints, the two parcels were suitable for up to 1 MW of
photovoltaics, with half to be installed on each parcel. Only 10 of the 27 total acres were
immediately suitable for deploying photovoltaic modules because of unfavorable surface
contours and the presence of 61 mature trees, and a downhill slope on the eastern side of lot 55.
Spire recommended that the first installation take place on Lot 19 because it required minimal
preparation for PV deployment. They argued completing phase I before beginning work on
phase II would giving neighbors a chance to get used to solar modules and create an opportunity
to recommend changes in the design of phase II if need be."15 This would require Bay State Gas
to buy lot 19 back from LaBaron Foundary and lease it to the City.
Brockton's Brightfield proposal included installing PV at additional locations to create
demand to attract a PV manufacture. Solar Design Associates performed technical feasibility
analysis for rooftop PV installations at the Brockton High School, wastewater treatment plant, a
minor league stadium to be operated by the new "Brockton Rox", the Brockton Area Transit
Authority, and a new desalination plant to be built by Brockton's private sector partner in
Dighton, MA. They concluded that a total of about 557 kW of peak PV capacity could be
deployed at the five locations."16
XENERGY (now KEMA) conducted the financial feasibility analysis. Based on the
technical parameters XENERGY concluded that the 1 MW array would cost $3.6 million to
develop. XENERGY's analysis showed that the project would have a negative net-present
value (NPV) for a private developer, but a small positive NPV under a non-profit model.
Consequently they recommended that the City own the project. XENERGY recommended "that
of the $3.6 million capital budget, the City obtain $1.5 million in grants, secure $500,000 from
selling the City-owned parcel [lot 55] on Grove Street to Bay State Gas Company, and issue a
114 Ribeiro, "Does It Have to Be So Complicated? Municipal Renewable Energy Projects in Massachusetts".
115 Spire Corporation, "Task 1 Report On: Technical Feasibility Study for the Brockton Bbrightfield,"
(Westborough, MA: 2002).116 City of Brockton, "Brownfields to Brightfields Project Final Report."
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$1.6 million bond."" 7 XENERGY also recommended that the city pursue the Contractor/Leaser
Build and Operate ownership and partnership model to "leverage the expertise of for-profit
developers while allowing the city to maximize its ability to secure low-cost capital."" 8 In July
2002 the Mayor embraced the idea of City ownership with the caveat that it had to be revenue
neutral and would require the establishment of an enterprise account like those used for the
water, sewer and municipal solid waste services. This would allow project revenues and
expenses to be separated from the general ftnd. The revenues from selling electricity and
renewable energy certificates would need to cover for debt service, operations and
maintenance.11 9
The community was presented with modified site plans and renderings at the second
public meeting on September 18, 2002. Residents supported the Brightfield concept but still had
deep concerns about the aesthetics, especially the fence, landscaping and height of the solar
panels. According to the Enterprise, "Neighbors of the Grove Street property where thousands
of solar panels may be located say they support the project. They just do not want to see it." 20
City officials decided the Brightfield should be designed as a "Solar Energy Park" to address
aesthetic concerns.
Figure 2.2121
Illustrative site section for the Brockton Brightfield
In March 2003 the MTC was so impressed with the projects progress that they amended
the original grant with an additional $79,500 for the completion of predevelopment activities.
The project was progressing well:
117 Ribeiro, "Does It Have to Be So Complicated? Municipal Renewable Energy Projects in Massachusetts". Page 42
118 Ibid. Page 43
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid. Page 43
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By March of 2003, Brockton had moved through the project concept and feasibility study
phase and obtained predevelopment support. It had worked with about 20 different actors
over the course of nearly three years. Brockton had won three highly competitive grant
awards, as well as a follow-on grant, totaling $247,965.122
However, many challenges lay ahead. The project required $3.6 million to develop a 500 kW
solar-plant. Obtaining $1.5 million in grant funds would be quite difficult because there were no
existing grant programs providing large grants for solar technologies. Over the next year the
project team worked tirelessly to secure the necessary grant funds. With the help of the Director
of the MTC's Renewable Energy Trust and other MTC staff, and lobbying of State
representatives by the President of Bay State Gas and other stakeholders the project team
eventually earned approval from the MTC Board for $1 million unsolicited grant proposal and a
$1,210,400 revenue guarantee under the Massachusetts Green Power Partnership. In order to
win support for the unsolicited proposal the project team had to convince the MTC Board that
the Brockton Brightfield would benefit the state as a whole. They made the case by emphasizing
its cost effectiveness over the typical MTC solar grants and the educational value of the solar
energy park. By the end of 2004 Brockton was still $416,000 short of the $1.5 million capital
development goal largely because the needs of the Brightfield project did not fit well with the
goals and purposes of existing programs: "DOE solar funds could not cover hardware and
installation; economic development funds whose primary metric is job creation had other
priorities; private foundations interested in renewable energy support education, outreach,
advocacy and policy rather than local implementation projects."123
Legal and Institutional Complications
The experience of the project team illustrates a steep learning curve associated with
carrying out a completely new type project. At multiple points the team was stunned by legal
barriers uncovered by their lawyers. After three years of feasibility studies, grant applications,
and cooperation with multiple state and federal agencies, the project team was stunned in 2004
when it learned from special council that the City of Brockton did not have legal authority to
finance, develop, own or operate an energy plant. Brockton needed a Home Rule petition
approved by the State Legislature to grant it such authority. Furthermore, because Massachusetts
122 Ribeiro, "Does It Have to Be So Complicated? Municipal Renewable Energy Projects in Massachusetts". Page 44
123 Ibid. Page 50
General Laws limited municipal bonds for energy improvements to public facilities to 10 years
the City also needed the state legislature to grant it authority to issue a bond with the 20 year life
required by the financing plan.'24
Another challenge resulted from a lack of clarity on which of the state procurement laws
applied to the project. The construction procurement law required that design and construction
be bid separately. This was problematic because solar power developers typically work on a
design-build basis. In order to allow the project to be awarded to the company that would submit
the winning design, "The project team asked that the Home Rule Petition [authorizing the City to
finance, develop, own, and operate the Brightfield] specify Chapter 30B Uniform Procurement
Act, which would allow the City to make its selection based on evaluation criteria rather than the
'lowest qualified and responsible bidder' as dictated by the construction procurement
regulations." 25 After many delays and complications and the expenditure of significant political
capital "Chapter 5 of the Acts of 2005: An Act authorizing the city of Brockton to install, finance
and operate solar energy facilities (House, No. 2007)" passed the House and Senate under
suspense of the rules on February 10, and was signed by the governor on February 17, 2005.
The timing of the legislation was critical because the MTC grant hinged on its passage.
Bay State Gas, a willing and crucial partner in the brightfield project, wanted to buy Lot
55 back from the city for site control purposes because the company was required under state
brownfield regulations to maintain the remedial cap for the foreseeable future. Of the 14.7
acres, the company only wanted to purchase the 8.174 developable acres and leave the city the
wetlands portion as a buffer for the Salisbury River. The City eventually convinced Bay State
Gas to pay $500,000, approximately $100,000 more than the appraised value, for the 8 acre
property.126 However, closing the deal would take nearly two years and involve several major
setbacks. The Assistant City Solicitor determined in August 2003 that the land transaction was
exempt from Chapter 30B of the state procurement law because it was a hazardous waste site.
On the verge of closing the deal with all of the city council and zoning approvals in place, this
decision was overturned by the City Solicitor in August 2004 meaning that a bidding process
would have to take place. A messy process followed with two unsuccessful RFPs. After Bay
State Gas won the third RFP City Council finally approved the land sale and lease-back in June
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid. Page 52
126 Ibid.
2005. In September 2005 the Assistant City Solicitor examined the deed for the first time and
discovered that the property had been conveyed to the city to be used as park land triggering
Article 97 of the Massachusetts Constitution. The land was originally donated to the city in 1972
with a restriction that "the property shall be used for park, recreational or conservation purposes
only." 27 The land transaction was prohibited without another special act of the State Legislature.
Furthermore, because the land had originally been a gift to the city, the Home Rule petition
needed the approval of the state's Attorney General before legislature would ratify it. The
special legislation allowing Brockton to sell Lot 55 to Bay State Gas was approved by the
legislature on November 16 and ratified by the governor on November 22, 2005.
A critical component of the project financing was an innovative marketing strategy for
the brightfield's future RECs that was devised under an EPA Innovation Working Group grant.
The model was similar to selling stock in a company at a premium price in the early years in
exchange for greater returns when the company grows later on. Under the model a customer
would purchase a fixed percentage of the Brightfield's REC production at a premium price for a
fixed annual cost in a long-term contract. The surplus annual cash flow created by the premium
would be set-aside in a fund dedicated for capacity expansions. The project would be expanded
in increments of 100-150 kW every 5 years or so. After each capacity expansion a customer
under contract would be entitled to the same fixed percentage of RECs produced by the now
larger Brightfield, thus paying roughly the same price for a greater number of RECs. The long
term contract (20 years instead of 1 to 3 typical for RECs at the time), the fixed annual price, the
initial price premium, and the capacity expansion scenario were all innovations. 128 Ribeiro
argues that furthermore:
This approach would: 1) reduce the $/MWh price to customers of RECs over time, 2)
allow for customers to support the ongoing development of renewable energy and meet
growing retail demand, and 3) help encourage customers to enter into long-term contracts
from the beginning or to renew existing contracts down the road (customers that did not
renew their contracts would lose future rights to a fixed percentage of the additional
capacity). The City of Brockton, in turn, would benefit from the increased electricity
production. Moreover, the expansion concept is well suited for self-funded brownfield
127 Ibid. Page 55
128 __ , "Case Study: Brockton "Brownfields to Brightfields" Renewable Energy Certificate Innovative
Marketing Strategy."
redevelopment (e.g. a 500 kW project can grow into a 1 MW project with the exclusive
use of internal cash flow).1 29
The proposal appealed to large firms that were attracted to the economy of scale the project
provided and had customers interested in solar RECs.
A 20-year contract was negotiated with Constellation New Energy, which had an
electricity supply contract with the City of Brockton nearing expiration. The contract balanced
the City's need for a revenue guarantee with the company's need for some pricing flexibility.
Constellation New Energy agreed to the following REC terms, "18 cents per kWh for years 1-5;
18 cents per kWh (with Brockton assigning the MGPP Put Option Agreement to Constellation
New Energy) for years 6-15; and 'market value' for years 16-20, with Constellation New Energy
to reasonably determine market value prior to each year."130 Additionally, the company will also
purchase the brightfield's electricity for 7 cents per kWh for the first 10 years, and at annually
determined market value for the second 10 years of the contract. This arrangement provided
enough certainty of revenue to facilitate long-term financing. The city executed a contract with
Global Solar for the 425 kW brightfield on March 17, 2006.
Figure 2.3 13
Gas Works site before Brightfield project. Brockton Brightfield under construction 2006
Conclusion
The majority of the barriers the Brockton Brightfield project encountered resulted from
state laws defining municipal authority or governing the manner in which public entities conduct
business. The brownfield remediation was largely complete when Ribeiro first contacted Bay
129 , "Does It Have to Be So Complicated? Municipal Renewable Energy Projects in Massachusetts". Page 58
"0 Ibid. Page 61
131 Source of images, , "Case Study: Brockton "Brownfields to Brightfields" Renewable Energy Certificate
Innovative Marketing Strategy."
State to discuss the brightfield concept. Thus the brightfield project team did not have to deal
with the common brownfield challenges of cleanup costs, determining cleanup liability, or the
technical challenges of determining appropriate cleanup standards and remediation measures.
There were technical challenges in designing the solar array in a way that maintained the
integrity of engineered barriers and would not interfere with site maintenance and future
remedial measures. These challenges pale in comparison to passing two Home Rule Petitions
through the state legislature or securing millions of dollars in grants.
The Brockton Brightfield was the first of its kind in Massachusetts, and as such produced
valuable public policy lessons. Guided by her experience managing the Brockton Brightfield
project, Lori Ribeiro joined the Policy Committee of the New England Clean Energy Council
(CEC) where she helped shape the Green Communities Act which removed many of the barriers
encountered by the Brockton Brightfield.1 32 The Act authorizes all Massachusetts
municipalities (not just those with municipally owned utilities as before) to own and operate
renewable energy generation facilities and to sell the resulting electricity and RECs. It allows
municipalities to issue15-year bonds or other notes of financing for renewable power generation
and raises the net-metering limit from 60kW to 2MW for electricity generated by wind and solar
technology. When the City of Brockton was developing its financing plan for its Brightfield,
Massachusetts did not explicitly authorize local government to engage in net-metering under a
third party power purchase or energy services agreement. This barrier was removed by Chapter
169 of the Acts of 2008, An Act Relative to Green (commonly called the Green Communities
Act), which authorized government entities to enter into energy services contracts, including
third party power purchase agreements for solar and wind power. Municipalities seeking a third
party power purchase agreement are now exempt from chapter 30B procurement requirements.' 3 3
While this change does not benefit a scenario in which the city would own the power plant as
Brockton owns the Brightfield, it provides a tool local governments can use to increase
renewable energy production.
Ribeiro and the CEC were among multiple voices advocating for the final contents of the
Green Communities Act. I do not want to overstate their influence on the legislation, but it is
132 Lori Ribeiro. Personal Interview. March 11, 2010
133 Memorandum dated July 15, 2008 from WilmerHale to the Massachusetts Technology Collaborative Renewable
Energy Trust. http://www.masstech.org/SOLAR/thirdparty/LegalPathwayAnalysis71608.pdf
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noteworthy that the legislation removed the most significant barriers residing in state law.' 34 As
the largest solar power plant in the state and a pioneering brownfield redevelopment project, the
Brockton Brightfield was a major accomplishment not just for Brockton, but for the state of
Massachusetts. It succeeded because of substantial support in state government and by the
state's federal delegation. Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that lessons learned by the
Brightfield project team were not lost on state policymakers as they drafted the Green
Communities Act, particularly when they were presented with draft language co-written by
Ribeiro.135
134 Because Article 97 is part of the state constitution it could not be affected by regular legislation like the Green
Communities Act. Rather it would require a process of amending the state constitution. While Article 97 may
constrain renewable energy development in general, it is unlikely to constrain renewable energy development on
brownfields. The Brockton Brightfield scenario in which the site is both a brownfield and coveyed as park land is
unusual. Lori Ribeiro. Telephone Interview. March 11, 2010
135 Lori Ribeiro. Telephone Interview. March 11, 2010
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Chapter 3: Steel Winds, Lackawanna, New York
Introduction
The Steel Winds project points to conditions that allow the redevelopment of brownfields
with commercial-scale renewable energy to proceed smoothly. First, key players laid the
groundwork for wind development before soliciting a developer. Paul Curran, the founder of
BQ Energy began assembling the stakeholders in 2003. Prompted by local advocates for
sustainable development, Erie County spent three years evaluating the potential for wind
development in the Buffalo area that not only highlighted the Bethlehem Steel Company (BSC)
Lackawanna Works site as the site with the greatest wind resources, but laid out the steps local
governments could take to facilitate wind energy development. Cooperation between all
stakeholders from the onset moved the project forward quickly. State policy offered powerful
incentives for brownfield redevelopment and renewable energy that made the project
economically viable. The former BSC Lackawanna Works site was extremely well suited for a
commercial scale wind farm because it had tremendous wind resources, outstanding
transportation and electrical infrastructure, and few competing uses. Steel Winds is an excellent
example of the benefit that existing infrastructure on brownfields may provide for installing
commercial-scale renewable energy facilities. Finally Steel Winds demonstrates this type of
project can improve a city's image and spur redevelopment interest.
The former Lackawanna Works site is subject to a RCRA corrective action. The site is
owned by Tecumseh Redevelopment Inc., which is a subsidiary of Arcelor Mittal. BQ Energy
(now Apex Wind Energy) was able to work with Tecumseh Redevelopment Inc. to carve a
moderately polluted 29 acre brownfield parcel out of this larger more contaminated property. By
doing this BQ Energy accessed highly valuable brownfield tax credits and liability protection
through the New York State Brownfield Cleanup Program (BCP). The success of Steel Winds I
is a testament to the BCP's effectiveness at facilitating redevelopment through providing critical
funding and liability protection. 36 The tax credits afforded by the BCP made Steel Winds I
possible. Future phases of Steel Winds will take advantage of the infrastructure improvements
made during Steel Winds I, particularly modifications to an on-site substation and transmission
136 Steel Winds I refers to the first 8 wind turbines erected at the BSC Lackawanna Works site.
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lines. Future phases of Steel Winds will not be eligible for Brownfield's Tax Credits but will
take advantage of the infrastructure improvements for which previous tax credits helped pay.
The chapter's first section summarizes the site's history and its impact on the City of
Lackawanna. A brief overview of environmental enforcement actions is also given. Next the
remediation specific to the Steel Winds parcel and the construction of the wind farm is
explained. The third section describes the origin of the concept of siting a wind farm at the
former Lackawanna Works site and how those actions paved the way for the Steel Winds project.
The fourth section describes the "nuts and bolts" of developing, permitting, and financing the
project. The experience of Steel Winds in navigating the necessary regulatory processes is
described. Of particular interest is the project team's success at carving a moderately polluted
brownfield out of the larger RCRA jurisdiction and the relative speed with which the project was
moved through the state's environmental review process. Exploring the project's financing
highlights the significance of brownfield tax credits in the financing strategy and the
sophistication with which major wind energy developers finance projects. Payments in Lieu of
Taxes play a significant role in wind energy development in New York, and the pros and cons of
this system are discussed in the section five. The next section highlights the image value
produced by the project. The chapter concludes by summarizing the lessons revealed by the
case.
Site History and Summary of Environmental Enforcement Actions
The BSC Lackawanna Works site is complex. The 1,100 acre property spans two
municipal jurisdictions with the majority of the site in Lackawanna and a small southern portion
in the Town of Hamburg. The overall property is still subject to an RCRA consent order dating
back to 1990 and Tecumseh is continuing the remediation process under supervision of the New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC). The site includes active rail
lines, ongoing slag mining activities and lumber distribution operated by other companies under
short-term contracts. An active port cuts through a portion of the site. The port is operated by
Gateway Trade Center (GTC), Inc, which owns the adjacent property. Light manufacturing,
warehouse, distribution and transportation facilities operate on GTC's land.
The City of Lackawanna was established in 1909. It essentially began as a company
town that resulted from the Lackawanna Iron and Steel Company relocation from Scranton,
Pennsylvania, to the shore of Lake Erie on the southern edge of Buffalo. The factory was made
into a fully integrated steel plant after Bethlehem Steel purchased it in 1922. It eventually
became the fourth largest plant in the nation, capable of producing 7 million tons of steel
annually. Coke, coke by-products, structured steel, steel coal, steel bars, and specialty products
were produced at the plant. 3 7
During the time integrated Figure 3.1
steel making operations were
taking place at the site, 440 acres
of man-made land consisting of
steel slag were placed into Lake
Erie (Figure 1). This area is
referred to as the Slag Fill Area
(SFA) by Tecumseh. 139 This land
filling took place in an area of the
lake that included two Federal
Dumping Grounds used for dredge
spoils and other materials by the Dates show extension of slag fill into lake Erie at the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers former BSC Lackawanna Works site.
(USACE). As far back as 1938, "the SFA was also used for the management of waste materials,
including sludge from wastewater treatment plants; sludge, dusts, and liquids from iron-making,
steel-making, steel-forming, steel-finishing, and coke-making operations; and dredge materials
from Smokes Creek."14 0
Between 1971 and 1977 Bethlehem Steel cut the workforce at the Lackawanna plant
from 18,500 to just 5,000, with massive layoffs occurring in 1971 and 1977. In December 1982
the company announced that it would lay off another 3,900 employees shutting down most of the
137 Sisk and Way, "R.C.R.A. Facility Assessment: Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Lackawanna Plant."
138 New York State Dept. of Environmental Conservation, "July 2009 Public Presentation - Part I.I.,"
http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/regionspdf/atp9tol2.pdf.
139 Tecumseh Redevelopment Inc., "Final R.C.R.A. Facility Investigation Report," (Richfield, OH: U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, 2004).
140 Ibid. Page 2
plant. 141 BSC closed its coke oven operation in September 2001, leaving a galvanized products
mill as the only remaining steel manufacturing related activity at the Lackawanna Works site.
The galvanizing operations were acquired by International Steel Group Lackawanna, Inc. as part
of the asset purchase agreement that was approved by the Bankruptcy Court on April 23,
2003 .142
In 2005 Tecumseh signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Erie County
and the City of Lackawanna committing to promote redevelopment on the site after cleanup.
The City of Lackawanna Planning Board, the lead agency for the Steel Winds Project under the
State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), issued a Negative Declaration to BQ Energy
for the Steel Winds project on September 7, 2005. A Negative Declaration means that the
project will not have significant negative environmental impacts, and therefore does not have to
file a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). This ruling gave initial approval to the project.
Construction of Steel Winds I began in September 2006 and the -eight turbines began full
commercial operation on June 5, 2007.143
Remediation and Wind Farm construction
The Steel Winds I parcel is a 30 acre strip of the former BSC Lackawanna Works located
within the SFA along the Lake Erie shoreline. Other vulnerable aquatic habitats bordered by the
site include Smokes Creek and Blasdell Creek. Several State wetlands and two state beaches are
also located within two miles of the Site, while two marinas lie within one mile north of the
site.144 The north end of the BSC Site is a nesting ground for thousands of birds.145 Fishing and
boating are common near the site offshore in Lake Erie. Prior to grading the SFA had a variable
topography due to the slag/fill deposition patterns. Wastes at the BSC Site are a result of three
primary operations: coal to coke production, iron ore to steel production, and support operations.
141 Jonathan S. Cherry, "The Windy City: Harnessing Power in the Neighborhood Landscape" (Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 2008).
142 Tecumseh Redevelopment Inc., "Final R.C.R.A. Facility Investigation Report." Page 2
143 "Steel Winds Project Achieves Full Commercial Operations; Wind Farm Represents a Significant Achievement
in the Use of New Clipper Wind Turbine Technology and the Revitalization of Former Bethlehem Steel Brownfield
Site," Business Wire, June 5, 2007.
144 , "Final R.C.R.A. Facility Investigation Report." Page 5
145 Dr. Ernest Sternberg and et al, "Wind Energy Initiatives for Greater Buffalo," (Buffalo: University at Buffalo,
the State University of New York, 2001).
Waste materials include coal tar, sodium phenolate, ammonium sulfate, naphthalene, light oil,
sulfur, slag and dozens more.146
The only discernible features of the Steel Winds I site prior to construction of the wind
farm were access roads and slag/fill piles. To access and erect the wind turbines, the area within
200 feet of each turbine was graded relatively flat with compacted slag fill. The eight windmills
have a 3-blade design with each blade measuring 153 feet long. The blades rotate atop 240-foot
monolithic tubular steel towers. Each tower is "anchored to massive octagon-shaped subsurface
reinforced concrete foundations measuring approximately 65 feet across by 8 feet deep." 147
The Remedial Actions implemented on the Steel Winds site included clearing the site of
existing vegetation, covering the entire site with one foot of clean soil (totaling approximately
38,000 cubic yards), and seeding to promote vegetative growth. According to the Site
Investigation/Remedial Alternatives Report/Interim Remedial Measures Report (SI/RAR/IRM)
for the site:
The estimated capital cost for this alternative is approximately $1.2 million. Annual
OM&M costs for groundwater monitoring, cover maintenance, and annual certifications
are estimated to be $13,500, resulting in an estimated 30-year present worth cost of $1.4
million. 148
Enhanced aerobic bioremediation was implemented to mitigate groundwater contamination.
Oxygen Release Compound (ORC@) Advanced TM filter socks placed in monitoring wells
release oxygen over an extended period raising oxygen levels in the groundwater: "In the
presence of this long-lasting oxygen source, aerobic microbes flourish accelerating natural
attenuation of gasoline and fuel additives (BTEX and MTBE), diesel, kerosene, jet fuel, gas
condensates, fuel oils, lubricants, bunker oil, PAHs, certain metals (arsenic), certain
pesticides/herbicides and certain industrial solvents (alcohols and ketones)." 149 Filter socks were
placed in three upgradient, off-site monitoring wells, and two upgradient on-site groundwater
monitoring wells. This groundwater treatment system had an estimated 30-year present worth
cost of $102,000.
146 Ibid.
147 BQ Energy LLC. and Tecumseh Redevelopment Inc., "Site Investigation/Remedial Alternatives Report/Interim
Remedial Measures Report: Brownfield Cleanup Program, Steel Winds Lackawanna Site," (Buffalo, NY: New
York State Dept. of Environmental Conservation, 2007). Page 4
148 Ibid. Page 48
149 Ibid. Page 47
NYSDEC approved these Remedial Actions as sufficient to meet the Remedial Action
Objectives (RAOs) for the site. RAOs "are site-specific statements that convey the goals for
minimizing or eliminating substantial risks to public health and the environment."150 The chosen
Remedial Actions were sufficient to "Remove or cover impacted slag/fill to levels protective of
human health" and "Mitigate loadings to groundwater from impacted slag/fill at levels that could
be expected to result in exceedance of groundwater quality standards."
Foundation excavation activities began on September 13, 2006 and were completed on
October 18, 2006. When the excavation team encountered visual or olfactory impacts in the soil/
fill, the material was segregated and staged on plastic sheeting north of the excavation. Because
the material was unsuitable for foundation backfill, and because space was limited for turbine
construction within the site, the staged material was later moved to the adjacent Tecumseh
property pending Turnkey (the environmental consulting firm contracted by Tecumseh) and
NYSDEC determination on soil handling requirements. The scrap metal removed from the site
was consolidated for off-site recycling by Tecumseh's licensed scrap recovery firm, Iron City
Recovery, and the tires were disposed off-site as part of Interim Remedial Measures (IRM)
activities associated with placement of a soil cover.
Paving the Way for Wind Development in the Buffalo Area
The Buffalo Green Gold Development Corporation, urban planning graduate students at
the University of Buffalo, and others were strong advocates for wind development in the Buffalo
area years before BQ Energy and UPC Wind (now First Wind) decided to develop a wind farm
in Lackawanna. These early advocates assessed wind resources and pushed local officials to
encourage wind development. They argued for the development of wind energy on brownfields
and offshore in Lake Erie and encouraged the county to take actions to attract wind developers as
part of a sustainable development plan. Waterfront brownfields redevelopment was one of their
goals, and the former Lackawanna Works site ranked high on the list of possible sites from the
beginning. These advocates encouraged county and city officials to conduct more in depth
assessment of wind resources and form a wind action group to determine how to make wind
energy development a reality. They were successful at gaining widespread support:
15 Ibid. Page 42
Despite initial skepticism about the effectiveness of an urban wind farm along Lake Erie,
the Steel Winds project was eventually supported and championed vigorously by a wide
range of local actors-politicians, public servants, renewable energy advocates,
businesses, the site's property owner, and the Buffalo media. The former Bethlehem Steel
site was technically ideal, had few competing uses, and had an image of industry and
contamination that fit well with the prospect of large-scale renewable energy. 151
The advocates consistently argued that one of the major benefits wind energy would bring would
be a great boost to the area's image. Many of their ideas have been implemented. Steel Winds
has succeeded in attracting positive attention to the area. However, aside from expansion of
Steel Winds, future wind energy development will most likely occur offshore in Lake Erie where
it will not use land that has greater economic development potential and where the visual and
auditory impacts will not deter residential and commercial development. BQ Energy received
50% support from New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA)
to perform a preliminary feasibility study for wind turbines off the shore of the BSC site in Lake
Erie. On December 1, 2009 the New York Power Authority issued a request for proposals (RFP)
for a 120-500 MW offshore wind project in state waters of Lake Erie or Lake Ontario.
Buffalo's Green Gold Development Corporation (Green Gold) was an early advocate for
sustainable brownfields redevelopment in the Buffalo area. Green Gold was established in 1998
by a coalition of businesses, environmental organizations, and local governments. It was created
to "recast the image and the reality of the local economy" and create the "Silicon Valley of
Green Business" in Western New York.153 According to the group's website, "The Green Gold
Strategy offers Buffalo the opportunity for economic and environmental revitalization by
favoring sustainable approaches to brownfield redevelopment, building design and industry."154
By 2001 the group decided that a wind power demonstration project could be the catalyst to
begin turning their vision into reality.1 55
Also in 2001 urban planning graduate students at the University of Buffalo conducted a
study of six potential sites for wind energy development in the Buffalo area.156 One of the three
sites the study recommended was the former BSC Lackawanna Works. The study also
151 Cherry, "The Windy City: Harnessing Power in the Neighborhood Landscape". Page 81
152 New York Power Authority, "Great Lakes Offshore Wind Project (.G.L.O.W.),"
http://www.nypa.gov/NYPAwindpower/GreatLakesWind.htm.
153 "Home," Buffalo's Green Gold Development Corporation, http://greengold.org/index.php.
154 "About Us," Buffalo's Green Gold Development Corporation http://greengold.org/aboutus.php.
155 Cherry, "The Windy City: Harnessing Power in the Neighborhood Landscape". Page 82
156 Sternberg and al, "Wind Energy Initiatives for Greater Buffalo."
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recommended the formation of an action group to focus on making wind development a reality
by overseeing "all of the developments of future wind energy initiatives."157 This led Green Gold
to form the Wind Action Group, which has met monthly ever since. The group's original
members included local businesses, wind advocates, and Erie County. Eventually several private
wind energy developers, including Paul Curran, started attending meetings.15 8
Paul Curran was a project manager for Texaco before helping to start BQ Energy. At
Texaco he created a business model of developing renewable energy projects at brownfield sites
building a wind farm in 2002 at the Nerefco oil refinery near Rotterdam in the Netherlands.
Having worked in the oil industry, he felt comfortable with the environmental and legal
complexity of brownfield sites and anticipated that there would not be as much community
opposition to wind projects at those sites compared to undeveloped sites. This was the case with
Steel Winds where the community overwhelmingly supported the project.159 In 2003 he began
working in Lackawanna to "put together the necessary pieces to make the project a reality."
According to Curran , we [BQ Energy] put together all the stakeholders, it took about three years
to get everybody to think it was a great idea." 60 He noted that when he first approached the
county about developing a wind farm on the Lackawanna Works site the county was already
measuring the wind there for the Erie County Shoreline Wind Study reviewed below.
The University of Buffalo study focused on wind development as catalyst for
redeveloping derelict industrial sites on the Lake Erie waterfront. Referring to the former BSC
site, the authors suggest:
A wind farm could make a large impact towards the redevelopment of the property. The
property could be divided so that areas not contaminated could be developed. The county
could create a municipal utility and distribute power to the newly created parcels. If this
utility can show that it produces energy, it would be eligible for low cost energy from the
New York Power Authority. The municipal utility would then be able to offer low cost
energy to companies that would develop on the Bethlehem Steel property. The legal
implications of this strategy still need to be studied. This development creates real
opportunity for the Bethlehem Steel site.161
Note the suggestion to locate wind turbines on uncontaminated sites that have been divided out
from larger brownfields. BQ energy and Tecumseh proved the effectiveness of this novel
157 Ibid. Page VII
158 Cherry, "The Windy City: Harnessing Power in the Neighborhood Landscape".
159 Ibid.
160 Paul Curran. Personal Interview. April 2, 2010.
161 Sternberg and al, "Wind Energy Initiatives for Greater Buffalo." Page viii
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approach at the BSC site. The study noted the following advantages of the BSC site: the area
was relatively secluded and devoid of public activity, and its existing electrical infrastructure
would allow for easy interconnection to the grid.
The University of Buffalo Study recommended placing 12 one MW turbines in the
southern area of the Bethlehem Steel site, where most of the slag had been cleared by a mining
company which sold the slag for highway construction. It also recommended that 19 two MW
turbines be placed offshore of the Bethlehem Steel Site. Based on the American Wind Energy
Association's estimate that on average every 100 MW of wind generates $1,000,000 in local
property taxes annually, The University of Buffalo study estimated that the City of Lackawanna
had the potential to earn approximately $850,000 in tax revenues by developing 85 MW of wind
power.1 62 The study proposed new recreational space, a "green" business park, and a "Windway
Trail" bike path running by the proposed wind farms along the shore from the lighthouse at the
mouth of the Buffalo River in Buffalo nine miles south to Woodlawn Beach in Hamburg.
The University of Buffalo study recommended actions local government could take to
encourage wind development. It suggested the cities of Buffalo and Lackawanna, and the Town
of Hamburg augment their zoning ordinances along four categories to ensure the rights and
safety of residents. The primary categories were setbacks, environmental, safety, and design.
The legislation that created the Bethlehem Redevelopment Area included zoning for industrial,
civic, and open space; and allows for accessory developments including picnic, transit, parking,
fence, and solar collection facility construction.1 63
Mark Mitskovski was the Director of Environment and Planning for Erie County from
2000-2005. In that role he would receive frequent calls from Laird Robertson at Ecology and
Environment-a multinational environmental consulting firm-pushing him to look at wind
development. In 2002 he collaborated with Robertson to win matching funds from NYSERDA
to perform a preliminary review of the Buffalo area's wind resources. The editorial staff of The
Buffalo News responded to the news of the new study with a skeptical editorial that ran on July
27:
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with a new effort to study wind power on the Buffalo
waterfront... [but] Nobody seems inclined to mention, though, that we've been here
before. Erie County used $1.6 million in federal funds to build a 120-foot-tall windmill
162 Ibid. Page 57
163 Ibid.
on the shore near the South Towns sewer plant in Hamburg 18 years ago, and it produced
only chuckles before it was torn down four years later.
OK, maybe technology has improved..., but before anyone starts decorating a
redevelopment-targeted [Buffalo] waterfront with dozens of 220-foot towers, with blades
reaching up to 330 feet, we ought to consider aesthetics as well as location. And as far as
location goes -- has anybody considered the inside of City Hall. 16 4
However, The Buffalo News would become a strong supporter of the Steel Wind project. The
resulting report, The Erie County Shoreline Wind Study (Shoreline Wind Study) was released in
2005 and identified the BSC Lackawanna Works site as the best location of the five studied.165
In addition to having the best wind resources, the study saw the brownfield redevelopment
potential as a positive attribute highlighting that the site offered easy access for turbine
installation and the existing electrical infrastructure. The authors also argued that "A series of
wind turbines would not visually detract from the current viewsheds on this industrial site and
could markedly improve the site's image."166 Wind resource is the most important factor in
determining the potential for commercial wind energy development, and the study attracted the
attention of wind energy developers.
The study identified economic incentives for Steel Winds including the federal
Production Tax Credit (PTC), potential long-term power purchase agreements, and the state's
RPS. The PTC provides a tax credit for equity owners of wind-energy development and can
enable wind energy to be financially competitive with conventional forms of energy production.
The study concluded that the PTC is critical to development of the wind-energy industry. 67 The
study also argued that not only are long term power purchase agreements (PPAs) important to
ensure the financial viability of a permitted wind energy project, "without a long-term PPA, there
is considerable risk: projects are more difficult to finance, the price of power will increase, and
164 "It Seems to Us," The Buffalo News, July 27, 2002.
165 Cherry, "The Windy City: Harnessing Power in the Neighborhood Landscape".
166 Tom Hersey and Kevin Neumaier, "Erie County Shoreline Wind Study: Final Report," (Albany: New York
State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA), 2005). Page 7-2
167At the time, the PTC was in place for projects installed through 2005. In 2009 the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) extended the PTC for wind through 2012. Introduced as part of the Energy Policy Act
of 1992, the PCT was allowed to expire three times between 1999 and 2004. Due in part to vigorous lobbying by
environmental groups and renewable energy industry advocates, the PTC has remained in place since 2004.
However, the ongoing uncertainty of its future can deter potential wind developers "Production Tax Credit for
Renewable Energy ", Union of Concerned Scientits,
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/solutions/bigpicturesolutions/production-tax-credit-for.html.
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reliance on fossil fuels will continue."16 8 Other factors that can encourage renewable energy
development include "Low-cost interconnection opportunities, local permitting requirements,
wholesale electric prices in the area, and opportunities for 'green' market sales." 169
The Shoreline Wind Study pointed to actions local officials in Erie County could take to
prepare for wind energy development. At the top of the list was reforming zoning codes to
explicitly allow wind turbines. The authors reported that:
Currently, none of the municipalities along the Erie County shoreline have specific
provisions for wind-powered structures in their local zoning laws, and thus there is no
clear path to applying for and obtaining special use permits for constructing and siting
wind turbines. Developers and project applicants would benefit from consistent, specific
criteria for permit applications and schedules and construction requirements, turning this
perceived barrier to development into a navigable and streamlined process.ro
However, local municipalities did not rush to pass new zoning ordinances that allowed for wind.
In a 2005 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Erie County and Tecumseh, the City of
Lackawanna tentatively endorsed wind development on a portion of the BSC site. The Town of
Hamburg did not pass a wind ordinance until 2007 after being approached by BQ Energy
regarding Steel Winds II.
Erie County first approached Lackawanna about developing wind on the BSC site in
2000. After 5 years of negotiation, a MOU for cleanup of the site was signed between the
landowner, Erie County, and the City of Lackawanna in April 2005. The agreement tentatively
endorsed a master plan for the site that included wind energy generation and public recreational
access to the waterfront as part of a 10-year mixed-use redevelopment effort. " The 2005 MOU
states "The County of Erie will seek to provide a minimum of $10 million of public funds for
infrastructure development (roads, water, sewers, lighting, public access and recreational
facilities), which public funds are key to successful implementation of the Master Plan."172
168 Hersey and Neumaier, "Erie County Shoreline Wind Study: Final Report." Page S-3
169 Ibid. Page S-2
" Ibid. Page S-3
171 Cherry, "The Windy City: Harnessing Power in the Neighborhood Landscape".
172 "Lackawanna Redevelopment Concept Memorandum of Understanding," Tecumseh Redevelopment, Inc.,
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Tecumseh's Redevelopment Master Plan for the Steel Works site as agreed to in the 2005 MOU.
Navigating the Regulatory Process and Project Financing
Both Steel Winds I and II required site plan approvals and special use permits. A use
allowed under special use permit means that it is allowed on a case-by-case basis. In New York,
site plans, special use permits, and a number of other municipal land use decisions must be
referred to the county's department of planning and environment (or equivalent) for input. The
county does not have planning authority but can make recommendations and is supposed to
provide a regional planning perspective. Under the New York State Environmental Quality
Review Act (SEQRA) certain projects require a State Environmental Quality Review.
The SEQR process is triggered if a project may have significant environmental impacts;
when state permits must be obtained prior to construction; or when the state must fund or
approve the proposed project. Key issues typically relevant to wind projects are avian
impacts, cultural resources, visual impacts, biological considerations, and noise. Local
governmental agencies and the public largely determine the level of analysis required
under SEQR. A developer can minimize risk and potentially reduce the likelihood of
preparing an environmental impact statement (EIS) by fostering community acceptance;
173 Chris Pawenski. Personal Email. March 19, 2009
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siting turbines on properties having no or few environmental issues; and being
knowledgeable about science, state policy, and local permitting issue. 174
This is similar to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) or Massachusetts
Environmental Policy Act (MEPA). The City of Lackawanna was the lead agency for the SEQR
for Steel Winds I and II. The City issued a negative declaration to BQ Energy for Steel Winds I
in September 2005.7 A Negative Declaration means that the project will not have significant
negative environmental impacts, and therefore does not have to file a full Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS).
As the lead agency the City was responsible for officially filing the Environmental
Assessment Form (EIF) and supporting documentation with NYSDEC. The lead agency is also
responsible for coordinating with the other affected jurisdictions and "involved and interested
agencies."176 This Coordinated Review process requires the lead agency to notify the other
parties after completion of each segment of the environmental assessment, such as intent to act as
lead agency, scope of work, and draft environmental impact statement. The various jurisdictions
and agencies are then allowed to comment on the lead agency's findings. The lead agency has
power to make a negative or positive declaration but is also responsible for coordinating with the
"involved and interested agencies," and for being responsive to their concerns.17 7 For Steel
Winds I the only other jurisdiction was Erie County. Completing the EIF involves performing
focused and limited assessments of the possible impacts on birds and bats, and of visual and
noise impacts. Because the site was environmentally impaired, an "eyesore" and a significant
distance from residences, the potential for negative impacts were minimized and a more limited
assessment was adequate. The review and permitting process was completed in less than 90
days, which is unusually fast. 178
The more difficult challenge was getting the site into the BCP because it was part of a
Superfund Site with an historic RCRA jurisdiction. A condition of the BCP is that a property
cannot be subject to any other environmental enforcement actions. A significant component of
the financing came from Brownfield Tax credits, roughly 18% of total cleanup and development
17
4 Hersey and Neumaier, "Erie County Shoreline Wind Study: Final Report." Page S-3
175 BQ Energy LLC. and Tecumseh Redevelopment Inc., "Site Investigation/Remedial Alternatives Report/Interim
Remedial Measures Report: Brownfield Cleanup Program, Steel Winds Lackawanna Site."
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costs for Steel Winds I. Therefore completing the Brownfield Cleanup Program was essential to
the projects viability. BQ Energy created a new Limited Liability Corporation (LLC), Steel
Winds LLC, to own and operate the project. Because this LLC was new, it had zero tax liability.
The Brownfield Tax Credits are refundable tax credits, so Steel Winds LLC received a tax refund
payment after construction of the first eight turbines (Steel Winds I). Unfortunately, the BCP
has been changed since the completion of Steel Winds I so that tax credits are now capped.
Table 4.1 - Brownfield Tax Credits for Steel Winds 1179
On-site
Groundwater
Calendar Site Preparation Tangible Property Remediation
Year Component Comp onent Com onent Total
Cost Credit Cost Credit Cost Credit Cost Credit
2008 $1,243,656 $223,858 $36,201,838 $6,516,330 $77,989 $14,038 $37,523,483 $6,754,227
2009 $88,947 $16,010 - - - - $88,947 $16,010
David Flynn is an attorney for Phillips Lytle LLP and was one of the attorneys
representing BQ Energy during the SEQR and permitting process. He described the experience
of the Steel Winds project as somewhat unusual:
From a legal and regulatory perspective I think the biggest challenges were different from
what you would expect from a greenfield wind farm... [The challenges] were not related
to the land use and the environmental review of the wind project -those went
spectacularly well in an almost unprecedented process in terms of duration. What
became an issue and complicated the development process were... a number of
gatekeeping issues for entry into the states brownfield program. On paper, at first brush,
it looked like we couldn't get the property we wanted into the program because of these
historic regulatory issues. So we had to work with [NYS]DEC and U.S. EPA to carve-
out from those historic jurisdictional issues the strip of land that we were interested in for
our project, which then allowed it to be accepted into the brownfield program. 180
Turnkey Environmental Restoration, LLC (Turnkey) and Benchmark Environmental
Engineering & Science, PLLC (Benchmark) are employee owned consulting firms, both founded
by Paul Werthman in 1989.181 These two companies represent Tecumseh as its environmental
consultants. In the case of Steel Winds, Turnkey and Benchmark were involved in all property
related aspects, including land leases and sales. They worked on behalf of Tecumseh to
negotiate the 35 year land lease with BQ Energy and they applied to NYSDEC on behalf of BQ
179 New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, "Brownfield Credit Reports,"
http://www.tax.state.ny.us/statistics/specialinterestreports/brownfieldcredit/brownfieldcreditreports.htm.
180 David Flynn. Telephone Interview. April 16, 2010
181 While legally separate firms, they essentially function as one with Benchmark performing engineering services
and Turnkey handling environmental services that do not require a professional engineer. Paul Werthman.
Telephone Interview. March 12, 2010
to get the property into the BCP. This required selecting a site that was "clean" enough to be
removed from the RCRA Consent Order, but "dirty" enough to qualify for the BCP. Thus
Benchmark and Turnkey worked with BQ to get approval from the EPA to remove the site from
the RCRA order. Benchmark and Turnkey also worked closely with BQ Energy to perform the
environmental site assessment and remediation on a design/build basis, which allowed the
process to be completed quickly. Additionally they assisted BQ in determining alignments for
the interconnection into the substation that was owned by Tecumseh, and assisted in the physical
layout of wind turbines and utility lines.
On August 23, 2006, the Buffalo News reported that the EPA had completed
investigation of the 1600 acre former BSC site handing oversight over to NYSDEC and allowing
the Steel Winds parcel to enter the state's Brownfield's program. Steel Winds had support from
its federal delegation. Congressman Brian Higgins had urged the EPA to proceed quickly with
this decision. Senator Charles Schumer called the project a "great chance for us to bring jobs
here by establishing a real niche for the region." 8 2 The first turbine was completed in February
2007 after the project broke ground in September 2006. Steel Winds I began full commercial
operation on June 5, 2007.183
According to the EPA, the Steel Winds I project cost $40 million.' 84 BQ Energy was able
to reduce its construction costs significantly through the Brownfields Tax Credits as illustrated in
table 4.1 above. According to Paul Curran, the project's lead developer, they decided on 20 MW
for the Steel Winds I because the interconnection approval process in New York is much simpler
for projects 20 MW and under than for larger projects. The modular nature of wind energy is
advantageous in that the turbines comprise the majority of capital costs. Because there is not a
high fixed cost for associated infrastructure a project can be effectively sized according to what
the site allows. This is particularly true on a brownfield site where the project can take
advantage of existing transmission lines. Curran created a business model around developing
wind farms on brownfield sites. He explains:
182 Maki Becker, "Proposed Wind Turbine Site Gets Ok," Buffalo News, August 23, 2006.
183 "Steel Winds Project Achieves Full Commercial Operations; Wind Farm Represents a Significant Achievement
in the Use of New Clipper Wind Turbine Technology and the Revitalization of Former Bethlehem Steel Brownfield
Site."
184 "Bethlehem Steel Winds Project, New York," U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
http://www.epa.gov/renewableenergyland/successstories.htm#bethlehem.
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Brownfields always dictate how many turbines you can place. That is, you have to avoid
areas of significant pollution; you have to avoid areas where someone is going to want to
do something in the future for cleanup purposes.185
Another factor that contributes to determining where to place the turbines when developing a
large site like the Bethlehem Steel Site are the planned uses for other parts of the site. Steel
Winds is built on one edge of the site along the shore, which is a significant distance from the
portions of the site targeted for development as a business park. As illustrated in Figure 3.3 the
wind turbines are located a significant distance from remaining steel plant structures, and even
further from the nearest residences, which are on the far side of the factory ruins and not visible
in the photograph.
Former Lackawanna Steel Workers site viewed from Steel Winds I.
First Wind financed its purchase of Steel Winds I from BQ Energy with 100% equity.
According to their Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Registration Statement:
We undertook [Steel Winds I] primarily as a means of testing and gaining operating
experience with the Clipper wind turbines. The project's relatively small size allowed us
to initially finance the project with 100% equity, which provided more flexibility as we
185 Paul Curran. Interview. April 2, 2010
186 Photo by author. April 22, 2010.
worked with Clipper to understand the technology and deal with start-up issues that can
be common in new turbine designs. 187
It is notable that First Wind saw Steel Winds as a chance to experiment with Clipper's new
Liberty turbine model. This model suffered from three types of defects that caused periods of
prolonged downtime for turbines at Steel Winds I during 2007 and 2008.
Steel Winds I benefits from PTCs and MACRS depreciation and produces revenue
through cash payments for the electricity and RECs it generates. In January 2008, First Wind
executed an agreement with Lehman Brothers for $208 million of tax equity financing for its
New York projects (Steel Winds I, Cohocton I, and Pratsburg I). In August 2008, $19.7 million
of this was received for Steel Winds I. Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 16,
2009. Consequently "First Wind repurchased the tax equity investor's interest in Steel Winds I
for $4.5 million and terminated the agreement and such tax equity investor's remaining funding
obligations."188The company sells the electricity at floating prices within New York
Independent System Operator (NYISO) Zone A. It hedges against price volatility through
financial swaps, and entered into a swap through 2016 for 95% of Steel Winds I expected output
with an affiliate of Morgan Stanley. 189 In January 2010, First Wind entered into a five-year PPA
with Commerce Energy, Inc. that includes a fixed-price contact for all RECs generated by Steel
Winds I.190
The Town of Hamburg controls the southern portion of the Bethelehem Steel site. When
the town was approached by BQ Energy in 2006 they responded cautiously. Steven Walters is
the Town Supervisor for the Town of Hamburg. He described the Buffalo area's first experience
with commercial wind energy as "a debacle, a complete disaster."191 In 1984 Erie County
committed $1.6 million in federal funds to build a wind turbine near the South Towns Sewerage
Treatment plant in Hamburg. The turbine did not work well from the beginning and was torn-
down four years later.192
187 First Wind Holdings Inc., "Amendment No. 5 to Form S-I Registration Statement under the Securiteis Act of
1933," Securites and Exchange Comission,
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1434804/000104746910002797/a2195887zs-la.htm.
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192 "It Seems to Us."
Some resident groups pushed
back against BQ's proposal and
the Town put BQ's expansion
of Steel Winds on hold while it
finished revising its 1987
zoning code, which did not
allow wind turbines and had a
structural height limit well
Image of Steel Winds I from Lake Erie with the Buffalo below that of the turbines
skyline in the background. 193prosdb QEeg.Aproposed by BQ Energy. At
one point a moratorium on wind development was considered, but strong support from residents
led instead to the passage of a Commercial Wind Energy Conversion Systems (WECS)
ordinance in June, 2007. City officials took their time and carefully surveyed WECS ordinances
from around the country before crafting their own comprehensive wind ordinance. Mark
Mistkovski, BQ's project manager for Steel Winds at the time, heralded the ordinance as
"probably the best wind ordinance within the state." 194 Positive aspects for BQ included that the
ordinance allowed the planning board to waive the 1500 foot setback between wind towers and
residences. The ordinance changed the noise allowance for waterfront development from hard
limits of 45 and 50 decibels to the average noise level along the waterfront. It allowed new
commercial wind proposals to be studied on a case by case basis with input from residents and
required the developer to post a bond to pay for demolition should the turbines cease operation.
195This last component safeguards against a repeat of the Town's previous experience at the
sewage treatment plant and prevents a defunct wind turbine from remaining in the viewshed.
Immediately after completion of Steel Winds I, BQ began to move ahead with plans to
add 16 turbines to Steel Winds II in June 2007. This expansion project uses First Winds existing
infrastructure, including interconnection equipment and site personnel. On June 20, 2007, BQ
submitted a Letter of Intent to the City of Lackawanna requesting site plan approval and area
variances for the eleven turbines proposed for the portion of the site in Lackawanna. A
comprehensive environmental impact report including a Bird and Bat Risk Assessment, a Visual
193 "Projects," Apex Wind Energy, http://www.apexwind.com/projects/projects.html.
194 Elmer Ploetz, "Commercial Wind Energy Ordinance Wins Approval," The Buffalo News, June 26, 2007.
195 Ibid.
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Impact Assessment and A noise Impact Assessment, was also submitted. The City of
Lackawanna then sent a notice of intent to act as lead agency along with the comprehensive
report to the Town of Hamburg and other involved and interested agencies. The Town of
Hamburg initially objected to the City of Lackawanna acting as lead agency for the portion of the
site located in the Town of Hamburg, and shortly thereafter Erie County objected because
Hamburg had objected. The Town of Hamburg withdrew its objection after meeting with City of
Lackawanna officials in early August.
The project site in Hamburg included portions of three different properties owned by
Tecumseh Redevelopment, Inc., Buffalo Crushed Stone, Inc and South Buffalo Railway
Company. It was complicated slightly by the Town of Hamburg's Local Waterfront
Revitalization Plan "which calls for a mix of public recreation, marinas, waterfront access office
and residential development on the Buffalo Crushed Stone site."196 All of the issues were worked
out and BQ received approval of the site plan and special use permit in March 2008. In 2009 BQ
Energy was acquired by Greenlight Energy Inc, which consists of Apex Wind and Axio Power.
The other project developer, UPC Wind, had changed its name to First Wind in 2008. The Steel
Winds project was structured so that First Wind would acquire it once constructed and become
the owner operator. By 2009 first Wind had assumed control over future expansion of Steel
Winds. Steel Winds II was being delayed by negotiations of the Payment in Lieu of Taxes
(PILOT), which will be discussed in detail in the next section. In 2009 First Wind requested
modification to the site plan for Hamburg which required re-approval of the site plan and special
use permit. In addition First Wind requested and was granted a variance for one of the wind
turbines that was sited too close to a property line.
Another factor that may have slowed the progress of Steel Winds II is that the property
the turbine will be built on is not eligible for the BCP because environmental site assessments
have not discovered contamination in the area on which the turbines will be built. Nevertheless
some of the parties are concerned about liability issues because of the proximity to the RCRA
property, and because the expansion will use infrastructure on that property. However, since the
parcel will not complete the BCP no release from liability to the state will be granted. The fact
that there is no liability release, even though there are no environmental issues, has complicated
196 Adam S. Walters, September 18 2007.
the deal. Without recourse to the BCP liability protection the parties have had to address the
liability issues through language in the lease agreement.1 97
By early 2010, First Wind, the Town of Hamburg, and the City of Lackawanna reached
an agreement on Steel Winds II. The project has been scaled back from 16 turbines to 6, which
will result in an additional 15 megawatts of capacity bringing the project's total size to 35 MW.
However, First Wind was still in the process of securing the necessary rights to develop and
operate the project. It had completed the project's System Reliability Impact Study and
Facilities Study and was working towards an interconnection agreement with the New York
Independent System Operator (NYISO) and National Grid. The company estimates the total
installed development and construction costs for Steel Winds II will be approximately $40
million, including approximately $5 million of financing-related costs and excluding prepaid
turbine maintenance and warranty costs. It intends to sell the electricity directly to the market
through NYSO Zone A and hedge against fluctuating electricity prices through a financial
swap.198
Battling over PILOTs
Under New York State law wind power and solar power facilities are exempt from
property taxes unless the municipality "opts out" of that exemption. This tax exemption is an
important driver of renewable energy projects in New York, but it is not without its drawbacks.
Because local governments can opt out of the exemption they can compel developers to negotiate
a Payment in Liu of Taxes (PILOT). Typically the town or city will negotiate the total PILOT
amount with the developer and negotiate with the other taxing authorities (county, school
district) on how to share the PILOT."199 These negotiations are often contentious and protracted,
which has been the case with Steel Winds. This policy is beneficial to developers for two
reasons. First, the PILOT is always less than would be paid in property taxes. Second, a PILOT
reduces uncertainty in the developer's pro forma. This is because the PILOT is a fixed and does
not vary over time as property taxes do. Conversely the system creates uncertainty for
developers because they have to negotiate a PILOT for each project and because the negotiation
197 Paul Werthman, Telephone Interview. March 12, 2010
198 First Wind Holdings Inc., "Amendment No. 5 to Form S-I Registration Statement under the Securiteis Act of
1933."
199 Steven Walters. Interview. April 23, 2010
can be prolonged indefinitely. From a public policy perspective the law is beneficial because it
encourages renewable energy development by reducing costs for an industry that has narrow
profit margins and it generates some revenue for local governments, but the process can create
animosity between taxing authorities.
BQ Energy and UPC Wind did not have to pay property taxes on Steel Winds I. 200 The
City of Lackawanna and the developers agreed to an annual payment of $12,500 per turbine
($5,000 MW), a sum both parties agreed was generous in 2005. This is just half of the annual
property tax revenue per MW estimated by the University of Buffalo study. The Lackawanna
School District was upset when they learned that under the agreement the City would keep all of
the money. Mayor Polanski sees his role as negotiating on behalf of the City, not the School
District, so he does not think he acted in bad faith.20 1 Regardless, the agreement set the City up
for a fight with the School District over Steel Winds II. Paul Hashem was the Superintendent of
the Lackawanna School District at the time. According to an article in The Buffalo News printed
after the announcement of the PILOT, "Hashem, who supports the wind farm and even has a
photo mock-up of the completed Steel Winds in his office, said he believes that the laws
surrounding the tax exemptions were so complicated that the schools were inadvertently left
out." 202
The success of Steel Winds I raised the City's expectations. Steel Winds I increased
development interest in Lackawanna creating potentially competing interests for the BSC site.
This led the city of Lackawanna to try to negotiate higher payments for the second phase of Steel
Winds. As negotiations over expansion proceeded the City has put pressure on First Wind to
squeeze the turbines into a smaller area of the site. 203 City officials do not want expanded wind
power to deter more traditional forms of development. People are more inclined to support
offshore installations, particularly if it is a substantial distance offshore, because there will be
reduced potential for visual and audio affects to deter development. Wind turbines have a very
large footprint. Most developments have a fall zone that precludes constructing buildings within
204
a distance from the turbine that is one and a half times the height of the turbine. Thus wind
200 Maki Becker, "Powering up 'Steel Winds'; First of 8 Giant Turbines Completed at Old Bethlehem Site," Buffalo
News, February 21, 2007.
201 Norman Polanski. Interview. April 23, 2010
202 Becker, "Powering up 'Steel Winds'; First of 8 Giant Turbines Completed at Old Bethlehem Site."
203 Cherry, "The Windy City: Harnessing Power in the Neighborhood Landscape".
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turbines take away the potential for conventional development on significant amounts of land
beyond the land need for the operation of the turbine itself.
In 2008, then project manager Mark Mitskovksi felt the ongoing contract negotiations
were interfering with the planning and zoning review and the environmental review processes:
"This stack of paper is $700,000 worth of work submitted to Lackawanna and Hamburg.. .stalled
by economic payment issues that have nothing to do with [the environmental review]".2 In
early 2010 First Wind, the Town of Hamburg, and the City of Lackawanna finally reached
agreement on Steel Winds II. The second phase has been scaled back to six turbines - four in
Hamburg and two in Lackawanna. First Wind had decided not to pursue the second row of
turbines in Lackawanna because additional testing suggested that the first row of turbines would
diminish the wind resource for the second row.206 Under the negotiated PILOT First Wind will
pay $10,000 per installed megawatt. Frontier Central School District and the Town of Hamburg
have agreed to split the PILOT net of the county's share 51.5% for the Hamburg and 48.5% for
the School District. Hamburg Town Supervisor Steven Walters expects the County's share to be
in the range of 5 to 10 percent.207 Hamburg and Erie Country are still finalizing the PILOT
sharing agreement. 208 Next door in Lackawanna the situation is still up in the air. According to
Mayor Polanski the Lackawanna School District is still pushing for a higher share of the PILOT,
which could stall construction because First Wind wants to reach an agreement with all of the
parties before proceeding. 209
Mayor Polanski thinks that the way PILOTs are negotiated impedes wind power
development. The development is held up as the taxing authorities argue over their share of the
PILOT. He thinks it would be much better if the state set a statewide standard to take the
uncertainty and contentiousness out of the process.2 10 The standard could go as far as
establishing a set sum per megawatt and requiring that it be divided among the taxing authorities
in the same proportion as property taxes. Another option would be to set the share schedule but
still allow the local government to negotiate the sum with the developer.
20s Cherry, "The Windy City: Harnessing Power in the Neighborhood Landscape". Page 94
206 Norman Polanski. Interview. April 23, 2010
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"Looking Good", Image Matters
Improving the image of the Buffalo area has been a goal of local wind energy advocates
since the 1990's. Promoters of wind energy wanted to create the image of Buffalo as a center of
clean industry including renewable energy in order attract associated businesses. The Steel
Winds project has undoubtedly had a positive effect on the region's image and earned
widespread support. These image benefits are highly valued by stakeholders. The number of
Wind Farm projects in Western New York is growing, but so far has not lead to the
transformation of greater Buffalo's economy that proponents seek.
The University of Buffalo study, the Erie County and NYSEARDA report, and the Wind
Action Group have emphasized wind energy development as part of a new vision for the Buffalo
area. The students from the University of Buffalo argued:
One hundred years ago, greater Buffalo was the country's hub of electrical power. Wind
power can be the first step in reclaiming and reinventing Buffalo and Lackawanna as
post-industrial, sustainable cities. Greater Buffalo has the opportunity to dramatically
recast its image and lead the nation by example.2 '
Erie County and NYSERDA highlighted the general redevelopment potential of the Bethlehem
Steel Site suggesting that a wind farm could be structured in a way to attract development.
The property is an ideal location for many new industries because of its efficient
transportation network, logistical infrastructure, and regional access to a highly educated
and trained workforce. As the cost of energy is important to any new industrial plant, this
site could be well-suited for future development. A wind farm would occupy only a
small fraction of the [BSC] property, allowing the remaining land to be developed in such
a way as to attract more industry and jobs to Erie County and Western New York.2 12
Bill Nowak has been a passionate advocate for wind energy and sustainable development since
founding Green Gold. In an opinion piece printed in the Buffalo News Nowak wrote:
Steel Winds is the largest urban wind farm in North America. The eight turbines on the
old Bethlehem Steel site provide monumental advertising both for our wind resource and
for the potential that exists for renewal on our urban waterfront brownfields. Any
manufacturer looking to make a clear, progressive statement to markets far and wide
recognizes the benefit of being associated with this project. As a pre-eminent example of
brownfield reuse, this project has been written up in publications from Reader's Digest to
the New York Times. For the time being, thanks to progressive political leadership from
211 Sternberg and al, "Wind Energy Initiatives for Greater Buffalo."
m Hersey and Neumaier, "Erie County Shoreline Wind Study: Final Report." Page 6-10
the City of Lackawanna, Steel Winds gives Western New York a huge leg up in the race
to establish our regional identity as a hotbed of green activity.2 13
Highlighting the cost of transporting wind turbine components from Europe, Buffalo's
transportation assets, wind resources, and the presence of vast areas of brownfields along the
waterfront with transmission lines and access to shipping, Nowak makes a strong case for
Buffalo to become a center for wind energy development and wind manufacturing. He calls for
efforts to attract a major European wind manufacturer:
Jaws drop when development officials from other areas see the wide-open expanses on
our waterfront. Soil-open land-is abundant and perfectly located for clean energy
development right in the windiest part of our region where rail, shipping and trucking all
come together. Incredible, underutilized infrastructure in the form of power lines and
supporting small manufacturing shops create a perfect neighborhood for clean energy
operations... In a larger sense, potential industrial sites in Buffalo offer a premier
location for shipping. Buffalo sits within 500 miles of 60 percent of the Canadian
population and 40 percent of the U.S. population. 2 14
Despite all of these assets the green development boom has not yet materialized in Buffalo.
Stakeholders see the positive image effects of Steel Winds as highly valuable. The
University of Buffalo study concluded that "The most significant reason for greater Buffalo to
adopt wind energy is the opportunity to radically change the image of the region."215 After Steel
Winds I was operational, many stakeholders would agree. Bill Eagan was Director of Economic
Development for Lackawanna at the time Steel Winds I was built. In his view the image-
changing effects and the development interest they can attract outweighed the PILOT revenue:
Eagan agrees that the "real direct benefit" of the project to the City is not the payments
from the developer, but the image-changing effects of the wind turbines and the new
development that this attention can attract. Eagan claims the Steel Winds project has
already spurred the arrival of a new gas station, a coffee shop, a Tim Horton's, a law
enforcement weapon facility, and the city's first hotel since the Lackawanna Hotel closed
in the late 1970s.2 16
Mayor Polanski told the Buffalo News: "its generated interest, and people know where the City
of Lackawanna is...It projects our city in a positive light." 217 Shortly after construction began a delegation from
Cleveland visited Lackawanna to see the project. A coalition of business leaders, government
213 Bill Nowak, "Clean Energy; Green Jobs Are the Wave of the Future," Buffalo News, December 2, 2007.214 Ibid.
215 Sternberg and al, "Wind Energy Initiatives for Greater Buffalo." Page 10216 Cherry, "The Windy City: Harnessing Power in the Neighborhood Landscape". Page 90217 Becker, "Powering up 'Steel Winds'; First of 8 Giant Turbines Completed at Old Bethlehem Site."
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officials, foundations, and environmental groups in Cleveland are now interested in offshore
wind. ArcelorMittal is also exploring wind development at sites it owns in Cleveland.218
Each of the first eight wind turbines is emblazoned with the Figure 3.5219
logo of one of the project partners. These include UPC Wind, BQ
Energy, the City of Lackawanna, Erie County, NYSERDA, the
Wind Action Group, NYSDEC, and ArcelorMittal. According to
Mark Mitskovski:
We sent a photo [of the logo on the turbine] to Mittal Steel,
and within 24 hours they had the photo up on their website.
Within 48 hours, the chairman had phoned his US
counterparts and said 'I like this. I want more.' This is a first
for Mittal Steel.2 20  Wind Action Group logo
on a Steel Winds I
The community was happy to see the site reused for clean industry. turbineturbine.
Earlier proposals for site reuse included a tire burning facility in 1988, which community
activists successfully prevented. 2  Steel Winds has enjoyed overwhelming support in the
greater Buffalo area. The residents of Woodlawn, the residential neighborhood closest to the
site, are excited about the expansion.m
Conclusion
The experience of the Steel Winds project supports the common arguments for using
brownfields for renewable energy facilities. The existing infrastructure was very valuable in that
the project reused an onsite electrical substation as well as transmission lines, transportation
infrastructure including an active port used for shipping turbines and equipment. It demonstrates
that a wind farm is a viable reuse for a site with limited development potential - not much can be
constructed on slag. It also demonstrates one of the distinctive aspects of renewable energy
facilities as compared to other brownfield developments-they can coexist with ongoing
remediation. The community viewed the project favorably because it helped to remediate and
renew a blighted industrial area as opposed "spoiling" a scenic natural vista. Because the site
was industrial and environmentally impaired, the environmental review process went
218 Cherry, "The Windy City: Harnessing Power in the Neighborhood Landscape".
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222 Steven Walters. Interview. April 23, 2010
exceptionally fast. This suggests the potential to simplify permitting and environmental review
is an additional reason to locate renewable energy facilities on brownfields.
This case reveals the importance of building public support for wind energy development
in advance of actual development proposals. Several actors were advocating for wind energy
development on the Lake Erie waterfront before the Steel Winds project materialized. Thus the
support was there when BQ Energy was ready to build Steel Winds. Facilitated by the
groundwork laid by NYSERDA, Erie County, the City of Lackawanna, and Tecumseh
Redevelopment, the project moved forward smoothly. An important motivation behind the
political support was an expectation that a wind farm would improve the area's image and
stimulate sustainable development. The wind farm provided an image boost to the community
that was highly valued by local officials and has attracted positive attention.
Steel Winds reveals a novel strategy for minimizing cleanup costs and facilitating faster
redevelopment. This strategy is to "carve-out" moderately polluted brownfields from larger sites
with areas of severe contamination to take advantage of the benefits of state voluntary cleanup
programs. The developers effectively worked with the property owner to separate a moderately
polluted brownfield site from a highly contaminated Superfund property, and thus access
valuable tax credits and liability protection through New York's BCP. Phased-redevelopment in
which renewable energy facilities are developed first can generate revenue for property owners
to support ongoing site remediation of the large site, can provide revenue to the local
government, and create an image of progress and attract development interest.
Chapter 4: Exelon City Solar, Chicago, Illinois
Introduction
Brownfields-to-brightfield projects are not hard to accomplish if they are economically
viable; the parties work cooperatively together and the legal authority is clear. In contrast to the
Brockton Brightfield, which took 5 years to complete, the 10 MW City Solar power plant was
completed in approximately one year. As a "stimulus project," it needed to be partially
operational by the end of 2009 in order to take advantage of bonus depreciation under the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). If the Brockton Brightfield epitomizes the
struggle of a small, cash strapped city to build, own, and operate a solar power plant when it
lacks the proper legal authority, City Solar demonstrates how quickly a Brightfield project can be
built when the project has federal impetus, and the owner is one of the nation's largest electric
companies partnered with the world's largest solar power developer and a major city led by one
of the nation's most powerful mayors. City Solar shows that the physical complexities presented
by brownfield sites, such as the presence of engineered barriers, old infrastructure, underground
storage tanks and foundations, and contaminated soil, can be managed efficiently if the
construction team is well prepared and has the full cooperation of all the project partners.
Figure 4. 1223 City Solar, like the
Brockton Brightfield and Steel
Winds, illustrates that improving
the neighborhoods image is an
important benefit of locating solar
farms and wind farms on
A portion of the City Solar power plant with homes in the brownfields. In all three cases the
background.
communities overwhelmingly
supported the project. This suggests that choosing brownfields is an effective way to address the
"siting puzzle" for renewable energy power plants.2 24 The project has produced tangible benefits
223 Photo by Author. March 24, 2010
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but potentially noxious facilities such as hazardous waste treatment facilities. Conflicts around siting utility-scale
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for the city and the community. Through the land lease and real estate taxes, City Solar and will
generate revenue for the city on properties that had been vacant for decades. The project
converted a blighted and dangerous property into one with a productive power plant that is also
an educational opportunity and something in which the community can take pride. City Solar
will be a tourist destination and will be used for educational programs for k-12 students and by
nearby colleges.
This chapter begins with a summary of the history of the site and surrounding
neighborhood. The City's early efforts at promoting redevelopment in WIRA are discussed.
The next section describes the site remediation and solar plant construction. This section
highlights the complexity of the site and the importance of preparation, planning, and
cooperation between stakeholders in overcoming the technical complexity and uncertainty of
constructing on brownfield sites. The third section describes the projects partnership structure,
the importance of the ARRA in making the project possible, and how the project was moved
through the planning process. The following section focuses on the importance of political
support in motivating the cooperation necessary to move the project forward in the short time
frame afforded by the ARRA. The chapter concludes by summarizing the lessons revealed by
the case.
Site and Neighborhood History
The parcels comprising the City Solar project are three separate contiguous brownfield
properties totaling 41 acres located in the Pullman neighborhood on the South Side of Chicago.
The properties lie in the West Pullman Industrial Redevelopment Area (WIRA) Planned
Management District. It is designated as an Industrial Park Conservation Area (IPCA)-TIF
district and an Illinois Enterprise Zone. The area was at the heart of Chicago's manufacturing
from the 1880s until the 1980s. Over the years major manufactures like Pullman Car Works,
Dutch Boy Paint, AM Forge, and Ingersoll have located facilities there. As these businesses
came and went they left behind a complex industrial fabric comprised of a variety of industrial
renewable energy facilities share similar characteristics. A region's residents may agree that the facilities are needed
but object to locating them in their vicinity, and the benefits may be diffuse while the impacts on the landscape are
experienced locally.
buildings, underground and above ground storage tanks, transformers and other infrastructure.
They also left behind a variety of contamination ranging in severity from minor to severe.
The parcels that make up City Solar consist of the former Chicago Building
Structures/Chicago Malleable Castings site (also referred to Areas 10 and 11 by the city) and the
former International Harvester site (Area 12). The city had acquired ownership of these sites
over approximately the last 15 years. All sites were enrolled in the Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency's (IEPA's) Site Remediation Program (SRP), which is the state's voluntary
cleanup program (VCP). Areas 10 and 11 are jointly enrolled in the SRP. The city spent
approximately $800,000 on site investigation and remediation including removal of asbestos
containing material (ACM), soil and demolition materials. Roughly $200,000 more was required
for remediation concurrent with development of the solar power plant. This will be paid for by
the first two years of rent payments to the city.225
From roughly 1911 to 1975 Area 10 was a foundry operated by Chicago Malleable
Castings. After that Chicago Building Structures used the site primarily for warehousing
building materials until 2002. The city acquired the site through its Tax Reactivation Program
(TRP) and demolished the last building in 2008. A 1998 Phase II evaluation found polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), elevated metal contamination, and asbestos. Area 11 was once
the location of the International Harvester stock sheds and railroad spurs prior to 1911.
International Harvester operated a manufacturing facility on Area 12 that produced parts for
tractors, refrigerators, freezers, and industrial power equipment until 1983. Navistar is the
successor to International Harvester and stepped forward in 1996 to enroll Area 12 in the SRP.
In 1998 the city acquired the property though its tax reactivation program, and in 1999 the city
and Navistar entered into a cost sharing agreement in which Navistar pays 100% of the
administrative costs of completing the SRP. The City and Navistar share the cost of the final
remedy. Contaminants addressed on this site included light non-aqueous phase liquid (LNAPL),
PCBs, PNAs, total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH), high concentrations of various metals, and
hazardous waste.226 As of 2007, the USEPA had funded approximately $950,000 of cleanup on
225 Dave Graham. Personal Communication. March 23, 2010
226 ARCADIS U.S. Inc., "Former West Pullman Works Remedial Action Completion Report," (Chicago: Navistar,
Inc., 2009).
the International Harvester site through a Supplemental Environmental Project established in
1998.27
First settled in the 1830s, rapid growth did not occur in the West Pullman area until after
the opening of the Illinois Central and Michigan Central Railroad station and the development of
the Pullman Palace Car Works in the 1850s. Significant transportation improvements and
marketing efforts by the West Pullman Land Association attracted many industries to the area
beginning in 1880s. By 1919 the residential population had reached 23,019 people, partly as a
result of an influx of Eastern European Immigrants. The population continued to grow rapidly in
the post World War I period and reached about 30,000 in 1930. Major manufactures locating in
the neighborhood over the years included International Harvester, Pullman Car Works, Dutch
Boy Paint, AM Forge, and Ingersoll companies. Products manufactured in the area included
locomotive brake shoes, farm implements, railcars, various metallic working and forging
operations, and lead-based paint production.228
The population peaked in 1980 at 45,000. Beginning in the 1960s, Chicago's African-
American population began relocating to the West Pullman area in large numbers. By 1990,
94% of the West Pullman community was African American. Suburban style tract housing
proliferated in the community in the post war era. Consequently, West Pullman developed one of
the City's highest rates of single-family home ownership. 22 9 In 1990, 72% of the homes in the
area were owner-occupied and the 1990 median housing value was $59,270. As of 2000, the
population was 36,649, 92% African American, with a median family income of $42,914. The
unemployment rate was 17.6 percent in 1990 and 10.5 percent in 2000.230
When WIRA was created as an IPCA-TIF in 1998 a majority of the area was vacant and
environmental contamination was ubiquitous. The former International Harvester West Pullman
Works site (now home to Exelon City Solar), the former West Pullman Iron Metal, and the
Dutch Boy site were already listed in the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Index System List (CERCLIS) indicating that they posed serious
threats to the environment and human health. The city's environmental consultant reported,
227 Dave Graham, March 19, 2010.
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"The entire study area has railroad right-of-ways that are devoid of vegetation and could have
been contaminated by chemical spills and herbicide applications; [and] the study area also
exhibits many other potentially harmful conditions which are distributed throughout the sites and
include above ground and underground storage tanks, asbestos containing material, PCBs, and
lead-containing materials." 231 The main east-west route through the area, 1 1 2 th Street was in very
poor condition and was completely vacant on its south side where the former Dutch Boy Paints
and International Harvester sites are located.
The area's infrastructure was deemed inadequate to meet the needs of modern industrial
uses. The building stock was deteriorated with many vacant buildings exhibiting broken
windows and sagging roof lines. Most of the existing manufacturing buildings were relatively
small and built between the mid 1950s and late 1960s. The majority of the major employers had
been gone for years. In 1997 two businesses, Ingersoll Products at 11900 S. Morgan Street and
U.S. Gear at 1030 W. 119th Street, occupied the largest active industrial facilities in the area and
employed the majority of workers. A neighborhood that was once a thriving center of industry
famous for manufacturing luxury railroad cars was now heavily blighted and in serious need of
232
new investment.
WIRA was established as an IPCA-TIF in 1998. The lifespan of a TIF in Illinois is 23
years. In order to qualify as a TIF under the Illinois Jobs Recovery Law (IJRL) the area had to
meet certain conditions including being a "labor surplus municipality,"233 being well serviced by
multi-modal transportation, accounting for less than 2% of the city's equalized asset value
(EAV) in the most recent valuation, and that redevelopment by private investment "in
accordance with public goals" could not be reasonably expected "without the adoption of the
plan."234
The IPCA-TIF intends to foster the area's revitalization through site assembly efforts,
soil remediation projects, and numerous infrastructure improvements. It is part of a larger
comprehensive planning effort which seeks to revitalize the West Pullman/Maple Heights
231 S.B. Friedman & Company, "West Pullman Industrial Park Conservation Area Industrial Jobs Recovery Law Tax
Incremental Financing Eligibility Study and Redevelopment Planning and Project Plan." Page 55
232 Ibid.
233 Illinois TIF law defines a labor surplus municipality as "one in which the unemployment rate was more than 6
percent, and 100 percent or more of the national average unemployment rate at any time during the preceding six
months." "What Is T.I.F.."
24 , "West Pullman Industrial Park Conservation Area Industrial Jobs Recovery Law Tax Incremental
Financing Eligibility Study and Redevelopment Planning and Project Plan." Page 21
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community and is an important component of the city's economic and industrial development
strategy.m Under the plan the city catalogued, environmentally assessed, and appraised vacant
and underutilized properties in order to establish fair market values. The city then sought to
acquire those properties through direct purchase, the Tax Reactivation Program in which the city
attains tax delinquent properties for the cost of the delinquent taxes, donation, leasing, and
eminent domain. Several area-wide infrastructure improvements were made to improve
circulation and accessibility within WIRA. These circulation improvements included entryway
lighting, signage, landscaping, and street widening to various streets. Improvements were also
made to water and sewer systems.
In making the case for establishment of the ICPA-TIF, the Eligibility Study described the
challenges facing the neighborhood:
The environmental contamination, obsolete industrial structures, area abandonment, and
dated infrastructure have made the area unattractive for new investment. Without
substantial attention, the West Pullman IPCA will continue to be an underutilized and
uncompetitive industrial area, aggravating existing conditions and exerting negative
influences on the surrounding neighborhood.236
However, the ICPA Eligibility Report also highlighted the community's assets. The area has the
locational advantages of an industrial history, diverse transportation systems, and an accessible
industrial workforce. Exelon recognized the benefits of these assets. In presenting the city Solar
proposal to City Council it noted:
The existing site has accessible electric power interconnection infrastructure - a
Commonwealth Edison (ComEd) distribution line runs along the north side of the project
site, facilitating access to the electricity grid, thereby requiring less excavation and soil
disturbance in order to put the project into service. Road access to the site is excellent,
and since the project site is not immediately adjacent to any residential neighborhoods,
construction and operation of the facility will result in minimal disruption to surrounding
areas.237
While not "immediately adjacent" to residential properties, the area is surrounded by residential
neighborhoods that are predominantly occupied by working class families, are well maintained
and well organized around block clubs. The project hired construction workers from these
surrounding neighborhoods.
235 Ibid. Page 15
236 Ibid. Page 14
m Exelon Generation Company LLC., "City Solar, Chicago I.L.: Presentation Material for C.D.C. And City Council
"(Chicago: City of Chicago Department of Environment, 2009). Page 8
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Site Remediation and Solar Plant Construction
Navistar began site remediation activities on the Former West Pullman Works (FWPW)
site in 1996. The city acquired the property in 1998. That year the City of Chicago contracted
with Rust Environment and Infrastructure (Rust) to oversee the removal of over 2,600 tons of
construction debris containing ACM. During 1999 and 2000 Navistar performed a number of
remedial actions on the site including clearing the site of trees to allow for surface cleaning;
removing oily liquids from vaults and sewers, removal of USTs, removal of miscellaneous
debris, removal of approximately 2,930 tons of ACM, and removal and disposal of PCB-
impacted materials. In-situ treatment of groundwater contaminated with hexavalent and
trivalent chromium was completed successfully in early 2007.2 38IEPA approved a PCB remedial
objective (RO) of 1 mg/kg, or 1 part per million (ppm). During the summer of 2009 soils with
PCB concentrations exceeding 50 ppm were taken from the site and disposed of in Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA) permitted landfills. Soils with PCB concentrations between
1ppm and 50ppm were disposed of off-site as non-hazardous special waste at a landfill. 239 Soils
containing hazardous lead as defined by RCRA were transported to an appropriate disposal
facility in Illinois. Non-Hazardous Special Waste consisting of TPH, PNA, and soils and
concrete with PCB concentrations below 50 ppm were disposed of in two local landfills.
Approximately 20 new engineered barriers were installed throughout the site, which already
contained numerous concrete and asphalt engineered barriers. The barriers, including their
geographic coordinates will be recorded on the property deed after Navistar receives the NFR
letter for the site. As an institutional control, some of the engineered barriers are marked by
construction worker caution signs.
Prior to the solar plant construction, asbestos containing materials (ACM) left behind by
previous demolition activities covered roughly 50% of Areas 10 and 11. This ACM debris had
been weathered and degraded by exposure to the elements. In preparation for the solar plant, the
CDOE retained Tetra Tech and Carnow, Conibear and Associates (CCA) to assess the
contamination and create a materials management plan. Tetra Tech and CCA simulated worst
case dust generation conditions at three locations on the site in order to evaluate potential
238 ARCADIS U.S. Inc., "Former West Pullman Works Remedial Action Completion Report."
239 Ibid.
exposure to asbestos fibers. This involved a "rake test" in which the soil is agitated with
constant raking during dry conditions to simulate the dust created by construction activities. Air
samples taken during raking were analyzed in according to International Standard Organization
Method 10312. The tests concluded that areas containing one type of ACM, Transite debris,
posed a potential risk of asbestos exposure for construction workers. Based on discussion of the
proposed construction activities between Tetra Tech and SunPower representatives, a
construction worker exposure frequency of 30 days was calculated based on six five-day works
240weeks of construction activities.
The City Solar site viewed from the northeast in September 2010 before construction began.
Construction involved clearing and grubbing, installing support columns, installing solar
panels, excavating soil in order to construct a retention basin, trenching, and installing utility
lines in paved and unpaved areas of the site. In order to avoid redistribution of ACM, areas with
ACM were not to be graded, scraped, or bulldozed. ACM soil and debris containing ACM were
either taken off site and disposed of or consolidated in areas that already contained ACM to
240 "Asbestos Management Plan: Former Chicago Malleable Castings/Chicago Building Structures Site," (Chicago:
Tetra Tech Inc., 2009).
241 Dave Graham. Personal Communication. March 24, 2010
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prevent the contamination of other areas of the site. In the event of dusty conditions a water
truck was brought on site to wet the soil and debris in order to limit the creation of ACM
containing dust. A critical concern for IEPA was that contaminants not be moved from
contaminated areas to non-contaminated areas.242
CDOE strives to "keep as much material onsite as possible to minimize disposal costs,
reduce road traffic and conserve landfill space." Remediation costs were minimized by
remediating the site to industrial standards using risk assessment, engineered barriers and deed
restrictions. The city enacted a groundwater ordinance in 1997 prohibiting the installation of
potable water wells in the city. The Illinois' VCP requires complete evaluation of groundwater
but allows the remedial applicant to rely on this groundwater ordinance to prevent human
consumption. The result is that most brownfield sites within Chicago do not require groundwater
remediation.
Figure 4.22 Navistar as the party responsible for the
cleanup provided Exelon and SunPower with all
of the relevant environmental documentation
and site plans. On September 15, 2009,
ARCADIS submitted the Remedial Action
Completion Report for Area 12 to IEPA.
SunPower and Turner Construction (Turner)
began redevelopment on Area 12 in October
2009. During subsurface construction from
Removal of drums from Building 9 basement October through November Exelon observed
four potential recognized environmental conditions. These included three drums in the basement
of Building 9, unidentified insulation-like material in the south central portion of the former
International Harvester site, stained soil and hydrocarbon orders in one section, and a sump pit.
Two underground storage tanks (USTs) were discovered as well. The three drums were
determined to contain non hazardous solid waste and were transported to an appropriate disposal
facility. The insulation-like material was determined not to contain asbestos and was buried
where it had been found. The sump was removed without discovering additional contamination.
242 "Asbestos Management Plan: Former Chicago Malleable Castings/Chicago Building Structures Site."
243 Gregory A. Vanderlaan, "Remedial Action Completion Report Addendum: Former West Pullman Works,
Chicago Illinois," (Chicago: ARCADIS, 2010).
Removal of both USTs resulted in the CDOE declaring a release for each when the excavation
activities turned up stained soil smelling of hydrocarbons. The stained soils were placed back
into the excavation areas and buried. Excavation of the second UST revealed a subsurface
foundation wall that extended to a depth of more than 14 feet.
Upon request a representative of IEPA Leaking Underground Storage Tank division
confirmed ARCADIS' could proceed with the SRP under the 20 day certification period, as
opposed to the 45 day certification period. On December 8, 2009, ARCADIS conducted a site
inspection of the FWPW site to evaluate impacts of solar plant construction on engineered
barriers at the site. A number of barriers installed by Navistar had been penetrated or otherwise
Site plan showing location of engineered barriers, former USTs, and excavations.
disturbed by installation of the solar modules. Upon completion of solar plant construction
Exelon repaired and or reconstructed the barriers. On behalf of the City of Chicago and
Navistar, ARCADIS conducted an inspection to verify and document that all barriers are intact
or repaired.
244 Gregory A. Vanderlaan, Richard E. Bartelt, and Vince Ekert, "Former West Pullman Works Remedial Action
Completion Report," (Chicago: Arcadis, 2009).
245 Vanderlaan, "Remedial Action Completion Report Addendum: Former West Pullman Works, Chicago Illinois."
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The engineered barriers exist to hold contaminated soil in place and prevent people from
inhaling or ingesting contaminated soil. Therefore when Todd Gross, IPEA's Project Manager
for the FWPW site, learned of the disruption and reconstruction of the engineered barriers he
became quite concerned that contaminated soil had been spread from one part of the site to
another. This would result in recontamination of the site and a change in site conditions so that
they no longer matched the ESAs and RACR. On March 24, 2010, Todd Gross met with
representatives from Navistar, ARCADIS, CDOE, Exelon, SunPower, and Turner Construction
for a briefing on the impact of construction on the engineered barriers and remedies implemented
by the construction team. I was fortunate to be allowed to join the meeting. ARCADIS had
provided Exelon, SunPower, and Turner with detailed site plans showing the location of all of
the engineered barriers. The construction team overlaid their engineering drawings for the solar
plant with the site plan showing the location of the engineered barriers. The combined site plan
that resulted had a detailed identification grid so that Exelon's project manager could show Gross
which barriers had been ruptured and where the USTs had been removed. Any soil excavated
during construction of the solar plant was put back in place and the barrier above it was repaired.
After the briefing Gross' concerns had been largely addressed. He no longer feared that
the site had been recontaminated but stressed that IEPA had to be able to verify the remedies in
place during future inspections. After the briefing and related discussion the group inspected all
of the engineered barriers that had been affected. The site contains approximately 40 engineered
barriers, 9 of which were determined to need further repairs after touring the site with IEPA.
Additional modifications to some engineered barriers will be necessary, but Gross characterized
the issues as "minor." The extensive and careful documentation by ARCADIS and the
construction team allowed the project to proceed smoothly despite a very complex site with
numerous engineered barriers. It demonstrates that the site complexities presented by
brownfields can be managed efficiently with appropriate planning and information sharing.
Putting the Project Together
According to Dave Graham, City Solar is a case of "the stars aligning." 246 Graham is an
Environmental Engineer for the CDOE and has been working on remediating and redeveloping
246 Victory Heights/Maple Park Advisory Council Meeting. West Pullman Library, 830 West 1 19 th Street, Chicago,
Illinois. March 24, 2010
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brownfields in WIRA for ten years. One morning in February 2009 he was told to go to a
meeting. Inside the conference room sat representatives from Exelon Corp. and SunPower.
Exelon and SunPower wanted to build a large scale solar power plant in the Chicago area, maybe
on the Lake Michigan waterfront, at one of the airports, or some other location where the project
would be highly visible. Thus, the Exelon City Solar project is what a real estate developer
might call a case of a "use looking for a site." The Department of Environment and the
Department of Community Development convinced Exelon and Sunpower to build the plant in
West Pullman on Areas 10, 11, and 12. Such a large vacant industrial area in a dense urban
setting is rare. The site offered beneficial infrastructure including an adjacent high voltage
distribution line owned by ComEd, the electric utility serving the area and had excellent road
access. Development interest was limited in the area and the City argued the project would be a
big boost to the West Pullman community.
City Solar was a stimulus (ARRA) project from the beginning and it included close
collaboration between the City and the Obama Administration to make the project a reality.247
Exelon Generation Company LLC (ExGen) is the subsidiary of Exelon that developed City Solar
with SunPower. When the project was presented to City Council in May 2009, ExGen
highlighted how the project would contribute to the goals of the federal stimulus bill, stating,
"This project meets the overall objective of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009 because it is a commercially feasible renewable energy project that is 'Shovel Ready' and
can be rapidly deployed in 2009, helping to stimulate economic recovery."248 The project
depended on a Federal Loan Guarantee from DOE to be economically viable. ExGen and
SunPower's project timeline was structured around this loan:
Given the approval date for the loan guarantee from the U. S. Department of Energy
Loan Guarantee Project Office is unknown, the project will be executed in two phases.
The second Phase will follow loan approval. The first phase involves completing the
design, ordering material, establishing security, clearing the property, and installing 3,900
posts in "areas 10 & 11", the western 20 acres of the site that does not require soils
remediation.249
In the end, they decided to go ahead with the second phase before receiving the guarantee. The
DOE Loan Guarantee Project Office had become backlogged from the increase in applications
247 Dave Graham. Phone Interview. April 1, 2010
248 Exelon Generation Company LLC., "City Solar, Chicago I.L.: Presentation Material for C.D.C. And City Council
". Page 2
249 Ibid. Page 6
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that resulted from the additional loan guarantee funds made available by ARRA. ARRA also
included bonus depreciation under the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS).
Most types of solar, geothermal, and wind energy technologies have a depreciable life of five
years, as do several other renewable energy technologies. ARRA included bonus depreciation
such that "the owner is entitled to deduct 50% of the adjusted basis of the property in 2008 and
2009," with the remaining 50% of the adjusted basis to be depreciated over the regular
depreciation schedule.2 5 0 ExGen wanted to take advantage of this bonus depreciation, which
meant that the project had to be at least partially operational by December 31, 2009. Therefore
they decide to proceed to Phase II confident that the loan guarantee would eventually be
approved.
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250 Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, "Modified Accelerated Cost-Recovery System
(Macrs) + Bonus Depreciation (2008-2009),"
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?IncentiveCode=US06F.
251 Paul Ellsberg, March 11, 2010.
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I Figure 4.5m
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Table 4.1
City Solar
Sources and Uses of Funds (In Millions) 25 2
Sources Uses
DOE Loan $50.27 EPC Costs $55.00
Exelon $13.22 Owner's Construction $3.81
Costs
Total Project Funding $63.49 Construction $3.20
Contingency
Construction Subtotal $62.01
Capitalized Interest $0.84
Financing Fees $0.65
Total Source of Funds $63.49 Total Uses of Funds $63.49
Dollar amounts are in nominal (2009) dollars
ExGen and SunPower Corporation entered into an Engineering, Procurement and
Construction contract in which SunPower was responsible for design, engineering, procurement,
and construction of the facility. According to Exelon, "SunPower was chosen for the following
reasons: (1) it is vertically integrated as both a manufacturer of solar panels and as a system
installation company; (2) its solar cell conversion efficiency is the highest in the industry,
allowing for the most energy output possible on a given site; (3) it has deep experience in design
and installation; and (4) its officials immediately and enthusiastically endorsed the concept - the
utilization of City-owned land in order to build a 10 MW project on a brownfield site."253
SunPower forms joint ventures to develop and sell solar power plants to partners such as
developers, independent power producers, utilities and financiers. These partners buy power
plants developed by SunPower and enter into long term operating and maintenance service
agreements with the company's Service division. ExGen owns and controls approximately 33
GW of capacity, which is among the largest generation portfolios in the country. It is also the
largest wholesale marketer of wind energy east of the Mississippi River.
252 "City Solar, Chicago I.L.: Presentation Material for C.D.C. And City Council ", (Chicago: Exelon Generation
Company, L.L.C., 2009).
253 Exelon Generation Company LLC., "City Solar, Chicago I.L.: Presentation Material for C.D.C. And City Council
254 Ibid.
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SunPower will be responsible for operations and maintenance and will staff the facility
during business hours. The company will continuously monitor the facility and its performance.
Exelon is installing security cameras and providing security guards. Exelon Solar Chicago LLC
was created as wholly owned subsidiary of ExGen to own the facility and sell the electricity and
associated RECs produced by the facility to ExGen.
The passive nature of photovoltaics is a selling point for gaining community support.
Exelon called this passive nature "a key virtue of solar energy." It argued before City Council
that, "Once commissioned and operating, the facility will passively track the path of the sun
throughout the course of the day, making no noise and emitting no products." 255 The
Department of Zoning and Land Use Planning agreed, deeming the solar plant a Minor Utility
and Service, which is an as-of-right use in WIRA. According to Exelon, this determination was
made because of "the passive nature of the proposed use, the absence of any significant adverse
impacts on surrounding areas, and the potential environmental benefits gained by reducing
Chicago's dependence on fossil fuels."256 Because the project did not require a Special Use
permit, no Zoning Board of Appeals action was required and the project moved through the
normal building permit process.
SunPower's designers and engineers worked with the Chicago-based engineering design
firm Environmental Design International Inc. to design the system in accordance with local
codes. After the building permit application was submitted, the Chicago Department of Zoning
and Land Use Planning examined the full set of plans for zoning and landscape review. After
Zoning and Land Use Planning approval, the plans were referred back to the Chicago Building
Department for a full review. This included structural, fire, electrical, storm water, streets and
rights of way, and contaminated soils removal review.
Strong Political Support Enabled Full Cooperation
The City Solar project enjoyed strong political support from the time Exelon and
SunPower first approached the City onward, and this support motivated the level of cooperation
necessary to move the project forward quickly. There were several reasons the project received
such a high level of political support. It brought non-polluting development to a blighted
255 "City Solar, Chicago I.L.: Presentation Material for C.D.C. And City Council ". Page 8
256 Ibid. Page 5
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neighborhood that had experienced minimal development in several decades. Because it is the
largest urban solar power plant in the nation and a brownfield redevelopment, City Solar is an
unprecedented project that will improve the neighborhood's image. The fact that it was a
stimulus project that supported the President's clean energy agenda added to its appeal. Along
with solar energy training programs it brings hope that it will lead to further development of the
clean energy economy in Chicago. The City of Chicago sees the project as an important step
towards its goals of reducing power plant emissions by 20% and developing a green industry
workforce in Chicago. 25 7
City Solar is a breakthrough demonstration project. The project is remarkable because it
is the largest urban solar power plant in the U.S. and is located in a region not known for
deploying solar power. Exelon highlighted these aspects and linked the project to the Obama
Administration clean energy goals:
To our knowledge, City Solar would be the largest ground-based PV system installed in a
major urban setting in the United States and, we believe, the world. In addition, City
Solar will be built in the Midwest, where only a few small rooftop projects have been
attempted. We believe that the breakthrough application of large-scale solar power in
non-traditional regions as introduced by City Solar may spur similar installations, thus
expanding the overall contribution of renewable solar power to the country's generation
portfolio, a key Obama Administration platform. The 39-acre site will be visible from
the air as travelers fly into and out of Midway Airport. It will serve as a landmark and
source of pride for the West Pullman and greater Chicago communities. 258
Although not mentioned in the previous quote, the fact that it is a brownfield redevelopment
project is also extraordinary. The significance of the project was recognized immediately by
public officials. Everyone in city government was supportive from the beginning, including the
Mayor, Alderman Carrie Austin of the 3 4th War, the Departments of Environment, Community
Development, and Zoning and Land Use Planning.
Alderman Austin gave her support to the project in February 2009. She supported the
plan for cleanup and for the city to lease the land to Exelon, and supported the Obama
Administration's clean energy agenda. The Alderman had to approve anything involving a city
ordinance, whether it was removing an ally from the city's street system, approving wrought iron
fencing instead of chain-link fencing, or giving permission for Turner and SunPower to use City
Owned property as a staging area.
257 _ "City Solar, Chicago I.L.: Presentation Material for C.D.C. And City Council
258 "City Solar, Chicago I.L.: Presentation Material for C.D.C. And City Council ". Page 8
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The community's main concern was cleanup. Community members want to see issuance
of a No Further Remediation letter as proof that the site is clean. SunPower's design will
improve the site through perimeter landscaping and decorative fencing surrounding the facility.
Low-growing shrubs that will not shade the solar modules will be planted throughout. As part of
the storm water management plan the site is surrounded by a berm made from the materials
collected when the site was cleared for grading. The berm will be planted with native grasses.
According to Chester Wilson, Chief of Staff for Alderman Austin, the site will be tourist
attraction. A visitor center with indoor and outdoor observation areas will be built at the City
Solar site. Solar technology training programs are another community benefit. According to
Wilson, SunPower volunteered a training program before the Alderman even asked for it. The
Alderman's goal is to make sure the training programs benefit the community. SunPower asked
for six locations, and the Alderman suggested two elementary schools, White Edward and
Johnnie Coleman Academy, two high schools, Christian Fenger Academy High School and
Julian High School, and two colleges, Chicago State and Olive Harvey.2""
The completed project redeveloped a piece of contaminated property that would not have
been developed otherwise because it presented numerous physical constraints. The city did not
have money to remediate it to a point where it would be buildable for other uses. The site
presented constraints in the form of deep trenches and numerous engineered barriers.
Development potential was further limited because the building foundations that remained on the
site were so deep and difficult to remove. The only reasonable way to develop on the property
would be to backfill, grade, install slab, and build on top of the slab.
Alderman Austin is the Budget Chairman for the city. Thus, she wanted to spread the
project's economic benefits and make sure that qualified people from the surrounding area were
hired for construction and other jobs. Workers were hired from the 9th 3 4th 2 st and I 9 th
Wards. However, one area for which the neighborhood could not supply workers was specialty
welding. Many of the union welders in these four wards were not qualified to do the specialty
welding required for the solar installation. The project also sourced from two local steel
companies. This project created approximately 50 domestic offsite and 150 onsite jobs,
259 Chester Wilson. Interview. March 25, 2010
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including engineering, electrical, and construction. Additionally, seven to eight full- and part-
time workers will be hired to maintain the facility once it is operational.
Wilson believes that if Figure 4.6
there is a viable proposal for a
site that involves solar or
wind turbines then the
Aldermen will be behind it, so
there is not a need for as-of-
right zoning for solar or wind
energy conversion systems.
Wilson remarked that "The
building department jumped
all over [City Solar] and was 3D rendering of an aerial view of City Solar from the
like, hey, whatever you need northwest (proposed visitor center not shown).
to happen, whatever we need to do to get it done, let's get it done." The biggest issue was
landscaping-that is, what types of shrubbery and what types of trees? The city requires less
landscaping inside of an industrial park than elsewhere. The applicable ordinance only covered
what was outside of the fence. The Alderman was interested in landscaping inside the fence
where it is protected and can protect the solar panels from vandalism. The community requested
the berm, in part, for security reasons. During the project, a couple of the solar panels were
vandalized with rocks.
A lot of pride was expressed by residents at the Victory Heights/Maple Park Advisory
Council meeting on March 24, 2010. In the words of one long-time resident, the WIRA "used to
look pitiful." 26 1 Prior to the completion of the project, some properties had burned-out buildings
and cars. There were organized illegal operations to scavenge building materials from the
abandoned buildings. The scavengers would cut-off the locks put on the entry gates by the city
and replace them with their own locks. As an indication of how unsafe the area had become at
one time, Dave Graham used to worry about finding a dead body on one of the sites in the
260 Thomas S. O'Neill, "Chicago's Day in the Sun: Building the Nation's Largest Urban Power Plant," Exelon Corp.,
http://www.exeloncorp.com/assets/newsroom/speeches/docs/pres_ONeillAltEnergySymposium.pdf.
261 Victory Heights/Maple Park Advisory Council Meeting. West Pullman Library, 830 West 11 9 th Street, Chicago,
Illinois. March 24, 2010
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WIRA. 262 This project is turning a contaminated brownfield site that had been vacant for
decades into one that will pay rent, payroll taxes, and property taxes to the City. Exelon agreed
to pay $110,000 in annual rent to lease the land.263 SunPower plans to use the facility to develop
training and apprentice programs to train technicians for future solar projects.
Conclusion
The City Solar project shows that the complexity and uncertainty of brownfield sites can
be overcome by proper planning facilitated by close cooperation and information sharing
between stakeholders. Arcadis and the construction team demonstrated a high level of
professionalism in managing the remediation of the site concurrent with construction of the solar
power plant handling new environmental issues as they arose. The solar plant installation led to
the disruption of engineered barriers and that could have resulted in a serious conflict with IEPA.
However, their experience, professionalism, and careful documentation enabled them to quickly
address IEPA's concerns quickly and keep the project moving forward.
Over the previous decade, the city had implemented a number of measures that created
suitable conditions for the City Solar project. Under the city's brownfield program the city
acquired and assembled properties, and conducted building demolition and site remediation
activities. Navistar also contributed by taking responsibility for the FWPW site and actively
pursuing appropriate remediation. As part of the redevelopment plan for WIRA the city made a
number of infrastructure improvements. As an industrial planned management district the area
was maintained for industry and the zoning permitted a solar photovoltaic power plant as an as-
of-right use. Thus, an exceptionally large area was available with suitable conditions when
Exelon and SunPower approached the city in search of a site for their project
The project converted a blighted and dangerous property into one with a productive
power plant that is generating revenue for the city through the land lease and real estate taxes.
The project generated construction jobs and will continue to produce community benefits
through solar energy training programs and improved community image. Because it is also a
clean energy demonstration project with support of the White House, the project received strong
262 Dave Graham. Interview. March 24, 2010
263 Christopher Martin, "Exelon, Sunpower Win Chicago Vote for 10-Megawatt Solar Plant," Bloomberg, July 29,
2009.
107
political support from the time the concept was announced. This political support motivated the
stakeholder cooperation necessary to meet the deadline for stimulus fund eligibility.
The project supports the arguments for locating renewable energy on brownfields. The
solar power plant took advantage of onsite infrastructure and its construction was eased by
excellent road access. It was built on a very complex site with limited development potential.
The site is remarkable for being built in a heavily populated area in close proximity to a large
residential neighborhood and elementary school. Ultimately, the community was highly
supportive of developing renewable energy generation on this brownfield site.
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Chapter 5: Cross-Case Comparative Analysis
Introduction
The Brockton Brightfield, Steel Winds, and City Solar projects differ in a variety of
ways, including technology, project size, ownership structure, financing strategy, and state and
local policy context. Each project faced unique challenges in addition to the common brownfield
development challenges of cleanup costs, managing liability and uncertainty, navigating complex
bureaucratic processes and coordinating multiple stakeholders. This chapter compares how each
project overcame these common barriers. It also explores the unique challenges overcome by
each project and draws lessons and policy implications from those experiences. This cross-case
analysis reveals the importance of close cooperation among stakeholders and strong political
support from state and local officials in completing these projects. Strategies for reducing
cleanup costs, managing uncertainty, and properly phasing project development are suggested.
These three cases illustrate different steps local governments can take to encourage renewable
energy development on brownfields. The cases demonstrate the practical validity of arguments
for siting solar and wind farms on contaminated lands. They benefited from existing onsite
infrastructure and industrial zoning. Communities are supportive of renewable energy
production on these sites, just as proponents of siting renewable energy facilities on
contaminated lands argued they would be. The communities in which these projects were built
believe that such projects improve the local image. This image boost is highly valued by local
officials and residents.
Ownership Models
The table on the next page summarizes the comparison of the three successful projects.
Note that they are all structured under different ownership models: two variations of public
private and one fully private. In the case of the Brockton Brightifeld the solar power plant is
publically owned by the City of Brockton but the land is leased from a private company, Bay
State Gas. Steel Winds is privately owned and located on private land leased from Tecumseh
Redevelopment Inc, while City Solar is privately owned by one company, operated by a second
company, and on sited land leased from the City of Chicago.
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Table 5.1 Project Comparisons
Project Name Brockton Brightfield Steel Winds I and II Exelon City Solar
Location Brockton, MA Lackawanna NY Chicago, IL
Capacity Size 435 kW/ (27 acres total, 10 suitable 20 MW, 15MW (30 acre BF from
(Land Area) for PV 1100 acre RCRA property) 10 MW (39 acres)
Cost $3.037 million Approximately $40 Million for each $63 Million
Private company owns and operates Utility subsidiary owns plant, third
City owns solar plant, leases land plant, leases land from private land party developer/operator, City owns
Ownership from private owner owner land
Steel Winds I completed in 2007,
Year Completed 2006 Steel Winds II 2010 expected 2010
Time to Develop 6 years 4 years 1.5 years
Lackawanna receives $I100K/yr
PILOT for Steel Winds I,
Fixed price renewable energy for Lackawanna and Hamburg will $1 1K/yr lease, property taxes,
city, returned brownfield to receive $1OK/MW/yr for Steel Winds created 150 construction jobs, solar
productive use, improved site II, improved city image, positive training programs for K through
aesthetics, image benefits, outside attention, improved site College, improved site aesthetics,
Public benefits educational resource. aesthetics. tourist arsraction
Navistar and the City of Chicago,
Tecumseh for RCRA site, BQ Energy U.S. EPA Supplemental
Cleanup Paid By Bay State Gas where they built Environmental Project
MTC grants over $IrM, U.S. DOE ARRA DOE Loan Guarantees
$.8MI $1.6 bond, MA Green Power NY BCP tax credits $6 million, local $50M(pending?), ARRA bonus
Public Financial Partnership, other grants for pre- property tax exemption, PTC, MACRS, ITC (MACRS+ITC=50%
Support/Incentives development work, MA RPS/RECs MACRS, NY RPS/RECs Cash returns) Illinois RPS/SRECs
State law limited bonding
authority, did not authorize Carve brownfield out of RCRA, Extremely complex site - approx 40
municipality to own operate power ongoing remediation and industrial EBs, multiple parties responsible
Unique Challenges plant, Article 97 activity onsite for cleanup
These different models have pros and cons from a public benefits perspective. If the
power plant is publically owned tax payers will capture a larger direct benefit from the energy
production. The city can save money by producing its own electricity for use in public buildings
and hedging against volatility in electricity markets. It can also generate revenue by marketing
the associated RECs if state policy allows. In Brockton the long term contract with Constellation
New Energy provided the City with a source of fixed price electricity. However, the project had
very high transaction costs. It took six years to develop and an extraordinary commitment of
time and energy by the mayor and project coordinator. It was only possible because of an
exceptional fundraising campaign and substantial political support throughout state government.
Many local governments are not able to dedicate the time and resources necessary to make such
a project a reality.
Large-scale renewable energy facilities are complex development projects that require
specialized knowledge and expertise, expertise that local governments typically lack. Private
developers have greater financial flexibility and can take advantage of tax credits for renewable
energy investments that local government cannot. In short, with the exception of publically
owned utilities, local governments are ill suited to developing large-scale renewable energy
projects.
The public land/private power plant developer is an appealing model. It offers
government the opportunity to participate in and encourage renewable energy development
within the bounds of typical governmental operations. Leasing publically owned land to a
private developer produces revenue through lease payments and through property taxes, unless
property taxes have been waved as an incentive. This model captures more revenue than a fully
private development model with much less administrative burden for local government than the
public ownership model.
When the land and power plant are privately owned, as with Steel Winds, the local
government will receive revenue only through property taxes or PILOTs, but not as a direct
result of electricity and REC sales.264 This model does not create any unusual administrative
burdens for local officials. Rather it fits within the normal functions of municipal government in
terms of approving site plans, providing zoning approval, granting building permits, etc.
264 This does not have to be case. Minnesota's offers an example of a production based PILOT system in which the
revenue to the local government is a per kWh payment. This is discussed in more detail in the section on
recommendations for state action.
Working with private property owners to attract private renewable energy development to
brownfields may be an effective approach for local governments to take because it takes full
advantage of the financial flexibility and specialized expertise of the private sector.
Overcoming Common Challenges to Brownfield Redevelopment
Cleanup Costs
The projects differed in the level of cleanup costs they faced and how these were
overcome when they posed a challenge. Cleanup costs were not a challenge for the City of
Brockton in developing the Brockton Brightfield. Bay State Gas had completed the majority of
remediation before the city approached it in regards to developing a brightfield. The City of
Chicago used several strategies for handling cleanup costs. One was to manage as much material
on site as possible to minimize the expense of transportation and disposal. The Chicago
groundwater ordinance reduces costs by eliminating the need for expensive groundwater
remediation. Remediating the site to industrial standards using risk assessment, engineered
barriers and deed restrictions minimized costs. Funding for cleanup came from several sources.
The EPA funded approximately $950,000 of cleanup on the International Harvester site through
a Supplemental Environmental Project established in 1998. The City and Navistar executed a
cost sharing agreement for remediation of that site. Annual rent payments from Exelon to the
City of Chicago will cover approximately $200,000 in additional remediation performed in
preparation for power plant construction.
Of the three case studies, Steel Winds offers the most exciting strategy for minimizing
costs on difficult sites, which is to develop less polluted sites first by carving such parcels out of
the property. BQ Energy was able to minimize its costs in this way. BQ Energy worked with
Tecumseh to separate a moderately polluted parcel from the rest of the property for purposes of
taking advantage of the state's BCP. This allowed BQ Energy to build on a site that required
minimal remediation while gaining access to liability protection and to tax credits that composed
a significant amount of project financing. Steel Winds is significant as a revenue producing
operation that coexists with continuing site remediation. The property owner is receiving
revenue through rent payments and has developed a productive use on part of the property with
limited development potential for geotechnical reasons. It will be a number of years before
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larger development takes place on the Lackawanna Works site. Steel Winds is a sign of progress
that will endure during the long redevelopment process of the entire site. With property owner
cooperation, renewable energy developers can use "carving-out" as a strategy to reduce cleanup
costs for brownfield projects. This strategy facilitates phased development on difficult sites as
less polluted sites are developed first creating operations that will produce revenue during
ongoing remediation. Property owners may view them as interim uses during long-term
remediation that can be replaced by more lucrative commercial or residential development
should the real estate market strengthen in the future.
If a state VPC uses risk-based or tiered cleanup standards then choosing renewable
energy as a reuse will reduce cleanup costs. Such uses lead to minimal human exposure as site
access is restricted to construction and maintenance personnel. Photovoltaics can be built on top
of a site with little or no disturbance of engineered barriers or contaminated soils. Eliminating
the need for excavation reduces cleanup costs by avoiding the need to treat and dispose of
contaminated soils.
Liability and Risk Management
All three projects completed the VCP in their respective state. These programs provide
some measure of liability protection in the form of No Further Remediation or No Further Action
(NFA) letters or Certificates of Completion. These documents release the responsible party from
liability to the state. They assure the applicant that the state government will not attempt to force
them to perform further site remediation in the future as long as the applicant adheres to the
stipulations of the remedial action and site management plans including long term maintenance
of site controls. The sale of Lot 55 from the City of Brockton back to Bay State Gas eliminated
the City's liability exposure and increased Bay State's control of the site increasing the
company's ability to manage their liability.
The situation is more complex in the case of Solar City. The city has some liability
exposure as the owner of Areas 10 and 11. While the City owns Area 12 Navistar remains the
liable party and is pursuing a no NFR from IEPA through the SRP. Exelon will implement
institutional controls to manage its liability. Upon completion of the solar power plant the site
will be well controlled. The solar modules will be protected by a fence and security personnel.
Site access will generally be restricted to operations and maintenance personnel with limited
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access granted to students in SunPower's training programs and other individuals Exelon or
SunPower choose to allow on the site. The primary public access point will be the observation
tower.
BQ Energy obtained a Certificate of Completion through the New York BCP which
releases it from liability to the State for further remediation provided it adheres to the SMP.
Certificates of Completion and NFR are transferred with property ownership or control. The
ability to obtain the Certificate of Completion facilitated the development of Steel Winds I. The
inability of Steel Winds II to receive a Certificate of Completion has complicated lease negations
and hindered its progress. The parties have attempted to manage their liability through legal
language in the lease agreement.
Stakeholder Cooperation is Essentialfor Success.
All three projects demonstrate an impressive level of cooperation among stakeholders.
They all represent genuine partnership in which all parties are working together and committed
to the project's success. The Brockton Brightfield benefited from the full cooperation and
support of Bay State Gas, which assigned its environmental consultant to work with Spire Corp
to conduct the technical feasibility study. Bay State Gas also paid for landscaping improvements
that were essential to gaining community support. Ribeiro and Mayor Yunits worked closely
with staff at the MTC to craft a successful unsolicited grant proposal that was essential the
projects financial viability. They also worked with other stakeholders to build substantial
political support throughout state government.
In the case of Steel Winds, BQ Energy worked closely with Tecumseh's environmental
and engineering consultants, Benchmark and Turnkey, to meet the EPA's requirements to release
the Steel Winds site from the RCRA consent order on the BSC Lackawanna Works property.
They also worked together to admit the site into the state's BCP. The effort to release the site
from the EPA's jurisdiction benefited from the support of the Buffalo area's federal
representatives and the cooperation of EPA and NYSDEC. Benchmark worked with BQ Energy
on the layout of the turbines and integration and modification of the electrical infrastructure. The
development team, the City of Lackawanna, Erie County, the Town of Hamburg, and NYSDEC
all cooperated to complete the SEQR process, which proceeded in record time.
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The Solar City project offers an impressive example of how cooperation can help to
manage the uncertainty of working on a brownfield site. It demonstrates that the efficient
management of the site complexities presented by brownfields is possible with appropriate
planning and information sharing. Navistar cooperated fully by directing its environmental
consultant to share all relevant site plans and environmental documentation with the construction
team of Exelon, SunPower, and Turner. The extensive and careful documentation by ARCADIS
and the construction team allowed the project to proceed smoothly on a very complex site with
approximately 40 engineered barriers. Armed with this information and working closely,
ARCADIS and the construction team effectively worked through surprises they encountered
during site preparation. For example the construction team worked with ARCADIS to perform
additional remedial activities during site preparation and to remedy site disturbances that resulted
from power plant installation. The Mayor's Office, Alderman Austin, the Departments of
Environment, Community Development, Buildings, and Zoning and Land Use Planning, all
worked with Exelon and SunPower to move this project forward quickly.
The Importance of Political Support
All three projects benefited from overwhelming political support extending from the
community up to level of federal government. The projects converted blighted properties into
pollution free, revenue generating facilities.. Perhaps more importantly they improve the image
of communities associated with industrial decay and contamination. As highly visible symbols
of progress, modernization, and a commitment to renewable energy, the communities hope the
projects will spur development of a larger renewable energy industry with associated local
manufacturing. For these reasons local officials were supportive and took seriously their
responsibility to build broader public support. In all three cases they were able to do this.
Political and public support made possible the cooperation between public and private
stakeholders discussed in the previous section.
A driver of political support is the image benefits these projects are expected to bring.
The Brockton Brighfield was part of a larger rebranding project of the city as "solar champions"
seeking to market the city as committed to solar energy in order to attract a solar manufacture.
As early as the late 1990s a wind demonstration project on the Buffalo waterfront was seen as a
way to catalyze sustainable development and recast the areas image. Multiple stakeholders in
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Steel Winds cited the value of image improvement provided by the project. Eagan said the
positive impact on the areas image is worth more than the PILOT. Stakeholders there also hoped
that it would attract a manufacture of wind turbine or photovoltaic components. A number of
parties have since contacted Tecumseh with proposals for renewable and conventional energy
projects. Mayor Polanski stated that the project put Lackawanna on the map. Value placed on
image is further demonstrated by the logos on the wind turbines. Local officials expect City
Solar to be a tourist attraction. It is a signature demonstration project that the city hopes will
spur further solar development and growth in the local clean energy industry.
The City of Brockton built political support from the ground up. Solar energy
development had political support before Ribeiro became aware of DOE's Brightfield program.
Ribeiro's work was made possible because through the support of Mayor Yunits. With the
Mayor's support, she brought Spire Corp to Brockton and reached out to Bay State Gas. Early
success at wining grants to develop the concept and earning support in the neighborhood earned
the backing of the MTC's Director, Bob Pratt. Pratt committed to work with the project team to
convince the MTC Board to fund an unsolicited grant request. The Mayor expended
significantly political capital building support among state agencies. He was assisted by the
President of Bay State Gas, the local chamber of commerce, Bob Pratt and other stakeholders.
Strong support in state government lead to the eventual passage of two acts of special legislation
making the project possible. The project team was also assisted by Senators Kerry and Kennedy,
and Congressman Stephens Lynch in lobbying for federal funds.
The case of City Solar is quite different. Exelon and SunPower had the support of the
Obama Administration prior to approaching the City of Chicago. After gaining the support of
the Mayor's Office they met with Dave Graham in CDOE. Here political support expanded top
down from the federal government, to the city government, which then garnered public support
in the community. This support led to full cooperation from multiple departments of city
government, which was necessary for the project to be completed in the short time required to
remain eligible for federal stimulus funds.
In the case of Steel Winds there were a number of actors building support for wind
energy before the project materialized. Thus the support was their when BQ Energy proposed
Steel Winds. Before this the County and the State, through NYSERDA, were interested in wind
energy development on the Lackawanna Works site. Green Gold Development and the Wind
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Action Group had also been working to build public support for wind energy in the area since
2001. The developer began organizing the stakeholders in 2003, two years before announcing
the project.
Steel Winds I is an urban wind farm that used the largest turbines on the market at the
time. Yet, from the start it received overwhelming support from the residents of Lackawanna.
This is quite remarkable for a utility-scale wind project. Public support came more slowly in
Hamburg, most likely due to the residents' earlier experience with the faulty wind turbine at the
sewerage treatment plant. After several months of deliberation the Town came out in support
enacting a progressive wind ordinance. These findings strongly suggest that political support for
large-scale renewable energy projects, particularly wind, is easier to obtain when the site is a
brownfield.
Lessons for Local Governments
Before Steel Winds was proposed Erie County joined with NYSERDA to perform a wind
resource study. The study demonstrated that the Erie County Shoreline had significant wind
resources serving to attract the attention of wind power developers. Mapping solar and wind
resources at brownfield sites is a useful action local governments can take to promote related
development. The quality of the renewable resource is one of the most important factors for
determining whether a renewable energy project will be successful at a site.
The County, the City of Lackawanna, and Tecumseh Redevelopment signed a
memorandum of understanding for redevelopment of the BSC Lackawanna Works site that
included wind energy in the master plan. BQ Energy was already in negotiations with
Tecumseh regarding the development of Steel Winds. Although tentative, the MOU was an
important early endorsement of renewable energy development on the site.
Chicago acquired and assembled parcels, improved infrastructure and maintained the
area, all to make the site more attractive to developers. They also pursued responsible parties to
pay for the cleanup, began the remediation process, and entered sites in the state's VCP. When
Exelon and SunPower expressed interest in developing a project in the Chicago area the City had
an appropriate site prepared for them. Had the developers approached the City a few years
earlier the site would not have been ready for development. Alternatively, had redevelopment
activities in WIRA been more successful the sites may have been developed for other uses.
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Given the complexity of the site in terms of the number and variety of engineered barriers, the
latter scenario was unlikely.
It is notable that the industrial zoning in WIRA allowed for solar power plants as-of-
right. The Department of Planning and Zoning determined the solar power plant was a Minor
Utility and Service. It is unclear how explicit the as-of-right status is in the ordinance. Did the
department make this determination because of the political support for the project or are solar
power plants or photovoltaic arrays explicitly listed in the ordinance as a Minor Utility and
Service? For a municipality interested in attracting renewable energy development to brownfield
sites it would be better to explicitly allow for renewable energy technologies in the zoning
ordinance and providing detailed parameters of what is and is not permissible. Potential
developers will be encouraged to invest if uncertainty is reduced by spelling out what is
permitted.
As previously described, except for municipal utilities, local public agencies do not have
the appropriate skill set for developing large-scale renewable energy projects. However, the
experience of the Brockton Brightfield offers one critical lesson for City's that want to pursue
their own brownfield to renewable energy project. Before committing time and resources to
developing a project proposal and performing technical and financial feasibility analysis, local
officials should first conduct a legal analysis to make sure they have legal authority to own,
operate, finance and develop a renewable power plant. They should also explore whether their
bonding authority allows for the long-term financing needed for renewable energy to be cost
effective. If local officials determine there are no obvious legal barriers they can proceed by
locating a site with limited development potential (capped landfills for example) supporting
electrical and transportation infrastructure, and high quality solar or wind resources. Once a site
is located they can begin more detailed technical and financial feasibility studies and fundraising
efforts.
Findings
Successfully completing renewable energy development on brownfields requires strong
public support in the local community and the active support of state, local, and even federal
officials throughout the life of a project. Political support is a necessary ingredient to sustain the
level of cooperation required by these projects. Close cooperation, clear communication of
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expectations, and free sharing of information is necessary to overcome the complexity,
uncertainty, and risks of redeveloping brownfield properties. These projects require a true
partnership between local officials, regulators, property owners, and developers.
Both brownfields redevelopment and renewable energy development are complex
undertakings on their own. It is therefore reasonable to ask if using brownfields exacerbates the
complexity of renewable energy development. The answer is yes and no. The installation of the
wind towers or solar panels is likely to be complicated by the presence of engineered barriers or
other brownfield site constraints. At the same time, its installation is facilitated by onsite
infrastructure. For instance, the presence of electrical infrastructure allows for easy
interconnection and avoids the complicated process of laying new transmission that rural sites
may involve.
Judging by the experience of Steel Winds, the use of brownfield sites also simplifies the
environmental review process. Renewable energy projects, particularly wind farms may require
environmental impact statements. The use of industrial sites can reduce the scope of the
environmental review and thus the speed of the permitting process as such sites typically have
less wildlife and require the removal of less vegetation than undeveloped land more commonly
targeted for wind farms. Industrial areas are also less likely to contain potential archeological
sites
Nothing in this study suggests that locating a project on a brownfield denies renewable
energy developers financing sources they typically leverage. The Steel Winds case shows that
environmental liability is a concern for financiers. However, it suggests that such concerns can
be effectively addressed by the indemnification provided by a state VCP. According to Paul
Curran, it was not difficult for BQ Energy to obtain a development loan for Steel Winds 1.265
The renewable energy industry is less vulnerable to the financing difficulties brownfields can
create because tax equity typically comprises a significant portion of project financing.
Brownfield status does not affect the eligibility for the tax credits that drive renewable energy
development.
There is a growing pool of sophisticated wind and solar power companies that are willing
to take on brownfields redevelopment. These developers are experienced in assembling
corporate financing, marketing RECs and developing power-purchase agreements in diverse
265 Paul Curran. Telephone Interview. April 2, 2010
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settings. All levels of government should mobilize to implement policies that harness their
expertise to remediate contaminated sites and expand renewable energy production.
Recommendations
Local Actions
In many ways renewable energy projects are similar to other development projects and
thus could be served by traditional brownfield redevelopment programs such as the ones
reviewed in Chapter 1. Local government interested in promoting large-scale renewable
development should incorporate this interest into their comprehensive plan. The first step is to
inventory sites and characterize their potential for renewable energy development. Sites that are
suitable candidates are ones in weak real estate markets with few competing uses and that have
high-power transmission lines and electric substations. My findings suggest that industrial sites
that are considered "eyesores" are great candidates for wind turbines or photovoltaics because
the visual impacts are likely to be perceived as positive rather than negative. Sites that have
ongoing remediation needs or other site controls that limit development options should also be
prioritized for renewable energy. The quality of the wind or solar resource is probably the most
important factor in determining if a site is well suited to renewable energy production. Thus
evaluating these resources should be incorporated in to the larger inventory process. After
identifying areas well suited to renewable energy development the comprehensive plan should be
updated to indicate those areas targeted for renewable energy.
The municipality should also modify its zoning code to explicitly allow for wind turbines,
photovoltaics, or other energy facilities. A well designed ordinance that sets clear parameters on
what is allowed where and that establishes standard procedures, guidelines, and timelines for
approving renewable energy facilities can be very helpful in attracting renewable energy
developers. The permitting process can create uncertainty and time delays for developers, so the
more a municipality can reduce these delays and uncertainty the more attractive it will be to
developers. Another use of zoning power that would support renewable energy development
would be the establishment of solar or wind access laws or easements restricting construction on
adjacent parcels to guarantee access to the resource for the parcel targeted for energy
development. The ability of local governments to do this will vary depending on state law.
120
Depending on state law, local governments may pursue a Generic Environment Impact
Statement (GEIS) to streamline wind project permitting in the future. New York State allows
local governments to do this. Municipalities pursuing wind energy development should prepare
a GEIS for wind energy development as part of its comprehensive plan. The GEIS would
identify mitigation measures to be implemented through zoning standards, thereby eliminating
the need for state environmental quality review studies for individual proposed wind projects and
streamlining the review process for future developers. 266
Multiple properties with good wind or solar resources could be assembled and marketed
for the development of a renewable energy farm. If well suited parcels are noncontiguous, the
City could lease them all to a single developer to promote economies of scale (this may work
better for solar than wind.) The energy needs of the surrounding properties, or other potential
industries for the site should be evaluated to determine opportunities for behind the meter sales.
As part of the inventorying process the City should explore the possibility for phased-
development. Large heavily contaminated sites may offer the potential to use a portion of the
site for renewable energy. Thus the site inventory would include details about the location and
extent of contamination on different parts of the site. The phased-development strategy would
promote the option to develop renewable energy facilities on less polluted sites first by carving
them out from the larger site. Depending on the state's VCP, it may be possible to separate a
less polluted brownfield site from a larger Superfund or RCRA site in order to qualify for the
VCP and associated incentives. The Steel Winds project demonstrates how beneficial this can
be.
State Actions
States should modify their VCPs, if necessary, to facilitate the division of potentially
contaminated sites into smaller brownfield parcels so that less polluted properties can complete
the VCP and be redeveloped more quickly. In general, New York's BCP offers a good model
for a VCP because it provides substantial tax credits that adequately compensate for the
increased administrative burdens of participating in the program. The liability release provided
by the program is also an effective driver for development.
266 A.W.S. Truewind L.L.C., "Wind Energy Toolkit," (Albany, NY: New York State Energy Research and
Development Authority, 2009).
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States should amend their zoning enabling legislation where necessary to encourage
brownfield-to-renewable energy projects. New Jersey offers an example of action that can be
taken at the state level. In March 2009 New Jersey enacted state legislation (A.B. 2550) that
amended the Municipal Land Use Law (P.L.1975, c.91) permitting facilities using solar energy
technologies, photovoltaics, and wind energy systems for electricity production as permitted uses
in an industrial-zoned parcel or parcels of 20 contiguous acres or more, provided the parcel or
parcels are owned by the same person or entity. The law applies universally to all municipalities
in the state.267
Property tax exemptions for renewable energy projects can be effective incentives for
such development. However, as seen in Steel Wind, when such policies encourage
supplementing lost tax revenue with PILOTs they can cause conflicts and delay projects. States
with policies similar to New York's that allow local governments to opt-out of tax exemptions
should standardize PILOT payments. The standard could go as far as establishing a set sum per
megawatt and requiring that it be divided among the taxing authorities in the same proportion as
property taxes. Another option would be to set the share schedule but still allow the local
government to negotiate the sum with the developer, which would alleviate at least some of the
contentiousness between taxing authorities. Minnesota provides an example of an alternative
PILOT system. The state has a production based system with four tiers, large-scale, medium-
scale, small and systems under 250 kW. Utility-scale projects, defined as those of 12 MW or
greater pay .12 cents per kWh, systems between 2 and 12 MW pay .036 cents per kWh, systems
between 250 kW and 2 MW pay .012 cents per KW, and those under 250 kW pay nothing.268
The drawback of a production system is revenue will vary annually as electricity production
fluctuates. A fixed-sum system is preferable for budgeting purposes.
Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have Renewable Portfolio Standards.
An increasing number of states have special carve-outs or credit multipliers for preferred
technologies. Solar technology is the most common example. 269 State RPS can likewise be
267Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, "New Jersey Solar and Wind Permitting Laws,"
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?IncentiveCode=NJ17R&re=1 &ee=1.268 A.W.S. Truewind L.L.C., "Wind Energy Toolkit."
269Ryan Wiser and Galen Barbose, "Renewables Portfolio Standards in the United States: A Status Report with
Data through 2007," (Berkeley, CA: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 2008).
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modified to either mandate renewable energy development on previously developed land, or
provide a credit multiplier for such development.
Federal Actions
The EPA should develop a standard protocol for releasing portions of sites subject to
EPA enforcement actions and consent orders from the larger property. The EPA has worked
with many states to develop MOUs endorsing state VCPs. The EPA can work with state
environmental agencies to modify, or develop new MOUs to facilitate the carve-out option.
The federal government provides critical tax subsidies to for solar and wind energy
projects. The ITC is an important financial driver for solar projects, and the PTC is likewise
critical to the viability of the wind energy industry. Offering a higher deduction under these
current tax credit programs for projects on brownfield sites could provide a strong incentive. For
example, the ITC provides a credit for 30% of project costs for solar projects. This could be
raised to 35% if the site is completing a VCP or other remediation program. The PTC offers a
2.1 cent/kWh benefit-this could be slightly higher for brownfield projects.
Robert Colangelo, Executive Director of the National Brownfields Association says
there really are not any incentives for developing on a brownfield. There are programs that try
and level the playing field, but from the developer's perspective it always easier and cheaper to
develop a parcel of undeveloped land. Renewable energy is a great fit with brownfields because
commercial RE projects require low-cost land to compensate for the expensive upfront capital
investment needed to construct the plant. According to Colangelo, low-cost loans or loan
guarantees for brownfields development would be very helpful.2 7 0 The DOE could prioritize
Loan Guarantees for brownfield sites.
270 Robert Colangelo, Phone Interview by Author. March 31, 2010.
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Conclusion
In many ways renewable energy projects are similar to other real estate developments.
Parties pursuing renewable energy projects on brownfields confront the same challenges faced
by anyone attempting to redevelop a brownfield. The two most significant challenges are clean-
up costs and legal liability. There are other important barriers. Redevelopment of brownfields
requires participation in lengthy and complicated administrative processes. As a result of being
abandoned, poor record keeping on the part of previous owners, complicated chains of title, and
other factors, brownfields present a greater level of uncertainty than other properties. However,
passive solar and wind energy installation are unique in that they can co-exist with ongoing
remediation.
The three projects studied here demonstrate that developing large-scale renewable energy
projects on complex contaminated brownfields can not only be viable business projects but
provide multiple community benefits. One important benefit is an improvement in community
image. In all three cases the sites had been derelict for a decade or more and were associated
with pollution and community decline. The projects not only improve the aesthetics of the site
but bring a non-polluting industry to communities that have historically had a concentration of
dirty industries. Other benefits include tax revenue or payments in lieu of taxes, educational
opportunities, tourism opportunities, and increased development interest in the surrounding area.
Brownfields may offer one solution to the siting difficulties faced by for energy
production facilities, particularly large-scale wind turbines. In all three cases studies the project
received overwhelming support from the community. This indicates that community acceptance
for large scale renewable energy development, particularly solar and wind power, is greater on
brownfield sites than greenfield sites. This seems reasonable for several reasons. People
generally do not find derelict industrial sites attractive. Such sites are perceived as unsafe and
polluted, which they often are. They also represent neighborhood decline. The establishment of
clean productive facilities on these sites represents the possibility of neighborhood renewal.
Furthermore, because the areas are already industrial the installation of solar panels or wind
turbines does not spoil a "natural" area or ruin a scenic view. Landscaping improvements
accompany two out of the three developments explored here and were important for gaining
support.
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The cases also demonstrate that the arguments for siting renewable energy facilities on
brownfields have practical validity. The existing infrastructure on these sites, particularly
electricity transmission infrastructure, is valuable and facilitates renewable energy development.
In the case of Steel Winds, the developers were able to avoid constructing a new substation by
purchasing one on site. Although modifications were necessary, the reuse of the substation still
resulted in significant savings for the developer. Transportation infrastructure is also important.
The presence of well serviced roads and multimodal transportation infrastructure, including rail
and shipping, facilitates construction.
These projects do not realize the full potential of incorporating renewable energy
facilities into brownfields redevelopment. There is potential to utilize the electricity produced by
such installations to provide power to adjacent communities. Low-cost behind the meter power
could also be used to attract businesses. There is potential to utilize brownfield for renewable
energy development under a community-wide distributed generation strategy. It appears that
this potential is not yet being realized.
While renewable energy projects face the same challenges as any brownfields
redevelopment, they differ in at least one important aspect. Passive renewable energy projects
like wind farms and solar farms differ provide an option for a revenue producing operation that
can coexist with continuing remediation activities. Carving-out less polluted parcels from large
properties for phased development is strategy that has great potential expand renewable energy
development on brownfields and provide property owners revenue that can facilitate complete
remediation.
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